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The in stitu tion  of the Prim e M inister in France rem ains rem arkably 
understud ied . There are m any personalised  accounts of the  w ork of 
in d iv id u a l P rim e M inisters and  the ir re la tions w ith  P residen ts and 
governm ent m inisters, however, there has been no rigorous a ttem pt to 
analyse the Prime M inister's overall influence in the governm ental decision 
m aking process. The aim of this thesis is to provide a systematic analysis of 
the Prim e M inister's influence over the policy m aking process from 1981- 
1991. The first chapter examines the existing literature on the core executive 
in France and identifies six models of core executive operations. U nder each 
of these m odels the Prime M inister's influence over the decision m aking 
process can be seen to differ. In order to determ ine the validity of these 
different models, eight public policy decisions are then examined and the role 
played by the Prime Minister in the preparation of each of them  is identified. 
From this study, it will be argued that the Prime M inister's influence in the 
policy process was dependent upon his position in relation to three types of 
con stra in ts : q u asi-p erm an en t in s titu tio n a l co n stra in ts , con junctu ra l 
constraints and m omentary constraints. In the final chapter the six models of 
core executive operations will be reconsidered. It will be argued that, instead 
of there being a single m odel which accounts for the Prim e M inister's 
influence over policy making, it is possible to m ove from one m odel to 
another. Each move being caused by a change in his relations with the three 
types of constraints identified previously.
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M odels of Core Executive Operations in France
The institu tion  of the Prim e M inister stands at the heart of the core 
executive^ in France. As a result, it has been the object of a considerable 
am ount of m edia, academic and public attention. Indeed, there are countless 
studies w hich deal either directly with the role of the Prim e M inister in 
France, or which, more frequently, refer rather more tangentially to the office. 
In the main, however, these studies are academically unrew arding. In fact, 
the nature  and influence of the Prim e M inister's influence in the policy 
process is remarkably poorly documented.
In France, core executive studies tend to be of two types. The first type 
are journalistic studies and are particularly num erous. N aturally  the Prime 
M inister is the focus of a great deal of attention in the national and weekly 
press. Such m edia scrutiny of the Prime M inister's role, however, tends to be 
highly personalised, anecdotal and lacking in analytical rigour. This situation 
is hardly surprising as the expectations and the constraints w ithin which the 
press operates are not conducive to any other sort of study.
Academic accounts, which form  the second type, also tend  to be 
d isappo in ting ly  incom plete. A m ongst these accounts there  is a well 
developed juridical lite ra tu re  based on the Prim e M inister's place in 
constitutional and adm inistrative law. This literature, how ever, naturally  
tends to underestim ate the political climate w ithin which the Prime Minister 
operates. Of the rest, there are only a small handful of studies which focus 
upon the Prime Minister directly.2 W hilst these studies are no doubt useful, 
they are also out of date and in the main concentrate on the Prime Minister's 
adm inistrative resources, rather than his influence in the policy process. The 
rem aining academic accounts refer to the Prim e M inister only indirectly, 
usually in the context of presidential studies.
There are three main reasons as to w hy rigorous studies of the French 
Prim e M inister's influence rem ain underdeveloped. The first is due to the 
political suprem acy of the President for m uch of the  Fifth Republic. Both 
journalistic and academic accounts will naturally focus their attention upon 
the perceived centre of pow er in the country. In the French case this attention 
has led to presidential studies since 1958. The result has been that prim e 
m inisterial studies have been seen to be of only secondary importance. It is 
also the case that, since the 1962 constitutional reform which instituted the 
direct election of the President, French politics has become m ore personality 
orientated. Individuals are judged on their capacity to hold the top office. This 
situation has served to personalise both  the journalistic and  academ ic 
literature. Emphasis, therefore, has been placed upon the individual strengths 
and weaknesses of the President and his m ain rival, the Prim e M inister, 
rather than  on an analytical appreciation of their influence in the policy 
process.
The second reason for the lack of prim e ministerial studies is due to 
the high level of secrecy which surrounds the workings of the core executive. 
Secrecy is clearly not a problem confined to France and similar problems have 
ham pered work on the core executive in, for example, the UK and Ireland.^ 
In France, all government documents are classified as secret and do not reach 
the public dom ain until years after the event. Moreover, even w hen minutes 
of past Conseil des m inistres, or committee meetings do appear, there is no 
procès-verbal from which a full picture of the governm ental debate could be 
reconstructed. Instead, there is only a general résum é of the m eetings' 
conclusions. Such secrecy fosters the im pressionistic, anecdotal accounts 
which characterise journalistic studies of the core executive. These anecdotes
are fascinating precisely because of the high level of secrecy and they have the 
advantage for the journalist that they are hard to contradict.
The th ird  reason is because of the norm ative elem ent upon which 
m any studies are based. W hilst in the UK this norm ative element is largely 
confined to  the belief in some quarters tha t there ought to be cabinet 
government, in France the doctrinal aspect is m uch stronger. Mainly because 
of the institutional shortcomings of the Third and Fourth French Republics, 
the debate surrounding the organisational structure of the Fifth Republic has 
been particularly doctrinaire. This debate has typically centred around, on the 
one hand, the notion supported  by the gaullists that there ought to be 
presidential governm ent and, on the other, the com m unist (and previously 
socialist) belief that there ought to be parliam entary  governm ent. Much 
academic and journalistic w riting is either consciously or subconsciously 
im bued w ith these norm ative elements, once again, to the detrim ent of 
analytical work on the nature of the core executive.
Therefore, neither the role of the French Prim e Minister in the policy 
process nor the workings of the French core executive as a whole has been 
the subject of a great deal of systematic research. The core executive in its 
entireity remains the 'black box' which translates policy inputs into outputs, 
bu t in a mysterious and unidentified way. The aim of this thesis is to examine 
one element w ithin the 'black box', the institution of the Prime Minister. By 
examining the nature and extent of his influence in the policy process, it is 
hoped both to fill a gap in the existing literature and to suggest some ways 
forward in the classification of core executives generally.
To this end, the first task is to outline the state of core executive studies 
in France to date and, in particular, prime ministerial studies. As was stated
earlier, even if the French Prime Minister has been the prim ary subject of 
only a few studies, his role has been discussed tangentially on countless other 
occasions. From the existing literature it is possible to identify six distinct 
m odels of core executive operations in each of which the Prime Minister is 
said to play a particular role. These m odels can be classed as, presidential 
governm ent; segm ented decision m aking; executive co-operation; prim e 
m inisterial government; ministerial governm ent; and the French variant of 
the bureaucratic co-ordination model. Each of these different variants will 
now be examined in turn.
M odels of Core Executive Operations in  France
Presidential governm ent
The existence of presidential government in France has always been based on 
the perceived practice of core executive operations. Présidentialisation began 
in the Fifth Republic under de Gaulle. It was then consolidated and even 
extended under Pom pidou and Giscard d'Estaing. Moreover, fears or hopes 
that the system would change under M itterrand proved to be prem ature. On 
num erous occasions policy leadership was as presidentialist under M itterrand 
as under his predecessors. The belief that there has been presidential 
governm ent is supported not only by journalists and academics, but also by 
the public. In public opinion polls, outside of the period of cohabitation, the 
President was regularly seen to be the one who controlled public policy in the 
country.^
In France, the phrase 'presidential government^ does not have the 
m eaning that it has in the United States. It is no t used to describe the
situation w here the President is at the head of an executive which cannot be 
dism issed by Congress. In fact, France can technically be classed as a semi- 
presidential régime.5 That is to say, a régime where there is a President with a 
certain set of constitutional powers who is elected by universal suffrage and 
cannot be dism issed by Parliament and where there is a Prime Minister who 
also has certain pow ers who leads a governm ent w hich is responsible to 
Parliam ent.
In France the phrase 'presidential governm ent' could be defined as 'the 
exertion of m onocratic au thority  by the P r e s id e n t 'T h a t  is to say, the 
President takes the responsibility upon himself to initiate policy. He decides 
the content of public policy. He also fulfils the role of statesm an that is 
characteristic of heads of state in most other countries. In the execution of the 
first tw o functions at least, the President seem ingly goes beyond a literal 
reading of his constitutional powers.
N o w h ere  in  the C onstitu tion  is the  P resid en t ascribed  any 
responsibility for policy making in normal times. He does have the right to 
appoint the Prim e Minister, but not the power to dismiss him. He negotiates 
treaties and is the commander-in-chief of the arm ed forces, but these powers 
are hardly the basis from which constitutionally he w ould have the right to 
govern the country. The President only seems to have a constitutional right 
to intervene in the policy process in exceptional circumstances. This is the 
case for the em ergency powers that he can assum e for a lim ited period 
according to Article 16.
Nevertheless, in practice the President has had  a major role in policy 
initiation. H is influence w as particu larly  apparen t du ring  the Giscard 
presidency w hen the President w ould issue 'lettres directives' to his Prime
M inister a t six m onthly intervals in which he outlined the tim etable of 
governm ent legislation in the period to come. M itterrand held good to this 
practice too for a time, even if the directives w ere m ore vague and the 
governm ental involvem ent in  their elaboration m ore noticeable.
Presidents have also regularly  intervened in the details of policy 
m aking. Individual Presidents have each been seen to have had  their own 
particular policy interests. Pom pidou, for example, personally oversaw  the 
decentralisation reforms during his period as President. M itterrand has paid 
m ore than  close attention to m atters architectural. This exercise of policy 
leadership, however, has gone far beyond sectors in  which Presidents have 
had a personal interest. They have intervened in all areas of policy in the 
m inutest of details. One measure of this has been the increase in  the num ber 
of conseils, policy elaboration meetings chaired by the President, during the 
course of the Fifth Republic. This increase was particularly noticeable during 
the Giscard presidency, yet was also m arked under de G aulle as well.^ 
M oreover, Presidents used their influence over appointm ents to ensure that 
'fidèles' w ere placed in key positions in the adm inistration a t the head of 
in te rm in isteria l co-ord inating  structures. These included  defence and 
m ilitary  institu tions. In this w ay the President colonised the  different 
components of the core executive.
So great has been the perceived extent of presidential governm ent that 
a whole range of convenient epithets have been conjured up  to characterise 
his position in the system. For some he is a king at the head of "la. monarchie 
républicaine".® He is said to exhibit "regal"^ characteristics at the head of a 
country over which it is said that he "règne et gouverne à la fois"^®. Giscard 
d'Estaing was called a "Prince-Président" and one w ho belonged to the ancien
8régime at that: 'l a  France est gouvernée par un  souverain élu, un  monarque
républicain, presque un  despote é c la i r é " ^ F o r  others he is not so m uch a
king as an emperor. As Suleiman as noted:
If the term  Im perial presidency' can be applied w ith any degree of 
validity, one m ight choose to apply it to the President of France rather 
than to his counterpart in the United States.^2
The apotheosis of the presidency under M itterrand has led to him  being
addressed  as 'D ieu' at least in popular parlance. W hatever the preferred
epithet m ay be, the im plication is the same, nam ely, tha t the President
controls public policy. As Duhamel has noted:
Les Français ne le savent guère: leur Président de la République est, de 
très loin, le chef de l'exécutif le plus puissant de l'Occident, celui qui 
dispose les pouvoirs les plus étendus au sein de son système politique 
na tional ... son influence, une fois élu , dev ien t litté ra lem en t
hégém onique.
In essence, the President is seen as the "chef réel du  gouvernement"
If the President has been classified in a num ber of different ways, then 
so too has the Prim e M inister. He has been variously  described as the 
P residen t's "chef d ' é t a t - m a j o r " ^ 5 ^  "l'hom m e lige du  Chef de l ' E t a t " a n  
"executive a s s i s t a n t " and the President's effective "directeur de c a b i n e t " ^ 8 .  
The role of the Prime Minister as implied in these phrases is twofold. Firstly, 
the Prim e M inister shows absolute loyalty to the President. Secondly, the 
Prim e M inister has no pow ers of policy initiation him self and only the 
slightest powers of decision taking. Instead, he faithfully executes decisions 
which have previously been taken by the President. He has the task of co­
ordinating the governm ent's activity, but the governm ent’s activity will be 
decided by the President.
U nder this situation the Prime M inister's personal set of advisers, his
cabinet, do not serve as a power base for the Prime Minister. Instead they too
are faithful executors of the presidential line. In policy preparation meetings
they kow-tow to presidential advisers. It m ust also be noted that under
presidential governm ent the Prime M inister only rem ains in office for as
long as the President thinks it propitious. The President reserves the right to
sack the Prim e M inister at a m om ent's notice. M oreover, Prim e M inisters
recognise this, completely unconstitutional, right of the President to dismiss
them. Debré's situation applies equally to other Prime Ministers:
The prim e m inister knew that his tenure of office depended entirely 
on his president's pleasure, since he himself could not make any claim 
to leadership  of a parliam entary  m ajority except as de G aulle 's 
spokesman and a s s i s t a n t . ^ 9
Subsequent Prime M inisters have reiterated their dual responsibility before
both the President and Parliament.
W hilst the notion of presidential governm ent w as derived  from
observed practice, there has also been a norm ative element involved as well.
Much of the ruling political élite backed by public opinion felt strongly that
such leadership was a good thing for the country. Others to be found in the
political opposition felt equally strongly that it was bad. The former argued
that the hum iliation suffered in 1940 and then the subsequent institutional
failure of the Fourth Republic was due to the lack of executive leadership.
Order was not brought out of chaos. The presidentialism  of the Fifth Republic
supposedly allowed order to reign.
This positive view of presidentialism  was espoused by de Gaulle and
his followers. In so far as gaullism was ever a coherent set of ideas, the role of
the President as the incarnation of the nation and of the Prime Minister as his
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loyal servant were part of such a set of ideas. De Gaulle first expressed this 
belief in his Bayeux speech in 1946. H is role in draw ing  up  the Fifth 
Republic's constitution in 1958 and his decision to assum e the presidency 
gave him  the opportun ity  to p u t his ideas in to  practice. The ultim ate 
expression of de Gaulle's theory of presidentialism  came during a 1964 press 
conference:
Mais, s'il doit être évidem m ent entendu que l'autorité  indivisible de 
l'Etat est confiée tout entière au Président par le peuple qui l'a  élu, qu'il 
n 'en  existe aucune autre, ni m inistérielle, ni civile, ni m ilitaire, ni 
judiciaire, qui ne soit conférée et m aintenue par lui, enfin qu 'il lui 
appartient d 'ajuster le domaine suprêm e qui lui est propre avec ceux 
dont il attribue la gestion à d ’autres ...20
Such was the force of the general's ideas and such was the zeal w ith which he
practised those ideas from 1958 to 1969 that both the doctrine and the practice
of presidential governm ent became firm ly entrenched am ongst the Fifth
Republic's most hallowed principles.
On the other hand, there were those w ho held a negative view  of
presidentialism . The m ost outspoken of these figures in the 1960s was
M itterrand whose book. Le Coup d'Etat Permanent, was the m ost eloquent
expression of this. M itterrand argued that the exercise of presidential power
had cut the democratic link between the policy m akers and the public. This
link could only be restored if the Prime M inister w as in  charge of policy
preparation and if the Parliament were more fully involved in this process.
Since M itterrand 's own election and his assum ption of the presidentialist
m antle the critique of this form of leadership has been confined to the
com m unists:
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La concentration m onarchique du  pouvoir entre les m ains d 'u n  seul 
hom m e a été conçu pour accroître l'em prise du  grand capital sur toute 
la vie du  pays et des gens.21
W hilst, therefore, the doctrinal aspect has dim inished over the years it still
complicates the debate over the présidentialisation of the régime.
For m any academ ic com m entators presidential governm ent was a
m atter of observable reality. In their study of the Fifth Republic under de
G aulle, W illiam s and H arrison could only conclude that there w as "no
dyarchy at the top "22 . Moreover, de Gaulle's successors have all been seen to
continue w ith  the presiden tia list tradition. M assot has quoted  Giscard
d'Estaing as saying: "Mon interprétation est l'interprétation présidentialiste de
nos in s t itu t io n s " ^ ^ . Even M itterrand well into his second term  in office has
been said to be following in de Gaulle's footsteps: "Sa boulimie de pouvoir n 'a
plus de limites. La monarchie absolue est bel et bien instaurée"24.
Segm ented decision m aking
As w ith  the previous approach, the segm ented decision m aking m odel is 
derived from observations as to how the régime operates. Here, responsibility 
for policy making and for the control of the services of the central state is not 
held by a single individual, be it the President or the Prime Minister, rather it 
is divided sectorally between the two. Each has his own particular sphere of 
com petence and there is little interaction betw een the two. As M aus has 
noted: "En réalité , il existe un  savant partage  de com pétence et de 
responsabilité entre le Président et le gouvemement"25. The identification of 
such a distribution of responsibilities dates back to the early years of de 
Gaulle's presidency and has been a constant feature of the Republic ever since.
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There are  tw o variants of this m odel, the trad itional dom ain and  the 
President's extended domain.
L The traditional dom ain
The first presentation of the segmented decion m aking m odel was given by 
Chaban-Delmas to the gaullist party congress at Bordeaux on 17th November 
1959. Chaban-Delmas identified a presidential policy m aking sector and a 
governm ental one. The governmental sector comprised those areas in which 
the President chose not to intervene. The President's areas conformed to what 
W illiams and Harrison have described as "noble politics"26. Chaban-Delmas 
stated:
Le secteur présidentiel comprend l'A lgérie, sans oublier le Sahara, la 
C om m unauté franco-africaine, les Affaires étrangères, la Défense 
nationale. Le secteur ouvert se rapporte  au reste. Dans le prem ier 
secteur le Gouvernement exécute, dans le second il conçoit.27
The areas under the President's control w ere know n collectively as his
'domaine réservé". In the areas w hich Chaban-D elm as iden tified  the
President was wholly and individually reponsible for policy making. The role
of the Prim e M inister and  M inisters therein  w as sim ply to carry out
presidential decisions faithfully. Thus, Debré w as publicly faithful to de
Gaulle's Algerian policy despite his personal opposition to it and Foreign and
Defence M inisters, such as Couve de M urville and M essmer, w ere loyal
presidential acolytes. If necessary, the President could rely on their support in
order to push  through an unpopular policy in these areas. In addition, de
G aulle ensu red  tha t he controlled the adm inistrative structures which
coord inated  policy. So, he chaired the conseil de défense and  in 1962
stream lined its secretariat (the Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale,
SGDN) placing a loyal general at the head of the new organisation.
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O utside of these areas, in the sphere of w hat W illiams and Harrison
called "conunon politics"28, the Prime M inister was particularly influential.
N ot only did the initiative for policy making in these other areas lie, by and
large, w ith the Prim e M inister, bu t he w as also responsible for decision
making as well. Maus described this situation with regard to Debré:
Dès 1959, le général de Gaulle laisse M. Michel Debré donner les 
impulsions nécessaires pour toutes les matières qui ne relèvent pas de 
l'Algérie, de l'Etat ou des Affaires étrangères.29
In practice this m eant that the Prime M inister was largely responsible for all
aspects of domestic policy making. As Cohen described:
Le Prem ier m inistre, quant à lui, joue un  rôle m arginal dans la 
définition de la politique étrangère et m ilitaire, alors que dans les 
dom aines économiques et sociaux il est en prem ière ligne ... pesant 
d 'un  poids considérable.^
The 1961 Education Act, for example, was called the Loi Debré. So, the Prime
M inister was free of the President's 'tutelle' and he enjoyed considerable
freedom  of action vis-à-vis his M inisters w ho rarely questioned the Prime
M inister's authority to decide. In non-presidential areas the Prim e Minister
also controlled governm ental services, such as the Planning Com missariat
and DATAR, the regional planning body.
The domaine réservé continued after de Gaulle's departure and it has
become an abiding feature of core executive operations throughout the Fifth
Republic. D uring the recent Gulf W ar, for example, relations betw een the
President and the Prime Minister were said to follow this schema. Here, the
President was responsible for deciding all substantive policy m atters with
regard to the crisis:
Toutes les grandes orientations, tant diplom atiques que militaires, ont 
été arrêtées à l'Elysée et seulement à l'Elysée.^l
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The Prime Minister, by contrast, was responsible for ensuring the efficient
execution of those decisions:
A lui ap p a rtie n t... la charge de gérer les conséquences économiques et 
sociales de  la crise. De lu i au ssi d ép en d  la coo rd ina tion  
interm inistérielle de la m ise en oeuvre des décisions concernant le 
G olfe ... C 'e s t enfin  au  P rem ier m in istre  q u 'il  a p p a rtien t, 
conform ém ent à la C onstitu tion , d 'a ssu re r  la  lia ison  avec le 
Parlement.32
Once again, therefore, the M itterrand presidency can be seen to be a 
continuation of the traditional practices of the régime, rather than a break 
with the past.
The m otivation behind this division of responsibility betw een the 
President and Prim e M inister is twofold. Firstly, the Presiden t's staff is 
relatively small and he does not have enough tim e to oversee any additional 
policy areas. Secondly, there is the constitutional aspect. Article 15 states that 
the President is the commander-in-chief of the arm ed forces; Article 52 says 
that he negotiates and ratifies treaties; Article 5 declares that he is "le garant 
de l'indépendance nationale, de l'intégrité du  territoire, du  respect des accords 
de C om m unauté et des traités"; Article 16 states th a t he m ay assum e 
emergency powers for himself in times of national crisis. Thus, it appears that 
the President does have the right to intervene in a limited set of policy areas.
IL The President's extended domain.
Over the years, although the notion of a p residential reserved dom ain 
remained plausible, the policy sectors in this dom ain have changed. With the 
end of the Algerian conflict and the decline in the salience of the French 
Community, these two areas no longer figured among the President's policy
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sectors. Instead, W right has argued that there are now  five components to the 
President's reserved domain. These components are: the traditional domain, 
less Algerian policy; economic, financial and industrial m atters; social and 
environm ental issues; questions which suddenly appeared on the political 
agenda because they were politically delicate or explosive (crises); and matters 
which attracted presidential attention for purely personal reasons.33
Economic policy and financial policy has been a part of the President's 
reserved dom ain since the end of the Algerian conflict in 1962. At that time 
de Gaulle felt able to intervene more broadly in the affairs of government. 
Economic independence was seen by him and subsequent Presidents as being 
as of equal importance as territorial independence. Thus, it became part of the 
reserved domain. So, for example, de Gaulle took the decision not to devalue 
the franc in 1967, while M itterrand decided not to devalue in May 1981.
Presidents have also seen European Com m unity (EC) policy to be of 
such national and international importance that they have felt it necessary to 
oversee the country 's policy tow ards it personally. For example, de Gaulle 
vetoed Britain's entry to the EEC in 1961, w hile Pom pidou reversed this 
decision in 1971. In 1986, M itterrand also placed one of his closest advisers, 
Elisabeth Guigou, at the head of the perm anent interm inisterial secretariat 
which coordinates the French response to EC policy initiatives (the SGCI). 
This appointm ent was judiciously timed as it came just before the period of 
cohabitation. It was a sign that EC policy was an area that the President was 
unwilling to see directed by the Prime Minister alone.
Presidential intervention has also traditionally been seen during times 
of crisis. Crises are threats to the stability of the state  and, as such, the 
President as constitutional guarantor of state continuity  is naturally  led
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tow ards dealing w ith such problem s w hen they arise. After an initial 
hesitation, therefore, de Gaulle dealt w ith the governm ent's response to the 
events of May 1968.
The m otivation behind the other two sectors that W right identified is 
m ore personal. W right argues that Giscard was particularly sensible to social 
and environm ental questions and that M itterrand has followed his lead. In 
addition, all Presidents have had certain areas in which they have personally 
been interested. For example, Pom pidou intervened in broadcasting policy. 
M itterrand has been keen to take decisions in the areas of culture and 
television policy.
This version of the segm ented decision m aking m odel has been
prom oted by various observers. For example, Massot has noted that:
Sous Georges Pompidou, on a noté que le 'dom aine réservé' du  chef de 
l'E tat débordait largem ent les questions de défense et de relations 
extérieures pour s’étendre au développem ent industriel, aux questions 
de réforme du  système éducatif, aux grands équipem ents urbains et, 
surtout, à l'ORTF. Comme si le général s 'é ta it jam ais in terd it de 
contrôler de très près les décisions prises dans ces matières!^^
M oreover, G aborit and  M ounier have argued  th a t the notion  of the
traditional reserved dom ain is outdated and that presidential interventions
have occured over a much wider range of areas. They have stated:
It would be more accurate to say that the president has at his disposal a 
pow er of strategic intervention which allows him  to take up  any 
governmental m atter which seems to him  to require a decision at the 
presidential l e v e l . ^ 5
Thus, the notion of the segm ented decision m aking m odel in France is
synonymous w ith the concept of limited presidential government.
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Executive co-operation
The executive co-operation model is derived from both constitutional theory
and  practice. According to this account, neither the President nor the Prime
M inister is in a position to dom inate the policy process, nor is there a clear
division of responsibilities between the two institutions. Instead, in all policy
areas responsibility for policy m aking is shared. In this sense the two
institutions co-operate together in the formulation of policy.
The Constitution was devised so as to force even unwilling Presidents
and Prime Ministers to work together. Duhamel has described this situation: 
presidential and prime ministerial powers are inextricably intertwined. 
The Prime Minister m ust countersign the President's ordinary acts, and 
those few that are especially exempted never concern, except for Art. 
16's emergency powers, matters of public policy dedsions.^^
The Prime Minister proposes the names of fu ture governm ent M inisters to
the President. The President chairs meetings of the Conseil des ministres and
in this way is inescapably associated w ith the governm ent's policies. The
President's countersignature is needed for m ost prim e ministerial decisions
of any im port while the reverse is true for presidential actions. Even in the
cases w here the Prim e M inister's approval is not form ally necessary, the
dissolution of the Assemblée nationale, for example, the President is obliged
to consult him.
In add ition  to these explicitly  constitu tional requ irem ents, the 
President and Prime Minister will be obliged to co-operate with each other on 
m any other occasions. A good example of this cooperation is the conseil de 
défense, the perm anent standing committee which form ulates defence policy 
and supervises its execution. W hilst the President is commander-in-chief of 
the arm ed forces and while he chairs the conseils de défense, the Prim e
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M inister is form ally and closely im plicated in the elaboration of defence
policy within these meetings. The official decree dated 7.1.59 states:
[le Prem ier m inistre] exerce la direction générale e t la direction 
m ilitaire de la défense. A ce titre, il form ule les directives générales 
pour les négociations concernant la défense et suit le développem ent 
de ces négociations. H décide de la préparation  et de la conduite 
supérieure des opérations et assure la co-ordination de l'activité en 
matière de défense de l'ensemble des départem ents ministériels.^^
Prim e m inisterial involvem ent, according to this view , how ever, goes
beyond simply the adm inistrative preparation and execution of presidential
decisions. The Prime Minister is present at the conseils, he intervenes in the
debate  and  his contribution to the form ulation  of defence policy is
considerable. Similarly, the responsibility for appointm ents is shared between
the tw o institutions. Moreover, the interm inisterial coordinating structures,
such as the SGCI and the SGDN, will report to both the President and the
Prime Minister.
Saves has a rgued  th a t such co-operation  on ly  exists a t the
adm inistrative level and that in practice the President is the dom inant
political figure. He has stated:
Quelle a été la portée pratique de ce dualisme? H semblerait qu'il ait été 
bien plus administratif que politique.38
How ever, Debbasch has argued that the adm inistrative co-operation is
reinforced by the high degree of practical co-operation:
En définitive, on est am ené à conclure tou t naturellem ent que ce 
bicéphalisme à la tête de l'exécutif se traduit par un  partage de pouvoir 
de décision qui n 'a  pas d 'équivalent aux Etats-Unis. Le partage de 
pouvoir en France a été inscrit dans la Constitution. H s'est également 
trad u it dans la p ra tique  par la création  d 'u n  certain  nom bre
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d 'in s titu tio n s  d 'a rb itrage  ... 25 conseils in term inistériels o n t été 
organisés en moyenne chaque année par le chef de l'Etat.39
Thus, for exam ple, the Secrétariat général du  gouvernem ent (SGG), one of
the Prim e M inister's services, is obliged to collaborate w ith the Secrétariat
général de  l'E lysée in the elaboration of the agenda for the Conseil des
m inistres. M oreover, the P resident's advisers and  the Prim e M inister's
advisers will m eet along with ministerial representatives in the vast array of
policy preparation  meetings which are needed to prepare any governm ent
bill.
The preparation  of the annual Finance bill is one area in which the
Prim e M inister's  influence is particu larly  strong. Dreyfus and  d 'A rcy,
how ever, have argued that the President is bound to be brought into the
elaboration of the bill by the very nature of the policy process itself:
Le poids d 'u n  m inistre peu t peser dans les décisions. D 'autre  part, 
certains ministres peuvent entretenir des relations privilégiées avec le 
Président de la République et faire contrepoids au pouvoir du  Premier 
m inistre. La collaboration entre le Président de la République et le 
Prem ier m inistre s'impose.^O
Thus, on occasions the Prime Minister will be faced by a powerful coalition of
Ministers and the President against his policies. On other occasions, however,
the Prim e M inister m ay be able to ally w ith the President against senior
M inisters. Similarly, at other times, the Prime M inister and M inisters may
find them selves in agreem ent against the President. The outcom e of these
situations will depend upon the prevailing political climate, bu t in all of
them  there has to be co-operation between the different components of the
core executive and particularly between the President and the Prime Minister
as the two senior arbitrating instances.
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A ccording to  its p roponen ts , th is executive co-operation  has 
characterised the operations of the Fifth Republic to date. It has been argued 
that, even under the supposed présidentialisation of the régime after 1958, co­
operation was the order of the day. One of de Gaulle's closest advisers has
argued that during Debré's premiership:
il n 'y  a pas de dyarchie à la tête de l'Etat. En d'autres termes, il n 'y  a pas 
partage de compétence entre le Président de la République et le Premier 
m inistre, chacun cam pant dans son cham p clos, m ais exercise en 
commun de pouvoir .41
M oreover, even during the m ost presidentialised period of the Republic,
under Giscard d 'Estaing, the Prim e M inister was closely involved in all
aspects of policy. One of the m ost famous examples of présidentialisation
were the lettres directives that Giscard sent to his Prime Ministers. Debbasch,
however, has argued that even these letters should be seen as an example of
collaboration and not domination:
Q uand on examine comment est élaborée cette lettre, on s'aperçoit 
qu’elle reflète globalement les aspirations du  Prem ier m inistre (ou de 
ses propres services), puisque 80 pour cent des projets sont inscrits à sa
demande.42
Debbasch himself was one of G iscard's closest advisers and it is noticeable 
how  those involved in the process have tended  to em phasise this co­
operation, whereas those observers outside have caricatured the system as 
being presidentialised.
Thus, the nature  of the French sem i-presidential system  and  the 
po litical env ironm en t th a t it p roduces n a tu ra lly  en ta ils  executive 
cooperation. President and Prime Minister are forced to collaborate precisely 
because they are rivals and because they are senior political figures. This 
situation is as true for the nomination of the Prime M inister as it is for the
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conduct of policy preparation after his appointm ent. Debbasch has noted 
elsewhere that:
L 'environnem ent politique joue, tou t d 'ab o rd , lors d u  choix du  
Prem ier ministre. Le problèm e m ajeur pour le chef de l'E tat est de 
choisir un  Prem ier m inistre qui dépend  to talem ent de  lui. Or, le 
Président de la République n 'a  pas un  pouvoir total de choix du  chef du 
gouvernement. Cette observation est particulièrem ent exacte au début 
d 'un  septennat.43
Even after the Prime M inister's appointm ent the tw o will w ork together, 
because if they did not then the system would break down, or at least it would 
find itself becalm ed in the doldrum s. It is in the interest of both actors to 
avoid this scenario as it is unlikely to be rew arded at a future presidential 
election. When the strains between the two protagonists become too great and 
co-operation is no longer possible, then the Prime M inister usually leaves. 
This is the escape valve that relieves the political pressure.
Duham el has proposed a law  w hereby the P resident's first prim e 
ministerial appointm ent is bound to be m otivated by political reasons (the 
political environment), while his second appointm ent, once the strains of co­
operation have seen the departure of the first, w ill be a technocrat. Co­
operation will be possible w ith the second w here it was no longer possible 
w ith the first. This law is said to have held good for Pom pidou's appointment 
and then his replacem ent by Couve de M urville once the form er himself 
became a political figure. It also held good for the replacem ent of Chaban- 
Delmas by Messmer; Chirac by Barre; and M auroy by Fabius.^  The political 
sytem, therefore, imposes co-operation betw een the President and Prime 
Minister. W hen this is no longer possible a new  face is required w ho will 
allow normal service to be resumed.
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The strength of this approach lies in the w ay in which it places the core 
executive w ithin the w ider political system and the constraints of that system. 
O ther theories tend to view the President and Prime M inister as if the black 
box is hermetically sealed from the constraints that are imposed by the system 
in general. It also has the advantage of being espoused by former presidential 
and  prim e m inisterial collaborators. A ssum ing these analysts are not 
disingenuous, this can only strengthen the validity of the approach.
Prim e m inisterial governm ent
In the UK, the notion of prime ministerial governm ent was developed in the 
1950s and 1960s as a reaction to the perceived increase in prim e ministerial 
influence in the policy process and the consequent inadequacy of cabinet 
governm ent theories to explain contem porary core executive operations. 
Therefore, British theories of prim e ministerial governm ent were based on 
the observed practice of executive institutional behaviour. By contrast, in 
France the prim e ministerial governm ent view was originally to be found 
not in observed practice, but in juridical accounts of core executive behaviour. 
Such accounts w ere derived  from  stud ies of constitu tional law  and 
adm inistrative law. How ever, this situation changed w ith  the arrival of 
cohabitation in 1986 when the Prime M inister became the chief policy maker 
in the country.
Prime m inisterial governm ent has been defined as "the exertion of 
m onocratic authority  by the p r e m i e r " 4 5  and as w here the Prim e Minister 
exhibits a "personal predominance in decision making". In theory, the French 
constitu tion  seem s unam biguously  to  p rov ide  for a system  of prim e 
m inisterial government. Article 20 states that: "le Gouvernem ent détermine
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et conduit la politique de la Nation", whilst Article 21 states that: "le Premier 
M inistre dirige l'action du Gouvernement". The Prim e Minister, therefore, is 
constitutionally placed at the head of a governm ent which is responsible for 
policy making in the country.
In addition, the Prime M inister's constitutional powers are increased by 
the subordination of the Parliament to government. As a direct result of the 
perceived parliam entary excesses of the Third and Fourth Republics, the 
C o n stitu tio n  of the  Fifth R epublic de libera te ly  set o u t to  control 
parliam entary  influence in the policy process. For exam ple, the areas in 
which Parliam ent is competent to legislate are designated. O utside of these 
areas the Prime Minister has the power to issue decrees which have the force 
of law. The governm ent controls the parliam entary timetable. Deputies and 
senators are restricted  in the am endm ents th a t they can propose and 
Parliam ent's capacity to bring dow n a governm ent is severely lim ited in 
com parison to previous régim es. The resu lt of all these m easures was 
constitu tionally  to reinforce the Prim e M inister's position as head  of 
governm ent.
The only other source of presidential authority  to intervene in the 
policy process is the highly ambiguous Article 5 which states: "H assure par 
son arbitrage le fonctionnem ent régulier des pouvoirs publics ainsi que la 
continuité de l'Etat. H est le garant de l'indépendance nationale, de l'intégrité 
du  territoire, du  respect des accords de Com m unauté et des traités". At no 
point, therefore, in the Constitution is the President given any explicit 
responsibility or co-responsibility for day-to-day policy making. There is no
overt constitutional legitim ation of p residential leadership . Instead this
joeloAgs
behoves to the Prime Minister.
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However, in practice, as was described above, for reasons historical,
political and conjunctural, the President has been seen to be the de facto head
of governm ent and has exerted policy leadership. As a result, the literature
which has emphasised the role of the Prime Minister has tended to be that
which has been divorced from the realities of the political situation and
which has concentrated on a literal reading of the Constitution. A prim e
example of this was Lascombe:
Le Premier ministre peut, en réalité, être autre chose que le 'second' du 
Président de la République. Il dispose pour cela, dans la Constitution, 
d 'élém ents de prem ière importance qui lui perm ettent, s'il le veut, de 
tenir un rôle prim ordial dans la politique nationale. L 'analyse que 
nous venons de m ener de l'article 49 alinéa 3 m ontre à l'évidence que 
le Prem ier m inistre, m aître absolu de la procédure législative, peut 
facilement lutter contre un Président recalcitrant ...46
It is difficult to imagine an analysis which took less account of the political
constraints preventing the Prime Minister from assum ing policy leadership
for himself.
Similar accounts which ignored political realities were particularly 
prevalent in 1985-86. The reason for this was the spectre of cohabitation 
which hung over the political system and which threatened to denude the 
President of his previously dom inant role. A good example of the juridical 
view  of prim e m inisterial influence came at th is tim e w ith  the debate 
surrounding the issue of whether or not the President had the right to refuse 
to sign a governm ental ordinance. Such ordinances are enabling bills by 
w hich Parliam ent, in a single vote, allows the governm ent (the Prim e 
M inister) to legislate  across a range of issues w ith o u t subsequent 
parliam entary deliberation.
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In the run  up  to and the im m ediate period  follow ing the 1986 
legislative elections a series of articles appeared in w hich the President's 
obligation to sign or his righ t to refuse w ere publicly  debated.47 The 
consequences for prim e m inisterial leadership during  cohabitation were not 
lost on the participants in this debate. The assertion of the du ty  to sign was 
often a covert call for the Prime Minister to be allowed to play as full a role as 
possible in the policy process and sometimes came from  figures identified 
w ith Chirac, or the right in general. The assertion that the President had the 
right to refuse came from those hoping to avoid presidential effacement and 
cam e from  people som e of w hom  w ere personally  iden tified  am ong 
M itterrand's supporters. In fact the debate was purely academic. M itterrand's 
eventual refusal to sign the privatisation ordinance w as arrived at through 
an appreciation of the political expediency of the action, rather than from an 
analysis of his constitutional right.48
In fact, however, the period of cohabitation d id  see the exercise of 
prim e ministerial government. For the first tim e in the history of the Fifth 
Republic to date the President was faced with a parliam entary majority which 
was hostile to him  and which supported the Prime Minister. As a result, the 
Prime Minister was able to exercise political leadership in the country. He 
assumed control of the policy process and m ade full use of the wide range of 
constitutional prerogatives which were provided for him. He allied with 
governm ent Ministers against the President so that the latter was unable to 
in tervene  in  policy preparation . Chirac increased  the adm inistrative  
resources of his office by creating a seven strong diplom atic cell w ithin his 
cabinet. Moreover, he utilised the resources of the perm anent administration 
to pursue his policy goals. He also ensured that the secret services worked
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under his orders, rather than those of the President. This was seen most 
dearly  with the events in New Caledonia in 1988.^^
So, even if it is not possible, as it is in the British case, to distinguish 
betw een  m onocratic varian ts and  clique varian ts , the  experience of 
cohabitation being too short, the notion of prim e m inisterial governm ent is 
relevant to theories of core executive operations in France.
M inisterial governm ent
Dunleavy has described the notion of m inisterial governm ent as one in 
which the governm ent ''has rem ained a federation of departm ents, each of 
which jealously guards its own political and adm inistrative a u to n o m y " 5 0 . In 
this case, the Minister is the chief policy maker in hisXher particular area and, 
compared with the variants analysed previously, the role of the President and 
the Prime Minister is much reduced. Rigaud has argued that the presidendes 
of de Gaulle and Pompidou saw the golden age of ministerial government in 
the Fifth Republic.^^
In France there is little  collective C abinet au tho rity .52 The two 
institutions which could, in theory, serve as the basis of a system of Cabinet 
government are, in practice, peripheral to the policy process. The first of these 
institutions, the Conseil de Cabinet (meetings of the governm ent chaired by 
the Prime Minister in the absence of the President), used to m eet regularly 
under Debré's prem iership, bu t has met only rarely ever since. A short-lived 
attem pt by Fabius and Chirac to revive it was quickly abandoned. The second 
institution, the Conseil des ministres (meetings of the governm ent chaired by 
the President), is mentioned in the Constitution and meets weekly. However, 
meetings are short; there is little majority voting; M inisters rarely intervene
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outside of their portfolio areas; and substantive policy decisions are rarely 
taken. It ratifies policy decisions taken elsewhere.
In contrast to the situation of weak collective C abinet authority . 
Ministers are in a relatively strong position to influence policy in the areas for 
which they are responsible. This situation is partly the result of the country's 
Jacobin tradition and partly the legacy of the system which was introduced 
under Napoleon Bonaparte and extended after his demise. Ministers have the 
support of a cabinet. They also stand at the head of M inistries which are 
generally characterised by a strong central perm anent administration. These 
two organisations help the Minister to form ulate policy. In addition, some 
Ministers enjoy the support of a highly developed system of field services 
which play a major role in policy implementation. Other Ministries w ithout 
these services can rely on the support of departm ental Prefects to assist them 
in their w o r k .5 3
M inisters also enjoy certain legal powers. For example, they appoint
the departm ental directeurs d'administration, a lthough these appointm ents
have to be m ade in the Conseil des m inistres and need the approval of the
President and  Prim e M inister. N evertheless, C henot has argued  that,
although M inisters inherit a powerful perm anent adm inistration w hen they
come to office, w ith the help of their cabinet, a little experience and a few
judicious appointments, they are in control of their department:
le m inistre, quand il veut assum er ses responsabilités et s'engager 
personnellem ent par une décision adm inistrative, reste le m aître de 
son ministère.54
In addition. M inisters are rarely subject to parliam entary  scrutiny. For 
example, the Foreign Affairs M inistry is able to  prepare treaties w ithout
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parliam entary interference. Also, Ministers enjoy the right to make delegated 
legislation in areas agreed by Parliament. Thus, they can issue decrees which 
have the force of law. Whilst these decrees are scrutinised by the SGG and the 
Conseil d'Etat, Ministers generally control the content of the decree.
The potential for m inisterial governm ent in France has also been 
helped because of the political stability of the Fifth Republic, a t least w hen 
com pared w ith its Third and Fourth Republic counterparts. Governm ents 
have rem ained in power for longer in the Fifth Republic and some Ministers 
have been able to develop a certain expertise and authority by rem aining at 
the head of a M inistry for considerable periods of time. For example, apart 
from the two year gap during cohabitation, Lang has been Culture M inister 
since 1981, Bérégovoy has been Finance Minister since July 1984 and Dumas 
has been Foreign Affairs Minister since December 1984.
M oreover, although in any political system  M inisters use  their 
positions as stepping stones to higher office, the présidentialisation of the 
Fifth Republic has personalised politics to an even greater degree than is 
w itnessed elsewhere. M inisters use their tim e in office to forw ard  their 
personal careers so as to be seen as candidates for Prime Minister and even for 
the presidency. Therefore, they have to be seen to be active and successful. 
One m anifestation of this phenom enon is the scram ble for adm inistrative 
resources during the first few days of any new governm ent. For example, 
senior Ministers try to maximise the num ber of Junior M inisters (secrétaires 
d'Etat) who are attached to their departm ent. Similarly, M inisters battle for 
their departm ent's right to control various public organisations. Frèches has 
described this situation well a t the tim e of the  form ation of C hirac 's 
governm ent in 1 9 8 6 . 5 5  A nother m anifestation of this phenom enon is the
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alm ost obsessive m inisterial desire to p repare  legislation. According to 
Frèches, for M inisters, " 'changer la loi' est généralem ent leur cri de 
ra lliem ent" 56. Thus, M inisters become personally identified w ith  laws that 
they have draw n up. For example, Gaston Defferre and the decentralisation 
reforms in 1981 and Jean Auroux and the workers' participation laws in 1982.
The result of the strength that M inisters individually possess is that 
they control policy m aking in the area under their jurisdiction. Thus, for 
exam ple, the Interior M inistry is responsible for m atters of terrorism ; the 
Foreign Affairs M inistry determines the position of France in disarm am ent 
negotiations^^; and the Finance M inistry plays a major role in the annual 
preparation of the budget. Ministers control their ow n areas of competence, 
but are unable to influence decision making in other policy areas.
This situation leads to a com partm entalisation (cloisonnement) of the 
policy process. Ministers defend their own policy turfs.58 The result is one of 
conflict between departm ents as interests collide. Interm inisterial committee 
m eetings are the site of this conflict betw een different m inisterial interests. 
Ministries will only unite when they have a common interest to do so. Even 
then, they will be uniting against other M inistries or coalitions of Ministries 
w ith opposing interests.
This situation is typically the one in which the Prime Minister is called 
upon to arbitrate. The arbitration function is fundam ental to the role of the 
Prim e M inister under a system of m inisterial governm ent. The exercise of 
this function can be seen when administrative resources are being distributed. 
The Prime Minister will often decide the organisations over which Ministries 
have control. However, the Prime M inister's role is not necessarily always 
that of an arbiter. For example, s \h e  is personally responsible for certain
30
policy decisions e.g., the authorisation of telephone taps. Moreover, the Prime 
M inister prom otes the cause of the Secrétariats d'Etats w ho are attached to 
hisXher office. For example, Rocard oversaw three such Junior Ministries; the 
Plan; Environment; and H um anitarian Aid. The latter w as often in dispute 
w ith the Foreign Affairs Ministry and in such cases the Prim e M inister was 
unable to play the role of arbiter because s \h e  was seen to be implicated in the 
outcome of the conflict. On these occasions the President w as called upon to 
arbitrate.
The Prim e M inister’s arbitration function has also dim inished w ith 
the growth in the size of his cabinet. It now  num bers betw een 30 and 40 
people. There is a t least one cabinet m em ber fo r each  governm ent 
departm ents. Therefore, the majority of the Prim e M inister's advisers have 
lost their overview of governm ental policy. They have become m inisterial 
representatives w ithin the Prim e M inister's cabinet. They articulate the 
dem ands of the Ministry whose work they follow, rather than providing the 
P rim e M inister w ith  an a lte rn a tiv e  se t of po licy  op tions. T hus, 
interdepartm ental conflicts are simply m irrored w ithin the Prime M inister's 
cabinet itself. The Prime Minister is unable to play the role of arbiter and, 
once again, the President, with his smaller team of advisers, is called upon to 
decide.
Bureaucratic coordination model
In the literature on the French core executive there is little reference to a 
bureaucratic coordination approach as it has been identified  in Britain.59 
W hilst studies of the French bureaucracy are legion, they  are either 
sociological investigations of the higher adm inistration , or attem pts to
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construct a general élite theory of the state based on the peculiarities of the 
adm inistrative training system. Despite the paucity of the existing literature, 
it is possible to construct a bureaucratic coordination model for France.
The key elem ent of the bureaucratic coordination m odel is that the 
political elements of the core executive have little or no control over the 
content of policy decisions. Instead, policy choices are determ ined by the 
bureaucratic elements of the core executive. The result is that in France policy 
decisions are m ade by senior dv il servants in the perm anent administration 
and by members of ministerial cabinets. Thus, although the President, Prime 
Minister and senior Ministers seem to exercise control of the policy process, 
in fact they are only articulating inform ation processed beforehand by the 
higher administration. The political input in the policy process is small. The 
bureaucratic input into this process is great.
One of the key elements of the bureaucratic coordination model is the 
existence of a highly developed cabinet system  in France. The President, 
Prim e Minister and Ministers each have a set of personal advisers (cabinets) 
who, w hilst neither being perm anent, nor technically civil servants during 
their period of em ploym ent, play a key role in the preparation of public 
policy. Ministers have up  to ten advisers, whilst the presidential and prime 
ministerial teams may num ber up to fifty.60 Members of ministerial cabinets 
confine their activities to the affairs of their ow n departm ent. The cabinets of 
the President and Prime Minister are organised sectoÿally, w ith each adviser 
having a particular Ministry or set of Ministries to follow.
The fundam ental role of cabinet members is to provide their political 
m aster w ith substantive policy advice. Thus, they regulate the information 
which M inisters receive about policy. They also have the opportunity  to
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m ake policy decisions themselves. The first stage of the policy preparation 
process (réunion interministérielle) is staffed largely by cabinet m em bers 
alone. M em bers of the perm anent adm in istration  m ay be present, bu t 
Ministers are not. These meetings are the site of substantive policy decisions. 
A lthough these decisions are usually of a technical or juridical nature, they 
often determine the general orientation of legislation. Thus, cabinet members 
are well placed to determine the substance of governm ent policy. In this they 
are helped by their close relations with the perm anent adm inistration and by 
the traditionally powerful role enjoyed by the French bureaucracy.
The plausibility of the bureaucratic coordination model is increased by 
the natu re  of the French political culture. As described in the previous 
section, French political culture is state oriented.^l At the national level 
governm ent departm ents are divided up  into bureaux which are subdivided 
into divisions. The head of each bureau and division is a senior civil servant 
w ith expertise in and influence over hisXher particular domain. Thus, whilst 
in France there is not the tradition of powerful perm anent secretaries as there 
is in Britain, there are a host of senior adm inistrators w ho hold a vital 
position in the policy process. It is their responsibility , in liaison w ith 
members of their M inister's cabinet, to prepare legislation and to coordinate 
the im plem entation of policy once it has becom e law . Therefore, the 
influence of Ministers in the policy process is slight. They are not well placed 
to question the policy recommendations which are presented to them  by their 
cabinet members and by their departm ental d v il servants. The influence of 
the technocrats in the Finance Ministry is an example of this model at w ork .^ 2
The strength of this m odel is further enhanced by the plethora of 
interdepartm ental committees which play a crudal role in the policy process.
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In France there is no system of perm anent Cabinet committees as there is in 
Britain. Instead  there  is a h ighly  developed  system  of com m ittees, 
com m issions and secretariats each of w hich has the  task of the  in ter­
departm ental coordination of policy in a particular area such as European 
Com munity policy (SGCI), or defence policy (SGDN). In addition, there is the 
equivalent of the British Cabinet Office, the SGG, which provides secretarial 
assistance to the government and whose head is the Prime M inister's senior 
legal adviser. The expertise that these organisations have accrued and the 
central position they enjoy in the policy process m eans that m inisterial 
control of decision making is further reduced. This situation extends to the 
security services over whom politicians have little or no control.63
As in the British case, there are tw o variants of the bureaucratic 
coordination model. The first emphasises the relatively homogeneous nature 
of the French senior adm inistration.^  Top dv il servants tend to be the sons 
and daughters of senior adm inistrators. They come m ainly from the Paris 
area. They also share  a com m on educa tional background  w ith  a 
disproportionate num ber having studied at the Institut d 'E tudes Politiques in 
Paris, follow ed by the Ecole N ationale d 'A dm inistration , o r the  Ecole 
Polytechnique w ith a subsequent passage in  one of the prestigious grands 
corps. These characteristics create a hom ogeneity of views and a shared 
approach  to  problem  solving. M oreover, th is background creates the 
possibility of linkages betw een adm inistrators in governm ent departm ents 
and between the adm inistration and people of a similar background in the 
wider public and private sector.
The second variant stresses the im pact of the bureaucracy, bu t denies 
that it is hom ogeneous. M any senior adm in istrators do  not share this
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com m on background and of those that do there is com petition between 
them.65 Rivalries between departm ents are so great and competition between 
grands corps is so fierce that the administration does not articulate any single 
view. Instead, tem porary alliances will form between different Ministries and 
services in order to force through the policy that is in their common interest 
a t that time. On other occasions the same Ministries and  services m ay find 
them selves in conflict w ith each other w hen their interests diverge. The 
comm on aspect to both variants of this m odel is the absence of political 
control over the decision making process.
Conclusion
This chapter has identified six different models of core executive behaviour. 
U nder each model the role of the Prime M inister was seen to vary. Indeed, 
the extent of the Prime M inister's influence w ent from being residual, under, 
for exam ple, the m odels of presidential governm ent or bureaucratic co­
ordination, to being all-pervasive, under the m odel of prim e m inisterial 
governm ent.
As presented  above, each one of the six d ifferent m odels is in 
com petition w ith the other. The m odels are, to  a large extent, m utually  
exclusive. For example, the accounts of presidential governm ent and prim e 
m inisterial governm ent, or of m inisterial governm ent and  bureaucratic 
coordination seem to be completely contradictory. The President cannot be 
exercising m onocratic pow er at the sam e tim e as the Prim e M inister. 
Similarly, if individual M inisters are able to dom inate policy m aking, then 
the d v il servants in their departm ents are not able to  do  so as well. If one 
institution is dom inant, then the other institution m ust be subordinate.
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The main aim of this thesis is to provide an analysis of the role of the 
French Prime Minister in the policy process, so enabling us to identify the 
extent of hisXher influence in that process. The em pirical studies to be 
undertaken in the chapters to follow will enable us to discern the nature of 
prim e ministerial influence. However, as a result of these empirical studies, 
we will also be able to test the validity of the different models presented above 
and  to decide which, if any, best describes the nature  of core executive 
operations. Indeed, in the final chapter we shall return  to the six different 
m odels and consider how  best they should be treated in the light of the 
evidence gleaned from the case studies.
Thus, whilst this study will fill a large gap in the academic literature on 
the French Prime Minister, it is also hoped that it will help to shed some light 
on the saliency, or otherwise, of the different m odels of core executive 
operations in France. Indeed, it is hoped that these observations w ith regard 
to France will also be of relevance to the study of core executive operations in 
a comparative, cross-national context.
Nevertheless, before embarking upon the case studies which will form 
the basis for our conclusions about the nature of prim e ministerial influence 
and the models of core executive operations, it is first of all necessary briefly 
to outline the mechanics of the policy process in France and to m ake some 
preliminary remarks about the institution of the Prime Minister.
Chapter 2
The French Prime M inister and the Policy Process
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The policy preparation process in France is m ade up  of several distinct stages. 
The Prime Minister is present at each of these different stages. In this section 
w e will examine the different stages and dem onstrate the critical role played 
by  the Prime Minister therein. We will begin by considering the executive 
part of the process and then go on to examine the parliam entary part.
The executive part of the policy preparation process is formally divided 
into four distinct stages. These stages consist of the three different types of 
form al interm inisterial m eetings (réunions, comités and conseils) and the 
Conseil des ministres. The former are the main arenas of policy preparation, 
while the latter serves prim arily to ratify decisions before their presentation 
to Parliament. In addition, the policy process is also characterised by a large 
num ber of inform al m eetings w hich take place alongside the official 
meetings at all of the crucial points of a bill's preparation.
The Prime Minister is present either directly or indirectly at each of the 
four different formal stages. He is either present in person, or is represented 
by one or more members of his cabinet. Moreover, at m any of the num erous 
inform al m eetings, gatherings and encounters that occur alongside the 
official meetings the Prime Minister is also either personally present, or is 
represented by his advisers. The importance of these different stages and the 
nature of the Prime Minister's presence at them will now  be considered.
C\
Once the decision has been taken to draw  up  legislation on a particular 
issue, the bill is first of all discussed in a series of réunions interministérielles. 
(The prelim inary rounds of the conférences budgétaires are also included in 
this category.) There is no set am ount of réunions which have to be held. The 
num ber varies from  bill to bill, depending  upon  their scope and the 
difficulties faced when drawing them up.
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R éunions  bring together the advisers of the d ifferent M inistries
responsible for the preparation of the bill, as well as representatives from
M atignon and the Elysée. At least one m em ber of the SGG also attends, in
order to carry out routine secretarial functions and, if necessary, to give
technical advice on the legal aspects of the bill. Réunions are particularly
im portant because, although only advisers are present, they are the first
official stage at which policy decisions are taken. A lthough these decisions
tend prim arily  to be of a technical juridical nature , they m ay have an
im portant impact upon the wording of a bill and on its future direction.
Réunions are usually chaired by a m em ber of the Prim e M inister's
cabinet. In their role as chairman, the Prime M inister's advisers have to sum
up debates and conduct the first in the series of policy arbitrations. These
arbitrations are necessitated because of the opposing interests of the several
Ministries. Py has described this situation:
Au cours de la réunion, les représentants ne s'exprim ent pas en leur 
nom propre mais exposent la position de leur ministre. Si les positions 
ne concordent pas, une so lu tion  en tra în an t u n  consensus est 
recherchée; en cas de désaccord persistent, le Prem ier m inistre prend 
une décision d'arbitrage. ^
In réunions, as Bauby has noted, the prime ministerial function of arbitrage is
carried out on the Prime Minister's behalf by his advisers: "Le représentant du
Prem ier m inistre conclut, tranche ou  arrête  ce qu 'il fau t soum ettre  à
l'arbitrage"^.
In theory, the Prime M inister's advisers arbitrate in a neutral m anner 
betw een the opposing  M inistries. They w eigh u p  the  streng ths and 
weaknesses of the different argum ents and decide accordingly as to which is 
the best policy to adopt. They favour no particular M inistry and have no 
particular interests of their own. However, it m ust be noted that this version
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represents a particularly idealised view of the policy process and the case 
studies will show that their role was not so disinterested as it may seem.
N ot all problem s can be reso lved  d u rin g  réu n io n s , how ever. 
Therefore, any outstanding matters are reserved for the attention of comités 
interministériels. These comités are the second stage in the hierarchy of the 
policy process. In addition to resolving problem s left over from  réunions, 
they also deal w ith m atters that are considered to be too im portant to be 
decided upon in the first stage. As such, they are the site of the major policy 
decisions for a bill. These meetings are always chaired by the Prime Minister 
personally. Again, as before, the Prime Minister will have to arbitrate between 
the different ministerial viewpoints. In carrying out his arbitration function, 
like his advisers previously, the Prim e M inister is supposed  to be a 
disinterested figure. Once again, the case studies will show that this view is 
barely representative of his actions.
As w ith réunions, comités are usually unable to resolve all of the 
contentious issues in a bill. Therefore, these issues have to be examined in 
the  th ird  stage of the  policy process h ierarchy , nam ely  c o n se ils  
interm inistériels. These meetings are chaired by the President. This fact 
accounts for their absence during cohabitation w hen the President played no 
formal role in policy preparation. Conseils exam ine the m ost fundam ental 
and usually the m ost controversial aspects of a bill. They are held to look at 
d isputes betw een M inisters that the Prim e M inister has been unable to 
resolve. They are also held to examine issues w here a M inister refuses to 
accept the Prime M inister's arbitration in the comité. On both occasions, 
therefore, the ultim ate arbiter in the policy process is the President. His 
decision is final. Conseils are also held on issues deem ed to belong to the
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President's reserved domain, such as questions of defence and foreign affairs, 
for example.
The executive p art of the policy process form ally ends w ith  the 
adoption of the bill by the Conseil des ministres. These meetings are largely
(X
perfunctory and  usually play only^jninor role in  policy preparation. It is 
during the course of the three previous stages in the policy process that the 
m ain policy decisions are taken. Thus, the Conseil des m inistres serves 
m erely to rubber-stam p decisions which have been draw n up  beforehand. It 
m ust be noted, however, that sometimes the contents of bills are discussed at 
these meetings. On these occasions the President will ask for the advice of the 
Prime M inister and Ministers and a final arbitration is m ade by the President 
on the basis of their interventions. This situation  happens only  rarely, 
how ever.
Alongside these formal meetings, the im portance of informal meetings
should also be noted. (Here, the word 'm eeting' m ay be misleading, for they
can take the  form  of luncheons, telephone conversations, or chance
encounters.) In a study of conflicts within the executive since 1973, Jean-Louis
Thiébault has underlined the importance of such m eetings in the resolution
of policy disputes and also the im portant role of the Prime Minister therein: 
les réunions informelles de m inistres qui se tiennent à huis clos dans 
le bureau  du  Prem ier m inistre, sans ordre  d u  jour et sans procès- 
verbal, sont d 'abord le lieu de règlement des conflits entre le Premier 
m inistre et ses ministres, par arbitrage du p rem ie r .3
The claustrophobie nature of the Parisian political 'village' greatly facilitates
such informal encounters.
These inform al m eetings serve to exchange inform ation betw een
different actors in the policy process. They also serve to open up  the decision
m aking process to a w ider group of people  than  sim ply m inisterial
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representatives. For example, party  representatives, or deputies. They allow
deals to be m ade between interested parties behind closed doors prior to the
form al meetings. The result is that, even at the level of réunions, people
rarely come to an official meeting unaw are of w hat the others are going to
argue for. As Bertrand Delcros has noted:
Les gens se connaissent très bien. Ils se voient tous les jours. Pour ce 
qui est les réunions interministérielles, tout a été réglé avant. Dans les 
coulisses. Ça évite les clashes.^
As a result, Mesnier has argued that, on occasions, even when decisions have
been reached beforehand, the participants still go through the m otions in
formal meetings of first disagreeing and then coming to a compromise.^ It is
im portant, therefore, that any study of the policy process considers the impact
of these informal meetings on the outcome of policy.
The executive stage of the  policy process is fo llow ed by  the
parliam entary  stage. However, it w ould be w rong to consider them  as
separate  and distinct. For example, both  the Prim e M inister and  other
M inisters still follow closely the passage of a bill through Parliam ent and,
indeed, the advice of parliam entarians m ay already have been requested
before the bill was sent to Parliam ent. In addition , governm ental and
parliam entary representatives may meet on occasions other than those which
com prise the official policy preparation  process. For exam ple, socialist
M inisters and deputies regularly cross paths at the weekly m eetings of the
party 's  executive bureau. Similar contacts take place during the breakfast
m eetings on Tuesday at M a tig n o n .^  In essence, these encounters serve as a
secondary arena for discussion and bargaining between members of both the
governm ent and Parliament.
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Once a bill has been officially adopted by the Conseil des ministres it is 
im m ediately placed before one of the two chambers. Usually the Assemblée 
nationale examines the bill before the Sénat, b u t the governm ent has the 
right to place it before the latter first if it so wishes. Before the bill is debated 
on the  floor of the cham ber, it is first exam ined in  either a special 
com m ission created especially for the bill, o r in one of the perm anent 
standing  commissions. Here, it will be exam ined clause by clause and a 
rapporteur, appointed from amongst the majority party  m embers, will draw  
up  a report in which the commission's am endm ents are detailed. W hen the 
bill is debated on the floor of the chamber the governm ent may accept all or 
some of these amendments, or it may insist upon its original version being 
passed. In the latter case, the party discipline of the majority group is strictly 
adhered to.
Once a bill has been passed by one chamber it shuttles to the next (la 
navette). If both  the Assemblée nationale and  the Sénat agree upon  a 
common version of the bill, then after three readings in each chamber the bill 
is considered to be passed. However, if after the second reading there are any 
textual differences in the bill between the tw o chambers, then the Prime 
M inister has the constitu tional righ t (Article 45) to  set u p  a special 
com m ission (une commission mixte paritaire) in order to try  and iron out 
the differences and agree upon a common text. If a common w ording is 
found, then the bill is considered once again by both chambers after which 
time it is definitively passed. If no agreement is forthcoming, then only the 
Assemblée nationale examines the bill again.
The above description is a brief résumé of the parliam entary part of the 
policy process. It does not go into all the details of parliam entary procedure as 
laid dow n in the Constitution, or in  the standing orders of both chambers.
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The general th rust of the parliam entary stage is that the governm ent has a 
num ber of pow erful constitutional devices which it can call upon to ensure 
the passage of the bill as agreed in the Conseil des ministres, rather than as 
am ended in Parliament. These devices can be seen, for example, in Articles 
34, 38, 40, 44,45, 47, 48 and 49 of the Constitution. It m ust also be appreciated 
tha t there is constant contact betw een m em bers of the governm ent and 
parliam entarians throughout each stage of the parliam entary process. The 
governm ent will be aw are of w hat am endm ents are being proposed and 
parliam entarians will be aw are of w hether the governm ent is hostile or 
favourable to them.
The P rim e M inister is w ell p laced  to  in te rv en e  d u rin g  the 
parliam entary  p a rt of the policy process. He is constitutionally  able to 
intervene because of the prerogatives that he enjoys as head of government. 
As a result, successive Prime M inisters have been able to dom inate the 
legislature and Parliam ent has gained the repu tation  of m erely rubber- 
stam ping executive decisions. The Prime Minister also has the adm inistrative 
resources to intervene effectively in the parliam entary process. In 1989, for 
exam ple, R ocard 's cabinet contained no less than  three parliam entary  
advisers. In addition, all Prime Ministers enjoy the services of the legislative 
division of the SGG. This division ensures th a t the Prim e M inister is 
inform ed of the parliam entary debates and proposed am endm ents. W hat is 
m ore, the Prim e M inister, in  conjunction w ith  re levan t M inisters, is 
responsible for selecting which, if any, of the parliam entary am endm ents to 
accept. Therefore, the Prime M inister's arbitration function can be seen to 
continue throughout the parliamentary part of the policy process.
Therefore, a t both the governmental and parliam entary stages of the 
policy preparation process the Prime Minister is a key figure. This position of
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im portance is enhanced even further w hen the  range of adm inistrative 
services that he is able to command is considered. According to figures for 
February 1st 1985, the Prime M inister's adm inistrative staff num bered 5,472 
and the total cost of these services was over 13 billion francs.^ Clearly only a 
fraction of this num ber will be involved in the preparation of any single bill, 
b u t the Prim e M inister's capacity for the collation and co-ordination of 
information is great. Services such as the SGG and the Service d'information 
et de diffusion (SID) play key back-up roles in the policy process.*
In addition to these perm anent adm inistrative resources, the Prime 
M inister's cabinet is of great importance. As described in the first chapter, it is 
structured so that there is at least one adviser for every policy issue. Thus, 
there is someone in the Prime M inister's cabinet who follows the progress of 
each bill in detail. These advisers are the Prime M inister's eyes and ears in the 
policy process. Consequently, because of these resources, the Prime Minister is 
well placed to express an opinion when he sees fit and to arbitrate accordingly. 
Taking into account the perm anent services for which he has responsibility 
and his cabinet, the office of the Prime Minister in administrative terms is the 
m ost influential institution in the country.
A lthough any study of the Prime M inister's influence in the policy 
process will need to take the administrative resources of the institution into 
account, this aspect should not be unduly  overestim ated. These resources 
have rem ained largely stable since the beginning of the Fifth Republic. Thus, 
while they are the basis of prime ministerial influence, they do not account 
for changes in the level of that influence over time. Instead, any study of the 
Prim e M inister's influence needs m ust concentrate p rim arily  upon  the 
political resources at his disposal. Unlike the level of his adm inistrative
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resources, his political resources will fluctuate  greatly and so will his 
influence accordingly.
The final part of the policy process which needs to be identified is the 
role played by the Conseil constitutionnel. It m ust be noted immediately that 
the  Conseil is not involved in the outcom e of all public policy decisions. 
F irstly , it can only exam ine statutes. Secondly, it has no pow ers of 
retrospective control and can only examine bills passed by Parliament before 
their promulgation. Thirdly, it has no power to call bills to be judged itself. It 
can only examine bills which are sent to it by the President, Prime Minister, 
or sixty senators or deputies. Nevertheless, the C oim dl's decisions are final 
and those decisions are m ade free from the direct control of the executive or 
legislature. Neither the Prime Minister's political or adm inistrative resources 
are likely to be of much importance in the Council's judgem ents. Therefore, 
the Council has a quasi-autonomous influence over the policy process.
M ethodology
It can be seen, therefore, that w ith the exception of that part of the policy 
process confined to the Conseil constitutionnel, the  Prim e M inister is 
involved at every stage in the preparation of a bill. To this extent, the 
im portance of the office is im m ediately apparent. The Prim e M inister is 
central to the policy process and seems to be well placed to exert an influence 
over it.
The thesis will examine the Prime M inister's influence over a ten year
period starting in May 1981. This period was chosen for several reasons.
to cAQbie us \o
Firstly, it is sufficiently long so ao 4or us ^ to be able- to  d raw  up  useful 
conclusions about the extent of prime ministerial influence. A shorter period 
of time would simply have provided a snapshot of the political system  at a
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particular moment. A longer period w ould have rendered it m ore difficult to 
compare the experiences of different Prime Ministers. Secondly, the year 1981 
and the arrival in power of the left for the first time under the Fifth Republic 
m arked a turn ing  point in the history of the régim e to date. As such, it 
represents a natural starting point for such a study. Thirdly, the 1981-1991 
period produced various different types of governm ental configuration. It 
saw  a PS \PC  coalition, a PS m ajority governm ent, a tw o year period of 
cohabitation and finally a period of PS dom inated m inority governm ent. 
Thus, the political system was not static during this time. These variations 
allow  the Prim e M inister's influence to be stud ied  under each of these 
different governm ental situations. Thus, a fuller picture of his role can be 
draw n up.
The study is not a purely theoretical one. W ilson has argued that 
theoretical studies can only reach general conclusions and that they tend to 
rely on evidence that is im pressionistic. Its findings are consequently 
w e a k e n e d .9  In order to avoid this situation, our study has a strong empirical 
emphasis. At the same time, we will not posit a hypothesis which will be 
tested throughout the course of the chapters which follow. We feel that this 
approach tends necessarily to pre-em pt the study 's findings. As such it was 
not appropriate for the purpose at hand.
Instead, Wilson has identified two alternative approaches to the study 
of the influence of groups or institutions in the policy process. The first, his 
favoured m ethod, is to engage upon, "empirical studies of overall patterns of 
... politics in a country" 10. In our case this approach w ould have involved 
concentrating solely upon  the Prim e M inister's office. It w ould  have 
necessitated interviews with as many representatives of this office as possible 
over as long a period of time as possible. A part from the logistical difficulties
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that this approach w ould have entailed given the constraints w ithin which 
doctoral students have to work, it w ould also have m eant that the results 
w ould have been uneven. There w ould have been little focus to the study 
and it w ould have been difficult, if not impossible, properly to compare the 
findings.
Instead, our analysis favours a different approach, namely that of case 
studies. The problem with any such approach is that of the representativeness 
of the studies. They have to be typical of the policy process and they have to be 
m atching such that comparisons are possible. Cognisant of these problems, 
we have chosen to study eight public policy decisions in the 1981-1991 period. 
These decisions are: the 1981, 1986 and January 1989 broadcasting acts; the 
1985, 1987 and 1990 Finance acts; the crisis surrounding the w ithdrawal of the 
D evaquet h igher education bill in 1986; and the debate over the  th ird  
devaluation of the franc in March 1983.
This num ber is sufficiently large so as to be able to draw  up  valid 
conclusions. The chosen studies also perm it comparisons to draw n within 
individual policy sectors and betw een different sectors over the period in 
question. They allow for the study of routine policy preparation processes in 
norm al times (the Finance acts); non-routine policy preparation in norm al 
times (the broadcasting acts); and policy preparation during crisis periods (the 
Devaquet bill and the 1983 devaluation). Thus, the studies which have been 
chosen are representative and matched and perm it conclusions validly to be 
reached about the Prime Minister's influence in the policy process.
The information about the particular case studies was derived from 
both prim ary and secondary sources. A round 60 interviews w ith Ministers, 
deputies, members of ministerial, prim e ministerial and presidential cabinets 
and representatives from the perm anent adm inistration w ere undertaken
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(see Appendix 1). In addition, one former Prim e M inister w as interviewed. 
These interview s were nearly all directly connected w ith the chosen case 
studies, although some more general interviews about the overall role of the 
Prim e M inister were also conducted. In addition to these prim ary sources, 
secondary information was also used. This inform ation included books and 
contem porary  new spaper accounts of the case studies; biographies and 
autobiographies of the relevant political actors; and general academic works 
on the Prime Minister and the French political system as a whole. It is hoped, 
therefore, as a result of the case study approach and of the collection of 
p rim ary  and secondary inform ation, that it will be possible to d raw  up 
detailed  conclusions about the natu re  of prim e m inisterial influence in 
France.
Thus, in order to examine precisely to w hat extent the Prime Minister 
is able to influence the policy process, it is now  necessary to embark upon the 
case studies of public policy decisions. The evidence derived from the studies 
in the next four chapters will serve to elucidate the natu re  of the Prim e 
M inister's influence in the policy process. We will begin by exam ining the 




The first set of case studies to be examined is in the area of broadcasting. 
Broadcasting is a particularly suitable candidate for study. As w ith  any area 
dealing w ith fundam ental public liberties, it is of considerable popular and 
political sensitivity. The problem s surround ing  the issues, options and 
governmental cleavages are, thus, accentuated. At the same time, throughout 
the course of the Fifth Republic, it has been an area in which the Prime 
M inister has been able to intervene directly, unlike other areas, such as 
foreign affairs, w hich have generally been controlled by the President. 
M oreover, the post-1981 period  prov ided  an excellent opportun ity  for 
comparative study as there were a num ber of im portant laws passed which 
fundam entally reorganised the broadcasting system.
For the first set of case studies, we have decided to look at three of these 
laws. We will exam ine the p reparation  and passage of the  July 1982, 
September 1986 and January 1989 Broadcasting Acts. The three laws will be 
considered in turn, starting w ith the July 1982 Broadcasting Act. Once the 
exam ination of these law s is complete, w e will d raw  som e prelim inary 
conclusions about the policy process and about the Prime M inister's influence 
therein .
The July 1982 Broadcasting A ct
Prior to 1981, French broadcasting was subject to strict central governm ent 
con tro l^ . For example, there w ere no official private  rad io  or television 
companies; the state broadcasting system was for the m ost p a rt publicly 
financed; the system was administered by a large, bureaucratic organisation 
(called the ORTF from 1964-1974), the subject itself of government control; the 
governm ent appointed all of the top figures in the broadcasting organisation; 
and  the M inister of Inform ation w ould intervene directly to change the 
content of news broadcasts and other programmes when he saw fit.
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The first major change to the system came w ith the election of Giscard 
d'Estaing as President and the passage of the 1974 Broadcasting Act. This law 
abolished both the Ministry of Information and the ORTF. The latter was split 
up  into its constituent parts, so as to form seven independent organisations, 
w ith a degree of competition being introduced between them. W hilst this law 
did symbolise a break with the past, it was an ambiguous reform that left few 
people satisfied with the resulting situation. The Com munist Party and some 
gauUists were nostalgic for the ORTF. The socialists, however, felt that the 
changes were merely cosmetic and that the governm ent's ability to control 
the  system  was still as strong as ever. In addition , there w ere m any 
m alcontents w ithin the broadcasting profession itself, w ith the loss of certain 
privileges enjoyed under the ORTF being the m ain grievance. It was against 
this background that in his 1981 presidential election cam paign M itterrand 
announced that a reform of the broadcasting system  w ould be one of his 
legislative priorities. W ith the election of M itterrand in May 1981 and the 
appointm ent of Pierre M auroy as Prime M inister, the preparation of this 
reform began.
Much of the legislation passed during M auroy's time as Prime Minister
w as derived from  M itterrand 's 110 Propositions for governm ent, which
form ed the basis of his electoral campaign. H ow ever, only one of these
propositions, num ber 94, dealt with broadcasting. Here, it was stated that:
La télévision et la radio seront décentralisées et pluralistes. Les radios 
locales pourron t librem ent s'im planter dans le cadre d 'u n  service 
public. Leur cahier des charges sera établi par les collectivités locales. 
Sera créé un  Conseil national de l'audiovisuel où les représentants de 
l'E tat seront minoritaires. Les droits des 'cibistes' seront pleinem ent 
reconnus.
Clearly, these vague prom ises w ere no basis for a major reform  of the 
broadcasting system.
5 2
The only other pre-election foundation for the bill was the report of 
one of the Socialist Party 's internal policy commissions headed by François- 
Régis Bastide. However, for the most part the Bastide report was a critique of 
the 1974 reform, rather than a blueprint for any new law. Thus, w ith neither 
the 110 Propositions, nor the Bastide report going into any detail about the 
content of any future reforms, the new governm ent and its Communications 
M inister, Georges Fillioud, had little basis from which to draw  up  the new 
bill.
In early June, an interm inisterial com m ittee for broadcasting was
created. C haired by Jérôme Clém ent, M auroy 's conseiller technique for
broadcasting affairs, it included representatives from the Elysée and from the
M inistries of C om m unication, C ulture , T elecom m unications, External
Relations, Interior and the Budget. It held weekly meetings at M atignon and
its official function was set down as follows:
Le groupe assurera les synthèses techniques et politiques nécessaires. H 
préparera les arbitrages que devra rendre le gouvernement.^
Its task, therefore, was not to draw  up  the w ording of the bill itself, bu t to
coordinate the work of others.
One of the first decisions that the committee took was to set up  five
w orking parties, each one specializing in a different policy sector. These
w orking parties w ere given the task of draw ing  up  detailed  legislative
proposals for the government to act upon. Each working party had on average
12 m em bers nom inated by M auroy in consultation w ith  C lém ent and
Fillioud, as well as the C ulture M inister, Jack Lang, and the President's
cabinet. W hilst m ost of those appo in ted  h ad  connections w ith  the
broadcasting industry, the majority were now  also mem bers of ministerial
cabinets, suggesting their allegiance to the governm ent. M oreover, a large
num ber had also been associated in the past w ith the ORTF.
5 3
The com m ittee also decided to set up  a commission de réflexion et 
d'orientation  under the aegis of the Prim e M inister. The idea for such a 
com m ission originally  came from  F illioud 's cabinet, bu t it w as quickly 
accepted by all the protagonists involved. Chaired by Pierre Moinot, form er 
m em ber of the Cour des Comptes, television scriptwriter and good friend of 
Jack Lang, the commission's function was to synthesize the conclusions of the 
w orking parties and to produce a detailed report for the Prime Minister. The 
nom ination procedure for the commission's other 12 m embers involved the 
same people as for the working parties, w ith the addition of M oinot himself. 
The result was an experienced set of people, coming predom inantly from the 
PS, PCF and MRG and which, therefore, reflected the com position of the 
governm ental coalition.
The com m ission's report, how ever, d id  no t sim ply re itera te  the 
governm ent's priorities, nor did it simply present a list of proposals which it 
knew  that the governm ent w ould favour. The proof of this lies in the fact 
that m any of its recommendations did not find their way into the final text of 
the bill. In fact, the commission was able to draw  up  its proposals relatively 
free from governmental interference. It was allowed to do so, firstly, because 
the government had little idea at this early stage of exactly w hat it w anted to 
see in the report and, secondly, because Moinot was sufficiently independent 
of m ind and strong of character, so as to be able to complete his report 
w ithout too m uch governm ental intervention.
These early stages of the bill's p reparation  show ed that the issues 
involved w ere m uch m ore complex than  had  orig inally  been foreseen. 
Consequently, Fillioud abandoned his original plans to see the bill debated in 
Parliam ent in N ovem ber and the details of the text were finalised by the 
government over the winter. At this stage the bill was being prepared by the 
different sets of ministerial advisers. For example, Lang's cabinet concentrated 
upon the clauses w hich concerned the cinema, w hile Louis M exandeau's
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cabinet a t the Telecom munications M inistry dealt w ith  the new  role of 
Télédiffusion de France (TDF). However, the Conununications M inistry was 
responsible for the vast majority of the bill, while it also supervised the work 
of Lang's and M exandeau's advisers. By contrast, Clém ent's role was more 
general. His interventions were not confined to any specific areas and he was 
free to intervene when and where he saw fit. A similar role was played by the 
P residen t's  advisers and , indeed, by Fillioud him self, as the M inister 
responsible for the bill as a whole.
Over the w inter of 1981-1982, Fillioud conducted a series of meetings 
w ith the representatives of the broadcasting unions. However, it was clear 
from an internal note to the Prime Minister that the aim of these meetings 
was to make the unions feel that they were involved in the decision making 
process, rather than to make them in any way the co-authors of the bill.^
The interministerial committee chaired by Clément continued to meet 
throughout the course of the bill's preparation. In addition to these official 
intragovernm ental meetings, there were also num erous unofficial meetings, 
or encounters. Both Cotta and Estier have described m eetings to which they 
w ere invited at the President's country retreat along w ith Lang, Fillioud, 
Clém ent, M exandeau, Fabius (the Budget M inister) and  A ndré Rousselet, 
M itterrand 's directeur de cabinet where the broadcasting bill was discussed.^ 
Lang had at least one lunch with the communist Health Minister, Jack Ralite, 
during which the main subject of conversation was this bill.5 Similarly, the 
contents of the bill were discussed on m ore than  one occasion during  the 
course of M auroy's weekly meetings w ith the President and at the weekly 
breakfasts betw een these two and the leaders of the PS. The confidential 
nature of these meetings, particularly the latter two, makes it difficult for us 
to ascertain whether they served merely as an exchange of ideas, or as a place 
where policy decisions were taken. It was clear, though, that their importance 
was not négligeable.
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The bill also passed through a series of other m andatory preparatory 
stages. There was a hearing before the Conseil d'Etat; a presentation to the 
Conseil des M inistres on the 31st M arch 1982; and a debate in both the 
Assemblée nationale and the Sénat. In addition, the bill was subm itted to the 
Conseil constitutionnel which ruled against several m inor clauses, m eaning 
that the Act was finally promulgated on the 29th July 1982.
The July 1982 law  was long and  complex. It contained 110 articles 
covering the whole gam ut of broadcasting issues. Even if it were possible, it 
w ou ld  be im practical for the p resen t s tu d y  to exam ine each article 
individually , so as to identify the Prim e M inister's influence. Therefore, 
w hilst we w ould argue that the Prime Minister, either personally, or through 
his advisers, was involved to some extent in the preparation of all of these 
articles, it is only possible for this study to concentrate on certain key areas. 
Four such areas have been chosen, nam ely, the fate of the m ain public 
television companies, the composition and pow ers of the new independent 
regulatory authority, the Haute Autorité, and the question of w hether or not 
advertising should be perm itted on local radio stations. Each area will now be 
considered in tu rn , starting w ith the fate of the m ain public television 
companies.
The reform of the two main television companies, TFl and A2, and of 
the country 's only production company, the Société Française de Production 
(SFP), was always going to be of particular professional, political and public 
interest. In the end, it transpired that the debate surrounding these three 
organisations was typical of that on the bill as a whole.
The Moinot report recommended that TFl, A2 and the SFP be brought 
together under one company to be called the Société Nationale de Télévision 
(SNT). In fact, this proposal was a com prom ise betw een the tw o m ain 
tendencies to be found  w ith in  the w ork ing  parties and  the M oinot
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com m ission and , indeed , w ith in  the  PS, the  governm en t and  the 
adm inistration. In o rder fully to understand  the exigencies behind  the 
preparation of the 1982 Broadcasting Act, it is necessary to examine these two 
tendencies in detail.
The supporters of the first tendency, who m ay be called the 'statists', 
w anted to see a reconstruction of the ORTF. The supporters of the second 
tendency, or 'liberals', preferred to see a decentralisation of the broadcasting 
system. The tw o tendencies represented coalitions of different interests and 
ideologies.
The comm unists favoured the statist approach. This a ttitude can be 
ascribed to ideological reasons and the PCF's desire to see the state controlling 
the the flow of information reaching the public. It can also be ascribed to 
pressure from the com m unist controlled trades ' union confederation, the 
CGT, which had seen its bargaining pow er severely weakened as a result of 
the break-up of the ORTF in the 1974 Act. Similarly, the Jacobin inspired 
component of the PS also favoured this approach, as it strengthened the role 
of the state.
Conversely, the PS's autogestionnaire com ponent favoured the second 
tendency, as it was m ore consistent w ith its beliefs. Some governm ent 
m em bers also privately favoured the liberal approach precisely because it 
weakened the unions. They feared that a left-wing governm ent w ould not be 
im m une to future industrial action and that imm ediate steps had to be taken 
to minimise its effects. In the perm anent administration, notably amongst the 
members of the Service Juridique et Technique de l'Inform ation (SJTI), there 
w as also a strong liberal trend  which favoured the advent of private 
broadcasting companies and which saw this bill as the opportunity to take the 
first steps towards this aim.
These tw o tendencies were present in the M oinot commission. The 
form er ORTF em ployees on the com m ission na tu ra lly  favoured  its
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reconstruction, whilst other elements, notably amongst the representatives of 
the perm anent administration, were opposed to this measure. The proposal 
to create the SNT was a compromise between the two tendedes. Thus, instead 
of a com plete retu rn  to the ORTF, the M oinot commission proposed  the 
creation of w hat am ounted to a mini-ORTF. This idea, however, received a 
mixed reaction from members of the government. Over the sum m er of 1981 
Fillioud had m ade veiled references to the creation of an organisation which 
w ould harm onise the program m e schedule of TFl and A2. His statements
had led people to believe that som ething akin to the ORTF w as about to
a.n
return.6 However, the creation of anything akin to such/prganisation, such as 
the SNT, was opposed by certain key elements w ithin the government. For 
example, Jérôme Clément was in favour of the more liberal approach, as was 
his dose friend and presidential adviser for broadcasting, Jean-Louis Bianco. 
Two other figures at the Elysée also favoured this approach, Jacques Attali and 
Rousselet. In addition, the staff of the SJTI were vehem ently opposed to any 
return  to the ORTF.
This latter group played an im portant role during the preparation of 
the law. Although offidally under the control of the Prime Minister, the SJTI 
w as effectively m anaged by the Com munications M inistry. In 1981, it was 
headed by Bertrand Cousin, a gauUist sym pathiser who later became an RPR 
deputy before taking up a post in the Hersant press empire. Cousin, backed by 
the rest of the SJTI, not all of whom  w ere gaullists, set out to oppose the 
statists w ith the desire to "vendre une thèse", nam ely, that of the liberal 
v i e w p o i n t . 7 Despite the hostility between Fillioud and Cousin, at this stage 
the latter was indispensable to the new Minister because of his wealth of legal 
and technical knowledge of broadcasting m atters and because of the loyalty of 
the rest of the SJTI to him. However, Cousin's knowledge was used by the 
SJTI to provide juridical arguments against the statist viewpoint and to have
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the bill w orded in a way which was compatible w ith its beliefs. Indeed, their 
knowledge was used by Clément in a similar way to similar ends.
Faced w ith opposition from several m em bers of the interm inisterial 
committee, the idea of the SNT was quickly rejected. However, a compromise 
still had  to be reached which w ould satisfy Fillioud and  the unions. The 
com prom ise which was finally agreed involved nationalizing the SFP and 
agreeing new production contracts between the SFP and both  TFl and A2. 
Therefore, the public sector's role was increased, bu t w ithin limits acceptable 
to Clément and the others.
W hilst the changes described above w ere im portan t, the m ajor 
innovation  contained in the bill w as the  creation  of an  independen t 
regulatory agency, the H aute Autorité. It w as designed to act as a buffer 
betw een the state and the broadcasting com panies and its creation was 
testim ony to the governm ent's desire to cut the infam ous umbilical cord 
between the government and the broadcasting system. The idea of setting up 
the H aute Autorité was well received by almost all concerned.
The idea of creating an authority of some sort was m ooted even before 
the 1981 elections. The Bastide report proposed the creation of a Conseil 
national w ith  certain  ind ep en d en t decision  m aking  pow ers, w here  
professionals and official representatives could m eet and discuss policy. The 
idea of a smaller, more autonom ous organisation, however, came from the 
M oinot commission's working parties and was adopted by M oinot as one of 
the central propositions of his report.
The idea of such an authority d id  not fall prey to the debate between 
the statists and the liberals. It was accepted by all, either enthusiastically, or 
because its symbolic value was high and because the M oinot report had  
created expectations which it was injudicious to  disappoint.® One of the 
concom itant problems, however, concerned the  com position of the fu ture 
authority. There was no magic form ula w hich su ited  everyone and each
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his
person had A eir own pet solution which he favoured, as can be seen in the 
table below:
Figure
M oinot: 3 President, 3 grands corps, 3 Conseil National de
VAudiovisuel (CNA).
Beck^O: 2 President, 2 Assemblée nationale, 2 Sénat, 3 CNA.
Fillioud: 3 President, 1 Assemblée nationale, 1 Sénat, 1 CNA, 1
personnel.
Attali: 3 President, 3 Assemblée nationale, 3 Sénat,
ibid.: 3 President, 1 Assemblée nationale, 3 grands corps, 1
Sénat, 1 Conseil Economique et Social.
M auroy: 3 President, 4 Parliament, 2 grands corps.
It is noticeable that Moinot, the least political of the above, suggested the most
technocratic of all the options. All of the others to a varying degree ensured
that the left would be in a majority due to the make up  of Parliament a t that
time. In a note to the President, Fillioud stated:
La composition doit toutefois être modifiée afin de garantir tout à la 
fois [son] indépendance et [sa] lég itim ité  politique'. Le Parlem ent, 
d 'une  part, et les représentants du  personnel, d 'au tre  part, sont en effet 
m arginalisés dans le schéma proposé. Il conviendrait donc de les 
ré in tro d u ire  afin d 'o b ten ir une  m eilleure  adéqua tion  en tre  la 
composition de la Haute Autorité et la majorité politique du  pays.^^
The desire to ensure a favourable governm ental majority was also one of
C lém ent's o b j e c t i v e s . ^ 2  Thus, while he m ay have p u t forw ard the liberal
view point on some issues, this approach was complicated by his desire and
the desire of others not to let the broadcasting system fall into the hands of
the opposition. As Cousin stated, "les arbitrages ne se font pas au hasard",
pointing to at least one machiavellian m otivation behind the governm ent’s
decisions.13
Normally, when no common agreement could be found to a particular 
problem , it was up to the Prime Minister to arbitrate between the conflicting
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dem ands. However, given the importance of this issue and given the Prime 
M inister's ow n involvem ent, the only person  left to arb itrate  w as the 
P residen t him self. Indeed , the P residen t pa id  close a tten tion  to the 
preparation of the text as a whole. It is clear that this m atter was discussed at 
the Elysée on several occasions. Cotta tells of a dinner there in M arch 1982, 
w hich she attended alongside Clément, Rousselet and Fillioud, w here the 
decision was taken to give the authority  the same composition as for the 
Conseil constitutionnel.
This decision was an astute tactical m ove by M itterrand. A t the time, 
the Council was accused of having an anti-governm ental bias by some PS 
depu ties because of its recent decisions concerning the  governm ent's 
nationalisation program m e. N aturally , opposition deputies defended the 
C ouncil's  role. By choosing th is configuration , therefore, M itterrand  
effectively stifled any future opposition criticism that the H aute A utorité 
would be biased towards the government as, by extension, such an accusation 
w ould be a criticism of the Conseil constitutionnel as w e l l . ^5 H ow ever, 
Fillioud did not change the text of the bill in line w ith this decision before it 
was presented to the Conseil des Ministres on March 31st 1982. Consequently, 
the traditional image of these meetings as being occasions to ratify decisions 
taken elsewhere was broken as, during the m eeting, the President insisted 
upon returning to the formula agreed over lunch a few days earlier.
Usually presidential decisions are final, yet not so this one. On this 
occasion, the opposition majority in the Sénat received the bill particularly 
well. Via their spokesman, Charles Pasqua, they let the governm ent know 
that they would pass the text agreed by the Assemblée nationale, if only the 
H aute A utorité 's composition were to be changed, so as to balance out the 
political forces within it. Once again M itterrand had  to decide and he agreed 
to Pasqua's proposal, feeling that a common text voted by both Chambers 
w ould increase the consensual appearance of the bill. By chance, however, at
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the sam e time, Gaston Defferre, the Interior M inister, announced the law  
splitting up  Paris, Marseille and Lyon into separate arrondissements. This bill 
w as seen, quite rightly, as being designed to weaken Chirac's hold over Paris. 
In retaliation, therefore, the RPR leader ordered Pasqua to w ithdraw  the deal 
and  vote against the broadcasting bill. Pasqua duly complied. As a result, the 
H aute A utorité 's composition returned to the form ula agreed in the Conseil 
des Ministres.
The question of w hat powers the new authority was to have was also of 
great importance. One of the interesting aspects that this question highlighted 
was that of the role of the Conseil d 'E tat and the Conseil constitutionnel in 
the  policy process. The form er is usually ignored in  any study  of policy 
preparation, while it is only recently that the latter has been the subject of any 
detailed study. Their influence on the w ording of this law, however, cannot 
not be ignored.
The Conseil d 'E tat refused to accept Fillioud's proposal that airspace 
could be conceded by the government for the use of another organisation and 
recom m ended that the articles perm itting this m easure be w ithdraw n from 
the text. The Conseil d 'E tat arrived at this decision because it considered 
airspace to be an immaterial concept and that previously only material things 
had  been granted  such concessions. A lthough the governm ent was not 
obliged to abide by the recom m endations of the Conseil d 'E tat, on this 
occasion the Prim e M inister decided to let the m atter drop, ra ther than 
pu rsue  the m atter any further and risk a confrontation w ith the Conseil 
d'Etat.
The role played by the Conseil constitutionnel was also important. One 
of the m ain criticisms of the Act following its passage was that the H aute 
A utorité had few powers to sanction broadcasting companies which ignored 
their statutory obligations as laid out in their cahier des charges. This lack of 
powers, however, was not due to any intention on the governm ent's part to
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create a w eak au tho rity , b u t because of the  fear th a t the  Conseil
constitutionnel would strike down any such powers if they were included in
the bill. At that time, the only agency which had been given such powers was
the Commission des Opérations de la Bourse. This commission, however,
had been set up  under the Fourth Republic and neither the jurists w ithin the
SJTI nor the m inisterial cabinet mem bers knew  w hether or not under the
Fifth Republic's Constitution such powers were permissable. As a result, it
was decided to play safe and the governm ent d iluted the H aute A utorité's
sanction powers, providing a perfect example of autolimitation^^.
As for the other powers of the new  authority, it was quickly apparent
that the recom m endations of the M oinot commission w ent too far for the
government. In a note to the President, Fillioud stated:
L 'adoption du  schéma avancé aboutirait à interdire la définition et la 
m ise en oeuvre d 'u n e  politique gouvernem entale cohérente de  la 
com m uni cation. 17
Even those people usually associated with the liberal stance, such as Clément 
and Bianco, were not keen to accept M oinot's proposals in their entireity. 
Bianco, for example, refused to accept the proposition that the H aute Autorité 
be given the power to share out the licence fee revenue amongst the public 
television companies.
This consensus w ith in  the governm ent form ed shortly  after the 
publication of M oinot's report. The cabinets of the leading m inisters, the 
Prime Minister and the President were all generally in agreem ent about the 
am ount of pow er to be accorded to the authority. It was agreed that the 
authority 's powers should be relatively modest. As a result of this consensus 
at the highest level, this aspect of the bill was dealt w ith almost entirely in 
réunions interministérielles, w here the only people present w ere cabinet 
m em bers. Indeed, it d id  not even figure on the  agenda of the com ité  
interministériel chaired by the Prime Minister in the presence of the relevant
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ministers. W hilst it d id crop up  during a meeting at the Elysée, the President 
did  not intervene, preferring to leave the m atter to his advisers.
In con trast to the p rev ious exam ple, the  question  of w hether 
advertising should be perm itted on local radio was debated prim arily in the 
higher échelons of the government. The conflict centred upon the diverging 
opinions of the Prim e M inister and  Com m unications Minister. Despite the 
M oinot report coming out in favour of advertising, M auroy and Fillioud had 
already hardened their positions over the sum m er of 1981. The speed w ith 
which the two protagonists formulated their argum ents followed on from the 
decision taken in June 1981 to draw  up a bill dealing w ith the local radio issue 
separately from the main broadcasting bill so as to legislate more quickly. The 
local radio stations bill was passed in Novem ber 1981. The passage of this 
latter bill m eant that a preliminary presidential arbitration on the question of 
advertising was necessitated in the sum m er of 1981. This arbitration w ent in 
M auroy's favour. The preparation of the July 1982 Act, however, provided an 
opportunity for Fillioud to reverse this decision and the m atter was discussed 
again.
Fillioud w as in favour of allowing advertising. H e felt that it w as 
essential if the stations were going to survive financially. He was supported, 
quk e naturally, by the advertising companies. M auroy, however, was opposed 
to this measure. In part, his decision was m otivated by ideological reasons. 
There was a long-term  and w idespread belief w ithin the PS that advertising 
on radio or television lowered the cultural quality of program m es. M auroy 
identified w ith this tradition and once in pow er he reiterated it, talking of 
"radios-fric" to describe the resulting situation. Equally im portant, however, 
was the coalition of local interests which formed around the Prime M inister's 
view point. This coalition consisted of represen tatives of the local and  
regional press, w hose financial survival was closely linked to their existing 
advertising agreem ents. The previous few years had  seen an explosion of
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local radio stations and the press felt that if advertising on them  w ere to be
allowed, then its future would be in doubt.
O ne of the m ost im portan t figures in this coalition w as Gaston
Defferre, the Interior Minister and mayor of Marseille, who had a controlling
interest in m uch of the area's press. M auroy, too, as m ayor of Lille, was not
unconcerned personally by the matter. Their insistence, backed up  by the close
relations both of them  shared w ith M itterrand, m eant that Fillioud was
unsuccessful. Giesbert recounts the meeting at the Elysée:
Vous avez sûrem ent raison, dit le President à Fillioud, mais dans une 
affaire comme celle-là, je ne peux aller contre la volonté du  Premier
m inistre. ^ 8
Consequently, the 1982 law m ade no provision for advertising on local radio 
and it was only later that the coalition against it weakened, thus m aking it 
possible.
The Septem ber 1986 Broadcasting Law.
In m any respects the 1982 law  represented a w atershed in the history of 
French broadcasting. Once it had been passed, for example, the support for a 
return  to the ORTF came only from certain isolated elements w ithin the PCF. 
M oreover, the existence of an independent authority w as widely recognised 
as be ing  an essential com ponent of the system . N evertheless, m ajor 
d isagreem ents d id  rem ain  about the  fu tu re  of b roadcasting . These 
disagreem ents were exacerbated by the arrival on the scene of new  m edia 
issues from 1982 onwards.
Between 1982 and 1986, the old media debate centred prim arily around 
the role of private television w ithin the broadcasting system. The creation of 
Canal+ by Rousselet in 1983 with M itterrand's benediction effectively ended 
this debate. Indeed, in 1985, M itterrand announced the form ation of two 
further private stations, channels 5 and 6. Their franchises, how ever, were
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aw arded to industrialists close to the PS and the opposition was enraged. 
Their anger was also directed at the H aute A utorité, partly  because the 
governm ent had a clear majority on it, bu t also because it lacked the powers 
to assert itself, even on those occasions w hen it w ished to do so. Combined 
w ith other latent difficulties, such as the SFP's continuing deficits, a major 
reorganisation of the system  became one of the opposition 's legislative 
priorities in the run up  to the 1986 legislative elections.
This traditional area of difficulties, how ever, w as com bined w ith 
problem s surrounding the new  media. The 1982 cable television plan had  
been a financial and organisational d isaster and  the progress of satellite 
broadcasting was slow. Both of these issues highlighted the interrelationship 
betw een policy and technology. New m edia initiatives were costly, involved 
num erous national and international industrial concerns and, in the French 
case, w ere dogged by sometimes less than expert bureaucratic intervention. 
Therefore, having committed itself to a new  law, Chirac's governm ent was 
faced w ith a variety of complex problems in the area of both old and new  
m édias.
W hen it came to power in March 1986, the right wing governm ent was 
generally m uch better prepared than the socialists had  been in 1981. This 
situation was particularly true in the area of broadcasting. In May 1984, Chirac 
delivered a major speech, m ostly drafted by Bertrand Cousin, in w hich he 
detailed his own policy objectives. Then, throughout 1985, the opposition 
parties worked together to produce the 1986 electoral platform. This platform  
included specific engagements to privatise two television companies and to 
em bark upon a complete reform of the telecommunications sector. In charge 
of the opposition 's pre-election working party  on broadcasting was Xavier 
Goyou-Beauchamps, ENA graduate and former adviser to Giscard d'Estaing as 
President. His work led to Giscard himself proposing a private m embers bill
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in the Assemblée nationale in January 1986, in which he outlined his plans 
for the broadcasting system.
The March 1986 elections saw the appointm ent of François Léotard as 
M inister for Culture and Communications. A lthough this was not his first 
choice M inistry, M itterrand having vetoed his appoin tm ent as Defence 
M inister, Léotard still ranked fourth in the governm ental hierarchy and was 
determ ined to make an impression at his new  job. He was backed up  by 
Philippe de Villiers as Secretary of State for Communications, bu t Léotard's 
am bition m eant that at no stage during the bill's preparation did  de Villiers 
play anything other a minor role.^9
Instead , Goyou-Beaucham ps w as appo in ted  by L éotard, slightly  
reluctantly bu t on Giscard's insistence, to help draft the bill. N om inated on 
April 1st, Goyou-Beauchamps inunediately called upon the SJTI's expertise in 
o rder to d raw  up  the law. On this occasion, the SJTI provided  classic 
adm inistrative support to the Minister and his advisers and did not attem pt 
to influence the w ording of the bill, despite the fact that the head of the 
organisation, Marc-André Feffer, had been appointed by the socialists. Goyou- 
Beaucham ps's starting point was G iscard's January bill, although this was 
quickly abandoned as it proved to be insufficiently detailed.20
One of the first decisions to be taken was that of dropping the proposed 
telecom m unications reform. This decision was taken by Chirac personally 
after a m eeting at the beginning of April w ith A ndré Bergeron, the head of 
the trades' union confederation, the Force Ouvrière (FO), in which he m ade it 
clear to the Prime Minister that any hasty reform w ould be likely to result in 
s tr ik e  a c tio n .21 W ith  C hirac  rem em b erin g  th e  1974 s tr ik e  by  
telecommunications workers which he had had to face w hen Prim e Minister 
before and with only two years until the presidential elections, he abandoned 
the idea of any immediate reform.
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As part of the preparation process, Léotard arranged four meetings with 
professionals from the broadcasting industry  in m id-April. However, these 
meetings had no real outcome on the bill as a whole and served merely as a 
m edia e x e r d s e . 2 2  in  fact, the first draft of the bill was draw n u p  by Goyou- 
Beauchamps and leaked to the press on April 24th. This leak w as not at all 
appreciated by Chirac whose advisers still had to go through the project and 
whose arbitrations were still to come. The Prime Minister refused to be put 
before a fait accompli, something which was affirmed the next day by Denis 
Baudouin, the  governm ent spokesperson. As a resu lt, th ere  follow ed 
num erous réunions interministérielles chaired by José Prêches, Chirac's 
adviser on broadcasting affairs, until only major disagreem ents rem ained. 
W hen these m eetings were completed, a series of comités interministériels 
w ere held. These comités were chaired by Chirac himself. As w ith the 1982 
law, it m ust be noted that there were also m any informal meetings, organised 
by Léotard alone, or by Chirac and his advisers, where the bill w as discussed 
and whose influence on the final w ording cannot be dismissed.
As the bill went before the Conseil d 'E tat on June 5th and then to the 
Conseil des M inistres on June 11th, the one thing notable for its absence 
throughout the whole process was any presidential intervention. M itterrand 
did  not intervene personally during the preparation of the bill, except after 
the Conseil des Ministres to say that he feared for the bill's effects on basic 
freedoms. Neither did his advisers attend any preparatory meetings, or even 
try  to contact governm ent m em bers, or their advisers. They kept the 
President informed of the bill's progress, but were not implicated a t any stage 
in its preparation.
During the Conseil des Ministres, the Prime Minister decided to call an 
extraordinary parliam entary session so as to allow the bill to be passed the bill 
during the sum m er, rather than waiting for the norm al parliam entary recall 
in October. The bill was examined firstly by the Sénat. It was poorly received
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there, especially by the Sénat's special com m ission. There, the RPR's 
spokesperson, A drien Gouteyron, proposed over 120 am endm ents on the 
com m ission's behalf. In all, over 1,800 am endm ents w ere drafted by the 
Senators, the vast majority by the PS/PCF minority in an  attem pt to delay the 
bill's passage. It was finally passed on July 24th after 180 hours of debate, the 
longest in the history of the Senate.
The debate in the Assemblée nationale was m uch shorter, starting on 
A ugust 4th and finishing four days later due to Chirac's authorisation of the 
use of A rticle 49-3 to truncate  discussion. A fter the  m eeting  of the 
parliam entary  m ixed parity  commission, the bill w as finally passed on 
A ugust 12th. The PS deputies, however, then placed it before the Conseil 
constitu tionnel, w hose decision came a m onth  la te r in w hich several 
im portant points were struck down, causing anger in  the governm ent ranks.
Given the range of issues covered and the complexity of the questions 
involved, it proved to be impossible to keep the text of the bill short. In the 
end, the law  contained 110 articles, the same as in 1982. Once again, it is 
impossible to study all of these articles and so three of the Act's major reforms 
have been chosen, namely, the composition of the regulatory agency which 
replaced the H aute  A utorité, the choice of w hich television channel to 
privatise and the conditions under which this privatisation was to take place. 
We w ould argue that these reforms are representative of the problem s faced 
during the preparation of the text as a whole.
In his 1984 press conference, Chirac had already stated that it was his 
intention to replace the H aute Autorité and he even suggested a name for the 
proposed new authority. La Commission N ationale de la Communication et 
des Libertés (CNCL). The H aute Autorité's fate seem ed to be sealed when 
Giscard's bill also proposed its replacement. However, Chirac, just before the 
March 1986 elections, suddenly changed his m ind and he told Michelle Cotta,
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the H aute Autorité's president, that he had dropped any plans to abolish it. 
Cotta recalled a conversation she had at this tim e w ith Chirac in which he 
said:
Je crois aux institutions. Celle-là en est une et qui a fait ses preuves. Je
ne vois pas de raison d 'en  changer.23
Once in power, however, the new Prime Minister came under pressure from 
both Léotard him self and from the parliam entary m ajority once again to 
replace the H aute A utorité w ith  a new  agency. Chirac, faced w ith  their 
insistence and not believing this to be an issue on which he felt strongly 
enough to assert his authority, bowed to their pressure and agreed to have the 
H aute Autorité replaced.
As in 1982, one of the most difficult problems facing the governm ent 
was the composition of the new agency. In 1984, Chirac had proposed that the 
President of the Republic should appoint one mem ber w ith six others to be 
nom inated by the grands corps and the different Académies, On the other 
hand, in January 1986, Giscard suggested that it should consist only of 
rep resen ta tives  from  the grands corps and , consisten t w ith  G oyou- 
Beaucham ps's original directive, it was largely this form ula that figured in 
the first draft of the bill in April 1986. Here, three people were to be appointed 
by each of the three grands corps, nam ely, the Conseil d 'E tat, C our de 
Cassation and Cour des Comptes. These three people w ould then co-opt three 
professionals from the broadcasting sector and these six w ould proceed to co­
opt one further member.
This proposal, however, m et w ith opposition from M atignon, m ost 
notably from Maurice Ulrich, Chirac's directeur de cabinet, U lrich's position 
m eant that he had a overall view of the policy process, but he followed the 
passage of this bill w ith particular interest due to his long experience of the 
broadcasting system, notably as head of A2 until 1981. While Ulrich was not 
opposed to the presence of the grands corps, he felt that the agency w ould lack
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legitim acy w ithou t any political representation .24 N ot being a decision, 
how ever, which could be agreed upon in réunions interministérielles, the 
m atter was discussed in a comité interministériel in May 1986. This meeting 
was chaired by Chirac in the presence of other senior ministers and Ulrich. At 
this m eeting U lrich's view point prevailed. Léotard was unw illing to insist 
upon the above formula, preferring to compromise on this issue so as to win 
on others. It was decided, therefore, that the CNCL w ould consist of three 
people appointed by the President of the Republic and by the Presidents of the 
tw o parliam entary Chambers. Three people w ould be nam ed by the grands 
corps, w hilst these six w ould then co-opt three others. N ot only did this 
form ula give the agency m ore legitimacy, but it also gave it a right w ing 
m ajority due to the traditionally conservative nature o f the grands corps and 
the righ t w ing parliam entary m ajority at that time. This was the form ula 
adopted in the Conseil des Ministres on June 11th.
Im mediately, however, the governm ent came under pressure to alter 
the  com position. Both the RPR and the UDF groups in the Assemblé 
nationale had set up  their own working parties to study the bill and both had 
reached different conclusions to the governm ent and to each other as to the 
best formula. More im portantly, on June 12th, Chirac received a letter from 
three m em bers of the Académie française form ally requesting tha t their 
organisation be represented on the CNCL. This initiative was inspired by a 
dual m otivation. Firstly, the Academy was seen as the guardian of French 
culture and, therefore, it w ould not be ou t of place on the CNCL. This 
argum ent was popu lar am ongst those people w orried by the prospect of 
cultural standards being lowered following the privatisation of TFl. Secondly, 
those people who proposed the idea and those who were behind the proposal, 
notably Academicians Alain Peyrefitte and Edgar Faure, w ere close to the 
H ersant group. The proposal was one way in which H ersant could be assured
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a voice on the CNCL. Indeed, the implications of this proposal were not lost 
on at least one adviser at Matignon.
From this point on, two things were clear: firstly, that neither Chirac 
nor Léotard were willing to battle on this question^S and, secondly, that the 
naked intention of at least the parliam entarians was to ensure that the CNCL 
w ould be endowed with a right wing majority. The m atter came to a head in 
early July w ith the examination by the Sénat of the CNCL's composition. The 
special senatorial commission on broadcasting had  tw o options which it 
preferred  to the governm ent's. The first involved a comm ission of nine 
mem bers: three appointed by the three Presidents as before, three by the 
grands corps and one by the Académie française, w ith these seven to co-opt 
tw o others. The second was that of a 12 member commission w ith the same 
form ula, b u t w ith the Presidents nam ing six people betw een them . The 
m atter was finally decided over a lunch at M atignon on  July 3rd which 
b ro u g h t together sen ior governm ent M in isters and  leaders of the 
parliam entary majority.
At this m eeting and despite U lrich's opposition, it was first of all 
decided to accept the introduction of the Académie française. This proposal 
m ade the Hersant group happy and it seemed to ensure a right wing majority. 
H ow ever, the parliam entarians w ere not sure tha t this m easure w ould 
ensure a majority. They believed that the grands corps, after five years of 
socialist rule, m ight elect people unfavourable to the governm ent. It was 
rem arked, for example, that the President of the Cour des Comptes, André 
Chandem agor, was a socialist and that both he and  the vice-President of the 
Conseil d 'E tat were known to frequent the Elysée from time to time. In order 
to be sure of a right w ing majority, therefore, it was decided to follow the 
Senate's second option and to double the num ber of people appointed by the 
three Presidents and to increase the num ber of people co-opted to three, 
bringing the num ber of members up to thirteen.
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The above example is a good illustration of the nature of the Prime 
M in iste r 's  role du rin g  cohabitation . In  all of the  decisive m eetings 
concerning the com position of the CNCL, it w as the Prim e M inister's 
arb itration  which w as final. There was no higher au thority  w hich could 
question his decision. There was no person to whom  those people w ho had 
been defeated could turn in order to try and have the decision reversed. In 
this way, the Prime Minister's role during this period was reminiscent of that 
of the President previously. While, this situation represented a sea change in 
the policy making process of the Fifth Republic, it was the norm  between 1986 
and 1988.
The choice of which television channel to privatise was an equally 
d iv isive issue. The m etam orphosis of the trad itionally  state o rien tated  
gaullists into fully fledged neo-liberals took place progressively throughout 
the early part of the 1980s, at least at the level of the party  leadership. One of 
the earliest m anifestations of this transform ation w as Chirac's 1984 press 
conference during  which he proposed the privatisation of tw o television 
companies, one of which was to be FR3, though the other was not specified. A 
sim ilar com m itm ent to the num ber of com panies to be p rivatised  w as 
contained in the M arch 1986 RPR-UDF electoral platform  and in G iscard's 
January 1986 bill. Once again, Goyou-Beauchamps took this bill as his starting 
point and he proposed the choice, w ith Leotard's full approval, of A2, plus a 
complete reorganisation and a partial privatisation of FR3. However, w ithin a 
m onth of coming to power, conflicting positions had  form ulated w ithin the 
governm ent and the choice of the num ber of channels to be p rivatised  
proved to be highly controversial.
Two questions were discussed in interministerial committee meetings. 
Firstly, the  num ber of channels to be p rivatised  and , secondly, w hich 
channels were to be chosen. Meetings were held on the 12th and 14th May to 
decide these questions. At these m eetings Chirac (the chairm an), Ulrich,
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Léotard, Longuet, Balladur (the Finance Minister), M adelin (Industry), Juppé 
(Budget), Cabana (Privatisation), Pasqua (Interior), Chalandon (Justice) w ere 
present.
U lrich w as in favour of privatising only one channel. As early  as 
January 1986, he had  w ritten to Chirac to w arn of the dangers of a full-scale 
reform  of the  b roadcasting  system.26 The lack of tim e before the 1988 
presidential elections and the social problem s tha t such a reform  w ould  
induce were the m ain reasons for his fears. In this view he was backed u p  by 
Prêches and by a significant part of the RPR, particularly in the Sénat. This 
latter group represented  the traditional tendency w ithin the party  w hich 
preferred to see changes am ongst the public sector personnel, rather than  a 
reorganisation of the system. They m ade their views know n to Chirac before 
the interministerial committee meetings were held.
At the same time, it had  become clear even am ongst Léotard's closest 
advisers that the mechanics of privatisating a television company were m uch 
more difficult than had at first been thought. The problem s involved w ere 
highly com plicated and a different procedure w as needed to the o ther 
privatisations that the governm ent was undertaking. As a result. Leotard d id  
not insist upon the im m ediate privatisation of tw o channels, bu t only on  a 
long-term  com m itm ent to a second. Despite L éotard 's liberalism  and the 
opposition's electoral commitment, therefore, it was decided to privatise only 
a single company.
The decision as to which company to choose was m uch more difficult. 
Léotard and his PR colleagues, G érard Longuet and  Alain M adelin, had  
publicly come o u t in  favour of A2. To choose anything other than  this 
channel, therefore, w ould be to embarrass the M inister w ho supposedly had 
responsibility for the  bill. It w ould also create an unfavourable clim ate 
between the RPR and the PR and, indeed, the UDF as a whole, because behind 
the scenes Giscard had  supported Léotard's choice of A2. Having refused the
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privatisation of two channels and with Chirac wanting to count upon the full 
support of the UDF at any future second round  presidential election ballot, 
the  Prim e M inister could only go against L eotard 's option  w ith  great 
difficulty.
Chirac's own advisers, however, were strongly in favour of the choice 
of FR3 and had  been lobbying the Prim e M inister to this end for several 
weeks. Ulrich felt that FR3 represented the least destabilising option and that 
it w ould also rid the state of the station's enorm ous financial deficit accrued 
over the years.27 Others, more cynically, believed that Ulrich was trying to 
pro tect his form er interests at A2. In any case, Ulrich was supported  by 
Prêches and, indeed, by Hersant who saw the opportunity here to increase his 
influence.28 Unfortunately for this group, the technical problem s associated 
w ith a privatisation of FR3 were even greater than those of any other station 
because of its unique structure. In addition, a week before the interministerial 
committee, Chirac had m et with representatives of the regional press lobby 
and, having m ooted the possibility of privatising FR3, found that they were 
strongly opposed to the measure, seeing their interests threatened.29
A t the first interm inisterial com m ittee m eeting, both  U lrich and 
Léotard pu t forward their respective views and neither were willing to back 
dow n. Towards the end of the m eeting, first Balladur and then M adelin, 
suggested that as a compromise TFl ought to be considered. This proposal 
came too late to be fully discussed and another meeting was scheduled for two 
days later. In the meantim e, Ulrich addressed another letter to the Prime 
M inister in favour of FR3, whilst Léotard contacted Giscard who between 
them  decided that either TFl, or A2 w ould be acceptable, although their 
preference was for the latter.30
The second meeting followed the same course as the first w ith neither 
Ulrich nor Léotard changing their views. In the face of a renewed attem pt at a
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compromise in favour of TFl by Balladur, Chirac came to see this solution as 
a w ay out of the impasse and it was accepted by Léotard.
Although clearly a compromise, TFl was chosen for seemingly sound 
financial, technical and political reasons. It was losing as m uch money as FR3, 
therefore , the governm ent's budgetary  problem s w ould  be eased; its 
p rivatisation  was technically easier than  that of FR3; it w as already a 
generalised, commercial channel, which was likely to m ake it appealing to 
investors; it was sufficiently im portant so as not to be seen as a snub to 
Léotard; and its chairm an was Hervé Bourges, a socialist, w ho w ould be 
obliged to leave once privatised. Therefore, although a comprom ise, there 
was reasoning behind Chirac's arbitration.
A part from problems within the company itself, the choice of TFl was 
no t w ell received by everyone w ithin  the governm ental coalition. The 
question came up for discussion again during the debate on the bill in the 
Sénat. The existence of a conservative elem ent w ithin the RPR senatorial 
group has already been noted, bu t the senatorial majority as a whole was 
highly critical of the text. They argued that it had been draw n up  hastily and 
that they had not been consulted by Léotard. The result was that a large 
num ber of am endm ents were proposed and the bill advanced only very 
slowly.
After two weeks of the extraordinary parliam entary session and w ith 
only 30 articles having been examined, Jean-Pierre Fourcade, president of the 
senatorial commission, asked Chirac to convoke a m eeting at M atignon to 
discuss the bill's future.^l At this meeting it was proposed on behalf of the 
senatorial majority that, in order to speed up its passage, the bill should be 
split into two parts, namely, the privatisation of TFl and the rest. It was also 
proposed that the examination of the first part should be delayed until the 
autum n. W hile Frèches was in favour of this option, Léotard was violently 
o p p o s e d . 3 2  The Minister had already been criticised for his handling of the bill
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in the Senate and saw  this proposal as underm ining his au thority  even
further. The Prime Minister arbitrated in Léotard's favour, fearing Léotard's
im m ediate resignation and electoral repercussions by the UDF a t the next
elections if he did  not. Chirac was also aware of the technical difficulties
involved in cutting up  such a complex bill. In return , the Sénat's standing
orders were scrutinized and a way was found to accelerate the passage of the
bill w ithout resorting to it being split up.
Once the choice of channel had been made, the problem rem ained as to
how  it should be privatised. One of the m ost difficult sections of the bill
concerned the privatisation procedure for TFl. The m ixture of technical and
political difficulties that the government faced led to w hat one adviser called
"un  débat sanglant". These difficulties sta rted  im m ediately  after the
governm ent's formation, even before the decision as to which chaimel was to
be privatised had been taken.
As Finance M inister, Balladur had  been given the responsibility of
preparing the technicalities behind the privatisation of all of the companies
chosen by the governm ent. N aturally , he assum ed that his brief w ould
include that of the chosen television company. Léotard, however, informed
Chirac that, as Culture Minister, he ought to control this process. His request
was formally pu t to the Prime Minister on 24th March 1986:
La préparation  et la m ise en oeuvre de certains organism es ou 
entreprises du secteur de la communication relèvent évidem m ent de 
m on ministère. Une position contraire aurait pratiquem ent pour effet, 
compte tenu des projets du gouvernement, de vider de toute substance 
la dimension 'communication' de mon département.33
In part, this dem and was an example of the norm al jockeying for position
that occurs at the start of any new administration. Ministers generally know
that if they lose control of a certain sector at the start, it is very difficult to win
it back later on. Here, the two Ministers were engaged in competition for the
control of the same sector, thus necessitating a Prim e Ministerial arbitration.
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Chirac's decision favoured Balladur. This decision was consistent w ith the 
logic of the other privatisations, bu t it also reflected the Finance M inister's 
close ties w ith  the Prime Minister, som ething that w as also show n in the 
budgetary negotiations at this time. All witnesses asserted, therefore, that the 
details of T F l's privatisation were largely controlled by Balladur and Jacques 
Friedm an, his economic adv iser.^  In all hum ility, Léotard now  asserts that 
his M inistry w ould not have had the adm inistrative resources to draw  up 
these details by itself.35 At the time, therefore, he was obliged to w ork 
alongside Balladur; he was not able to supplant him.
Once the choice of TFl had  been m ade, Balladur w as able to start 
detailing the m anner in which it w ould be privatised. It w as im m ediately 
clear that TFl was a special case and that a different procedure to the other 
privatisations would be necessary. In fact, the final text was a m ixture of the 
normal privatisation procedure as adopted by the governm ent for the rest of 
its program m e and the assurance that the cultural obligations required from a 
national television company would be respected. This m ixture was testimony 
to the specificity of TFl, but also reflected the way in which Léotard and his 
cabinet, along w ith Frèches, worked alongside Balladur and Friedman.
For every other privatisation, an independent comm ission set the 
m inim um  share price of the company, w ith the Finance M inister then being 
free to offer the shares at whatever price he saw fit, so long as it was not below 
the m inim um  level. Usually, the price was not fixed far above the m inimum, 
so that a large set of potential investors were w illing to p u t in a bid. The 
governm ent then allotted a fixed percentage of shares to be placed in the 
hands of a stable set of investors, or noyau dur, personally  selected by 
Balladur.
W ith regard to the privatisation of TFl, there w as never any question 
that the  Privatisation Com m ission w ould  no t be called upon  to fix a 
m inim um  price. The first difficult decision, how ever, w as w hether the
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governm ent, or the CNCL should appoint the noyau dur. In fact, this m atter 
w as resolved rather quickly, as all w ere agreed that to avoid giving the 
im pression that the governm ent still controlled the system, it should be the 
CNCL.
Much more divisive was the question as to w hat the criteria were to be 
by which the CNCL chose the stable set of investors. There were those people 
w ho w anted to see the application of a purely financial criterion, whereby the 
group  that offered the m ost am ount of m oney for the channel w ould be 
aw arded it. This is w hat Goyou-Beauchamps described as the "mieux disant 
financier"  option.36 Then, there w ere those people w ho argued that the 
decision should  be based on a different criterion, such as the g roup 's 
obligations to the am ount of educational program m es it w ould broadcast, or 
its com m itm ent to children 's progam m es, for exam ple. Instead, Léotard 
him self invented the notion of the 'mieux disant culturel', w hereby the 
CNCL w ould choose the group which m et or bettered the m inim um  price, 
b u t w hich also com m itted itself to the m axim um  num ber of cultural 
obligations. This decision was inspired by the desire to avoid the accusation 
that the channel w ould simply go to the highest b idder and was designed to 
show  tha t privatisation  d id  not necessarily entail a decline in  cultural 
standards. This form ula w as accepted by Chirac and  Balladur and  was laid 
dow n in Article 64 of the law.
The other major decision involved the m axim um  percentage of shares 
that any one person could hold in the company. The original ordinance 
laying dow n the general rules for the privatisation program m e w as very 
vague on this point. N o maximum percentage was specified. Therefore, it was 
up  to the governm ent to fix the limit in each case. W ith regard to TFl, the 
debate centred around  the com peting proposals of Léotard and  Balladur. 
Léotard, in conform ity w ith a recognised principle of com pany law, p u t 
forw ard  a threshold  of 33.3 per cent, or the m inim um  am oun t which
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provides a veto over company policy decisions. Balladur, on the other hand, 
w anted a w idespread dispersal of capital, w ith a m axim um  of 15 per cent. 
Indeed, this was the figure that appeared in Goyou-Beauchamp's first draft of 
the bill, reflecting Bahadur's influence over the privatisation details. When 
Léotard challenged this figure, how ever, Chirac was again called upon to 
arbitrate. Indeed, the Prime Minister accepted a suggestion m ade by U l r i c h . 3 7  
Nam ely, that a compromise figure of 25 per cent should be chosen, whereby 
both M inisters w ould be satisfied. This figure also represented the level at 
which the majority shareholding for the other privatisations had been fixed.
The January 1989 Broadcasting Law.
In the short period between the prom ulgation of the Loi Léotard and the May 
1988 presidential elections, the m ain problem s in the area of broadcasting 
su rrounded  the CNCL itself. Its righ t w ing m ajority w as im m ediately 
criticised by the opposition once the nam es of its m em bers w ere m ade 
known. It suffered internal problem s due to a divisive presidential contest 
between two of its members, Gabriel de Broglie and Jean Autin. One of its first 
decisions was the highly controversial reattribution of the franchises of La 5 
and M6 to people broadly associated w ith the new  governm ent, w ith  the 
former largely coming under Robert H ersant's control. It was accused of pro- 
governm ental bias in its handling of the 1987 N ew  Caledonian referendum . 
In addition, its reputation was badly tarnished w hen one of its members, 
Michel Droit, the representative of the Académie française, had to leave due 
to allegations that he had illegally aw arded franchises to certain local radio 
stations in which he had an interest.
It was against this background that M itterrand called the CNCL, "peu 
digne de respect", in a new spaper interview  in late 1987. In his election 
m anifesto. La Lettre aux Français, M itterrand pledged that if re-elected, it 
would quickly be abolished. He added, rather ironically, that the CNCL, "aura
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eu le m érite de m ontrer ce qu'il ne fallait pas faire". After the elections, a new 
C om m unications M inister, Catherine Tasca (a form er, b u t un tarn ished , 
CNCL m em ber and  presiden tia l confidante), w as appo in ted  w ith  the 
responsibility for drafting a new law  aimed at replacing the ephemeral CNCL.
Even more than most election manifestos. La Lettre aux Français was a 
relatively vague and undetailed docum ent. The fact that in the letter the 
section on broadcasting only dealt w ith the replacement of the CNCL seemed 
to rule out any major reorganisation of the system. Any plans to renationalise 
TFl also seemed to be ruled out due to the presidential commitment to the 
'n i - n i' principle of no further privatisations nor nationalisations. However, 
the letter did  suggest a name for the new authority, the Conseil Supérieur de 
l'A udiovisuel (CSA), bu t there was no m ention of its fu ture structure or 
powers. It d id  stress, however, that the CSA should, if possible, enter the 
Constitution, thus putting an end to the chop and change of authorities. As a 
result, despite the desire expressed in some quarters of the PS, Tasca m ade it 
clear from the outset that the new law w ould confine itself primarily w ith the 
creation of a new  regulatory authority and little more.
This decision was confirmed at the end of a meeting of the Conseil des 
m inistres devoted alm ost entirely to this subject on July 4th 1988. This 
m eeting also accepted the joint proposition of Tasca and  Lang (Culture 
M inister), backed up  by the new Prime Minister, Michel Rocard, to set up  a 
commission of experts to recommend to the governm ent the powers that the 
CSA should  be given. This proposition w as insp ired  partly  o u t of the 
governm ent's desire to legislate in a different m anner to Léotard, w ho drew  
up  the 1986 law "dans le secret d u  cabinet"^®, and partly out of the desire to 
draw  m ore people into the preparatory process. In this way, it was thought 
that the bill would stand a greater chance of winning enough support to allow 
it be voted into the Constitution. This proposition was also consistent w ith 
the 'méthode Rocard', w hereby any m ajor bill should  be preceded by a
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com m ission set up  to study  the problem s involved and  to  suggest a 
consensual way forward.
Despite these motivations, it was also clear that there was to be no 
repeat of the Moinot Commission. The group was given instructions to study 
the problem s surrounding the creation of a new authority, bu t not to embark 
upon an overall critique of the broadcasting system. It consisted of only seven 
m em bers and  there w ere no sub-com m issions, or w orking parties. The 
m em bers were appointed by the Prime Minister, in  close consultation with 
Tasca and Lang, and included em inent jurists, such as Pierre Avril, and also 
Françoise Giroud, a Minister during Giscard's Presidency.
The commission m et, on average, four tim es a week, although on 
num erous occasions only three or four of its members were present. It m et at 
the  Com m unications M inistry, in the presence of one of Tasca's advisers, 
Bertrand Delcros. Its work consisted of interviewing representatives from the 
broadcasting industry and of asking them how they would set about creating a 
new  authority. By the end of August it had seen nearly 100 people and Delcros 
had  sum m arised its findings in a short report which was then presented to 
Tasca.
D uring this time there were also several réunions interministérielles. 
C haired by Sylvie Hubac, R ocard 's adviser on broadcasting affairs, they 
involved only a small num ber of people, such as Delcros, Dominique Meyer, 
a m em ber of Lang's cabinet, and Bruno Chetaille from the Elysée. In fact, it 
w as in these m eetings, before the com m ission's report, that m ost of the 
im portant decisions were taken. Or rather, these meetings ratified agreements 
m ade betw een  the  sam e people  beforehand  in  unofficial m eetings, 
encounters and telephone c o n v e r s a t i o n s . ^ ^  Such was the agreem ent between 
those  p resen t a t these  m eetings, th a t on ly  one in fo rm al c o m ité  
interministériel was needed on this subject, although on several occasions
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there w ere informal meetings and lunches at the Elysée in the presence of 
M itterrand.
In the desire to draft a bill that would win sufficient support for it to go 
in to  the C onstitu tion, the Prim e M inister arranged  a series of highly 
publicised m eetings w ith representatives of all of the major parties. They 
were invited to come to Matignon and to discuss the project w ith the Prime 
Minister, Tasca and Lang. Between the 20th and the 29th September, Mauroy 
(PS), M éhaignerie (CDS), Marchais (PC), Juppé (RPR), Léotard (PR) and the 
form er Prim e M inister, Raym ond Barre, all took up  this offer. These 
meetings, however, had little effect on the w ording of the text and once again 
they served mainly as a media exerdse.^O Indeed, in private, the government 
had already given up  hope of seeing the bill enter the Constitution, at least 
im m ediately.
The bill was examined by the Conseil d 'E tat on October 6th and only 
m inor changes were made. It was presented to the Conseil des m inistres on 
October 12th and pu t before the Sénat two days later, with the Prime Minister 
having dedared  the bill to be of urgent importance. Discussion in the Sénat 
took place between Novem ber Sth-lOth w here im portant am endm ents were 
passed by the opposition majority. In the Assemblée nationale, however, the 
governm ent's text was largely restored, although several concessions were 
m ade to the centrist group, the UDC, in order to try  and w in their support. 
With the PS only having a relative majority and w ith the PC having dedared  
that they w ould not support the text, the governm ent needed the UDC's 
support so as to pass the bill w ithout recourse to A rtide  49-3, som ething that 
it wished to avoid. On the bill's first reading the UDC abstained allowing it to 
pass. On December 21st, at the second reading, how ever, the UDC line 
hardened, with Méhaignerie imposing conditions for his group's support that 
the governm ent could not accept. Therefore, the use of A rtide  49-3 was 
necessitated. The bill was subm itted to the Conseil constitutionnel the next
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day and its decision was delivered on January 17th 1989 in which only a few 
m inor points were struck down. The next day the bill became law.
In contrast to the two previous texts, this law  contained only 30 articles. 
In this respect, it is easier to focus upon the m ost im portant debates w ithout 
losing sight of the contents of the bill as a whole. However, as before, there is 
insufficient room  here to study  everything and so tw o areas of decision 
m ak ing  have been chosen. These areas deal respectively  w ith  the 
composition and the powers of the CSA.
The Lettre aux Français only obliquely hinted at the future composition 
of the CSA. In its eulogy of the H aute Autorité, it w ent into detail about the 
way in which its members were appointed. Whilst it d id not commit the new 
governm ent to this particular form ula, it was a clear h in t as to w hat the 
preferred presidential option was to be. Nevertheless, during the preparation 
of the bill num erous different solutions were p u t forward, although no-one
h i M S e J p
was w illing to commit th em selves strongly to any particular alternative 
form ulation .
By contrast, the commission of experts did come up w ith a suggestion 
which w on favour with certain people in governm ent circles. They proposed 
the sam e composition as the H aute Autorité, but w ith  the m em bers' names 
being sim ply announced by the President of the  Republic after secret 
consultations had  taken place betw een the three people involved. It was 
hoped that this solution w ould avoid the members being branded from the 
outset as representatives of a particular person or party, whilst still guarding 
the authority 's political legitimacy.^!
However, Tasca was opposed to this solution She favoured a simple 
return  to the 1982 situation.42 She asked for her proposal to be endorsed by 
the President during a lunch at the Elysée where the bill was to be discussed. 
Also present were Alain Simon, a former member of Fillioud's cabinet and a 
presidential friend and author of the broadcasting section of the Lettre aux
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Français; Gilles Ménage and Jean Kahn, both  presidential advisers; Tasca; 
Hubac; and  Roger Lesgards, Tasca's directeur de cabinet. Of these people, 
Simon favoured the proposal of the com m ission of experts, M itterrand, 
however, did not and he arbitrated in Tasca's fa v o u r  43
D uring the passage of the bill through the Sénat the text was changed 
by the opposition majority there, so as to allow the grands corps to appoint 
three of the nine members. This proposal was rejected by the governm ent In 
the Assemblée nationale, however, this question was one of the major points 
of discussion w ith the UDC w ith  a view  to w inning their support and 
avoiding the use of Article 49-3. Jacques Barrot, one of the leading UDC 
m em bers and  an im portan t figure  in  the  parliam en tary  com m ission 
examining the law, was in favour of his group supporting the text in return 
for the  governm ent's  acceptance of a series of am endm ents. In the 
parliam entary commission he worked closely w ith Jean-Jacques Quéyranne, 
PS spokesperson, and obtained several quite substantial concessions. Rocard 
and Tasca were willing to accept these concessions in return  for the UDC's 
support, still w ith an eye to the bill's entry into the Constitution at a later 
date. One of the points, however, on which neither Rocard nor Tasca would 
cede was the CSA's composition. This was a presidential arbitration and could 
only be reversed by M itterrand himself. The President was unwilling to do so.
The UDC, however, still insisted that the CSA's composition be altered. 
Even its m ost conciliatory m embers were unhappy  to support a bill which 
w ould leave the authority w ith a potential socialist majority. M oreover, the 
UDC had  already just supported the law  installing the Revenu M inimum  
d'Insertion  (RMI) and had  voted w ith the governm ent to pass the 1989 
budget. To support the government again w ould be to anger even further the 
RPR and UDF whose support the group needed at the municipal elections in 
March 1989. Méhaignerie, seeing the need to dissociate his group from the 
governm ent, insisted that it vote against the bill. Barrot, still favouring an
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agreem ent and aw are that the governm ent w ould w ithdraw  hard  fought
concessions if it were forced to use Article 49-3, was still conciliatory. He
publicly argued that there was no magic formula and that the present one was
as good as any.44 As Barrot himself stated, however:
Je n 'a i m alheureusem ent été suivi ... par certains m em bres de mon 
groupe parlem entaire qui m ettaient eux, en question, la composition 
du  CSA. C'est ainsi que nous sommes arrivés à un  vote négatif.45
B arrofs fears were realised as the governm ent refused to compromise. The
UDC voted against the bill and the use of Article 49-3 saw the disappearance
of several of Barrot's amendments.
The range of powers that the new  authority w ould enjoy was another
of the major issues that the law  dealt with. These powers covered three main
topics. Firstly, the powers it should have to set production quotas for both the
public and private television companies, sponsorship rules and limits to the
num ber of films m ade for the cinema to be broadcast on television. Secondly,
the role it should play vis-à-vis the public stations, w hether it should appoint
their managing directors, or whether it should share out the licence fee itself.
Thirdly, w hether it should have the same wide range of responsibilities as the
CNCL, over telecommunications, for example.
W hile there w ere m any different argum ents involved w ith  these
problems and m any different interests involved, it is possible to study them
all together. W hat united them was that they raised a single, bu t fundam ental
issue th a t d iv ided  the governm ent and  parliam ent alike, nam ely, the
distribution of these powers between the government and the CSA.
W ithin the governm ent, it was clear that there w ere tw o opposing
tendecies. On the one hand, there were those who felt that the CSA should be
given as w ide a range of powers as possible. This was the position of Hubac at
M atignon and possibly Delcros at the Com m unications M inistry. On the
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other hand, Tasca, Kahn and Leroy, the head of the SJTI, were all in favour of 
the CSA policing the system, bu t of the governm ent draw ing up the rules.
This cleavage could be seen on the question of production quotas, for 
example. In order that the governm ent's influence over the system be seen to 
end, H ubac argued that the CSA should  fix them . Tasca, how ever, was 
opposed, arguing that the economic and industrial im plications of these 
quotas m eant that they were too im portant to be fixed by anyone bu t the 
g o v e r n m e n t . ^ 6  The same positions were held over who should set the cahiers 
des charges of the public television companies. Hubac felt that the CSA could 
happily fulfil this task, whereas Tasca felt that, given the CSA's pow ers to 
sanction the companies, this proposal w ould m ake it both judge and  jury. 
Tasca also argued that, because the state funded the public stations, it had  the 
right to determine w hat they should and should not be d o i n g . 4 7
The debate betw een the tw o sides, how ever, w as now here near as 
'b loody' as it had been in 1986. N either H ubac nor Tasca defended these 
positions to their logical extremes. Jean Kahn's initial suggestion that, because 
the CSA w as not to be responsible before Parliament, it should not be given 
any pow ers of note was quickly rejected by T a s c a . 4 8  While at no time did  
Hubac envisage that the CSA w ould be allowed to share out the licence fee 
revenue between the public channels. Due to the experience of the last decade 
and  the political situation  in w hich the governm ent found  itself, the  
protagonists w ere generally aware of the lim its w ithin which they had  to 
remain. W ithin these limits, however, people argued their case tenaciously.
Interesting, here, is the SJTI's role. Similar to the 1982 situation, the 
head of the SJTI, Thierry Leroy, appointed in July 1988, had his own particular 
blueprint for the CSA. A t the same time, his particular view  of a top dv il 
servant's role was that he should not simply adm inister orders given to him 
by the Ministers responsible, but that he should tell the government w hat he, 
as an expert, thought policy should be.49 Thus, in debates, such as the one
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over w ho should fix the production quotas, the SJTI's role w as far from 
neutral. As someone close to Lang, Leroy's proposals w ere certainly better 
received by the government than were Cousin's suggestions in 1982.
Policy conflict, however, m eant the need for arbitration. There were 
three d istinct levels of arbitration. For the m ost difficult questions, the 
President was called upon to decide. Thus, it was he w ho resolved the 
problem  of who was to set the cahier des charges. Here, both tendencies were 
unable  to agree a solution w ithou t the P residen t's  in tervention. It is 
im portant, however, to dispel the notion that, in  1988 at least, broadcasting 
belonged to the reserved dom ain of presiden tia l interests.^O His direct 
involvem ent was confined to an Elysée lunch. Broadcasting was considered 
to be too base an issue for him to deal with in his second term of office.
The Prime Minister arbitrated a second level of problems. For example, 
the question of w hether the CSA should  au thorise  installations in the 
telecommunications sector, as the CNCL had done before. Paul Quilès (PTT 
Minister) was opposed to this measure, Tasca w as in favour and the Prime 
M inister was called upon to decide between them , w ith Quilès w inning the 
day.
However, by far the greatest num ber of decisions were taken in the 
réunions interministérielles. It is w orth  noting that in these m eetings the 
role of the presidential advisers, in conform ity w ith an unw ritten  ru le  of 
M itte rrand 's  second septennat, was to observe and then to inform  the 
President, rather than to take an active part in the discussions on his behalf.
More often than not, the result of these arbitrations, at whatever level 
they m ay have taken place, was a compromise. Victory was rarely total for 
either one side or the other. As Delcros rather idiosyncratically p u t it: "Un 
arbitrage, ce n 'est pas un arbitre, quelqu'un sur son trône, mais une salade."5I 
An arbitration was a compromise arrived at through bargaining, rather than a 
royal proclam ation. So, for exam ple, on the question of the production
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quotas, it was agreed that the governm ent w ould issue a decree fixing them, 
but that this decree would be examined by the CSA whose opinion of it would 
consequently be m ade public. A similar agreement was reached for the cahier 
des charges.
It m ust also be noted that some of the things which influenced the 
final outcom e of the above decisions were unforeseeable a t the start of the 
process, or w ere independen t of the argum ents of those involved. For 
exam ple, one of the major factors that resulted in arbitrations generally 
favourable to Tasca 's v iew poin t w as the strike  in  the  pub lic  sector 
b roadcasting  service th a t sta rted  in  Septem ber 1988. The strike  was 
particularly disruptive and it was the governm ent's responsibility to try  and 
end it, w ith M atignon leading the secret negotiations to this end. This strike 
brought hom e to the governm ent just how implicated it was in the running 
of the public sector system and it was realised that this situation w ould not
change even if the CSA's powers were to be as great as possible. Leroy believed
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that w ithout this strike the result of the arbitrations m ay have been very
different^2, whilst one contem porary newspaper close to the PS sum m ed up
the situation as follows:
D 'une certaine manière, les faits ont arbitré: lorsqu'il y a une crise, c'est 
toujours vers cet Etat si décrié que les partenaires se tournent. Et 
Rocard a fini par trancher en faveur de Tasca, contre l'av is de ses 
propres conseillers, qui voulaient, eux, donner tou t le pouvo ir au 
Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel.53
Exogeneous factors, such as this strike breaking out w hen it did , will always
add an element of unpredictability to the policy process.
So far, w e have presented  the governm ental side of the process.
Parliam ent's role, how ever, m ust not be underestim ated . P arliam ent's
influence varies according to the political circum stances of the day. In
December 1988, these circumstances were in Parliam ent's favour. As a  result
of the Prime M inister's desire to see the law passed w ithout the use of Article
8 9
49-3, the governm ent accepted several UDC amendm ents. Barrot m et with 
Delcros, Tasca, Lang and  Q uéyranne to negotiate their w o r d i n g . 5 4  For 
exam ple, the  issue of production quotas w as reopened. Barrot w as still 
favourable to the CSA fixing them and a compromise was reached whereby 
after 18 m onths it w ould do so, until w hich tim e the governm ent w ould 
have  this responsibility . A sim ilar agreem ent w as reached  over the 
teleconununications issue, w here the Prim e M inister w ent back upon  his 
earlier arbitration and allowed the CSA to guard its responsibilities in this 
area until the passage of a new law.
As w ith the previous example, however, M éhaignerie's unwillingness 
to  vote the  bill m eant that some of these concessions w ere w ithdraw n. 
M éhaignerie m ade it one of his conditions for the UDC's support that the 
CSA be given responsibility for the production quotas right from the outset. 
W ith the governm ent unwilling to accept his conditions as a whole, the UDC 
refused to support the bill. The governm ent then w ithdrew  the am endm ent 
it had agreed with Barrot and the CSA lost all powers in this area.
Conclusion
The three case studies considered above enable us to draw  some preliminary 
conclusions about the nature of the policy process in France and about the 
influence of the Prim e Minister w ithin that process. A lthough at this stage 
these conclusions will necessarily be incomplete, they will provide us w ith a 
background from which better to approach the chapters to come.
The above case studies threw  into relief the mechanics of the policy 
m aking process. In essence, there w ere tw o parts  to this process: the 
intragovem m ental part; and the extragovem m ental part. The form er refers 
to the bargaining which took place between governm ent members, largely 
before the w ording of the bill was finalised. The latter refers to the influence
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of extragovem m ental actors in the process, such as the Conseil d 'E tat and 
Parliam ent.
The intragovem m ental part of the policy process typically consisted of 
three stages, nam ely, réunions interministérielles, comités interministériels 
and conseils. As we saw in the case of the 1982 broadcasting bill, these three 
stages m ay be com plem ented by a special com m ission, o r inform al 
encounters, however, these three sets of meetings w ere the occasions when 
arbitrations occurred. In this sense, together they were the site of the decision 
m aking process.
There was a clear hierarchy of meetings. Réunions were followed by 
comités, which in tu m  were followed, if necessary, by conseils. A t réunions 
only m embers of ministerial cabinets were present, as well as senior members 
of the perm anent administration, such as the SJTI. A t comités M inisters were 
present, w hile senior cabinet m em bers w ere also occasionally inv ited  to 
attend. Comités were chaired by the Prime M inister personally. At réunions 
the sam e people were present as for comités, except for the President w ho 
attended and chaired the meeting. The only tim e w hen this process was 
disturbed was during the period of cohabitation when there were no conseils, 
as the President was absent from decision making.
This series of meetings acted as a filter system for the decision m aking 
process. Réunions served to decide technical m atters, or non-controversial 
political issues. Thus, for example, it was at this stage during the preparation 
of the 1989 Broadcasting Act that m any of the details of the CSA's powers 
were agreed upon. Comités were held to resolve m atters w here there were 
interm inisterial disputes. Here, the Prim e M inister w as called upon  to 
arbitrate, for exam ple in the dispute betw een Tasca and  Quilès in  1989. 
Conseils w ere the top tier of the arbitration process w here the President had 
to intervene on issues which were either too im portant to be decided upon in 
comités, such as the over the composition of the CSA in 1989, or w here the
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Prim e M inister's arbitration had been challenged, such as on the question of 
advertising on local radio in 1982..
It is im portant to stress, how ever, that a t all three stages of the 
intragovem m ental decision making process, the arbitrations which occurred 
w ere not haphazard. The arbitration process w as a bargaining process. It 
invo lved  negotiations and  com prom ises betw een all the  pro tagonists 
concerned. For example, in 1982 the decision not to  set up  the SNT was 
counterbalanced by new  production agreem ents betw een the SFP and the 
broadcasting companies. Similarly, in 1986 the decision to privatise TFl was 
arrived at as a compromise between the conflicting dem ands of those people 
w ho wished to see A2 chosen and those w ho w anted it to be FR3. Along with 
the observation that the policy process was a bargaining process, involving 
negotiations and  compromise, goes the assertion that the influence of the 
Prim e M inister cannot be considered in isolation, bu t that it m ust be judged 
alongside the influence of the other protagonists. We will return  to this point 
in the chapters to follow.
In addition to the intragovem m ental p a rt of the process, w e also 
identified an extragovem m ental element. That is to say, the situation where 
extragovem m ental organisations intervened to try  and change the w ording 
of a bill. These organisations usually intervened after the resolution of the 
in tragovem m ental series of m eetings and, thus, their influence w as an 
elem ent exogeneous to the governmental policy process.
In the case studies, several different organisations were identified 
which had  such an influence: the Conseil d'E tat, Assemblée nationale. Sénat, 
Conseil constitutionnel and various pressure groups, such as the H ersant 
group. In the case of the parliam entary actors and the H ersant group, the 
govem m ent was again obliged to engage in a process of bargaining before the 
final version of the bill was agreed upon. In the case of the two judicial actors, 
their decisions were either unchallenged, in the case of the Conseil d 'E tat's
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influence on the 1982 law, or unchallengeable, in the case of the Conseil 
constitutionnel. Just as above it was concluded that the influence of the Prime 
M inister can only be appreciated alongside the influence of the other 
governm ental actors, so the influence of the govem m ent can only properly 
be apprecia ted  a longside the influence of these ex tragovem m enta l 
organisations. Again, we will return to these organisations in future chapters. 





The second area of policy to be considered is that of budgetary politics. As in 
the previous section, three case studies will be taken, namely, the preparation 
and passage of the 1985, 1987 and 1990 budgets. While the preparation of the 
budget is an annual event and there are m any similarities in the process from 
year to year, these three budgets do provide three separate case studies. The 
differences in the overall political situation and in the policy content of the 
three examples mean that the they m ay be considered as three distinct case 
studies. By means of a detailed examination of these case studies the Prime 
M inister's influence in the policy process will be elucidated.
D ue to the complexity of the French budgetary  process it w ill be 
necessary, first of all, to give a general account of this process. We will then 
give a detailed account of the issues involved in the three case studies. From 
this account we will then draw  conclusions about the Prim e M inister's 
influence in the policy process.
The French Budgetary Procedure.
In m ost liberal democracies the preparation and vote of the budget is the
centrepiece of the economic and political year. France is no exception. All
Ministries take part in its preparation. It is the bill which regularly commands
the m ost public and journalistic interest. It is the bill on which, in Parliament,
the allegiances of all party groups are judged. As Prada notes:
II est clair que le b u d g e t est p robab lem ent l 'ac te  m ajeur du  
gouvernem ent, pu isqu 'il exprim e plus qu 'aucun  au tre  la solidarité 
gouvernem entale  dans la m ise en oeuvre d 'u n e  po litique  dont 
p ratiquem ent toutes les com posantes se trouven t directem ent ou 
indirectement traduites dans la loi de finances.!
The centrality of budgetary politics to the political system as a whole makes it 
a suitable candidiate for a set of case studies. After all, the influence of the
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Prim e M inister will be judged to  a large extent upon  his role in  the 
preparation  and passage of the most im portant bill of the legislative year. 
H ow ever, it is also a prim e candidate for investigation as it is an annual 
process. The budgetary procedure changes very little from  one year to the 
next. W hile the circumstances of each budget are different, the opportunities 
for com parison betw een one case study and another are maximised. It is 
necessary, therefore, to outline the budgetary  procedure in general before 
turning to an examination of the case studies in detail.^
The French financial year runs from  January 1st to December 31st. 
Therefore, the budget for 1985, for example, was prepared wholely during the 
course of 1984. The preparatory process for the budget of year n  starts in 
January of the year n  - 1.
T hroughout January and February, one of the  services w ith in  the 
Finance M inistry, the direction du Budget, starts to prepare a draft budget for 
the year n. In general term s, the previous year's budget is taken and  its 
continuing items are identified (services votés), so that a basic expenditure 
figure m ay be calculated. A t the sam e tim e, the m ost recent economic 
indicators are used  so as to provide a rough  estim ate of the  level of 
governm ent income, once again based on the provisions of the previous 
year's budget. To these figures are added various new  m easures w hich the 
governm ent has passed and any other items whose adoption is felt to be 
unavoidable during the course of the year. Once this inform ation has been 
fed in to  the com puters of the direction du Budget and  the econom etric 
models completed, there emerges a detailed draft of the coming year's budget 
(le budget de réconduction).
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Figure 1: The preparation of the budget in  the year n  -1
Jan. - Feb. Preparation of the budget de réconduction 
Mar. - Apr. Interm inisterial committees
Changes agreed by the Finance Minister, Prime Minister & 
President 
M id-April Lettre de cadrage
May - June Conférences budgétaires for expenditure items 
July Final prim e ministerial expenditure arbitrations
Mid-July Lettres plafonds
July - Aug. Finance Ministry prepares revenue component of the bill 
Late Aug. Prime ministerial arbitrations on revenue com ponent after 
meetings with the President 
Early Sept. Presented to the Conseil d 'Etat
Mid-Sept. Presented to Assemblée nationale. Examined by Finance 
Com m ission
y
Mid-Oct. Debated by Assemblée nationale 
Vote on equilibrium  level 
Votes on ministerial spending items 
M id-N ov. Vote on revenue component 
Early Dec. Examination by the Sénat 
Mid-Dec. Commission mixte paritaire
Possible recourse to Conseil constitutionnel 
Late Dec. Definitive adoption of the bill
It is usually in early March that the directeur du Budget presents this draft to 
the Finance Minister and the Budget Minister. They scrutinize it, m aking any 
changes to it that they feel to be necessary, or possible, at this stage. In fact, 
these changes are usually proposed not by the M inisters themselves, bu t by 
the directeur du  Budget himself and by the cabinets of the Finance and Budget
M inisters in close consultation w ith the Prim e M inister's and  President's
s
economic advisers. The resulting docum ent is then usually d o s s e d  at the 
interministerial level in a meeting of ministerial advisers, full Ministers and
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the  P rim e M in is t e r .3 This m eeting determ ines the  overall b udge ta ry  
priorities, such as the level of the deficit, for example.
The resu lt of this m eeting is the lettre de cadrage tha t the Prim e 
M inister sends to every Minister. As the former directeur d u  Budget, Michel 
Prada, notes:
C ette le ttre  com porte, en général, ou tre  le rappel des données 
fondam entales de la politique économ ique d u  gouvernem ent, les 
élém ents centraux de la stratégie budgétaire, qui varien t selon le 
gouvernem ent et les circonstances.^
It is at this stage in the process tha t the Prim e M inister's influence is 
considered to be at its greatest as he is closely involved in the choices Of the 
governm ent's overall budgetary strategy, which form the central components 
of the lettre de cadrage. *
The appearance of this letter is follow ed by the in term inisterial 
expenditure part of the process. Each Minister is called upon to prepare a list 
of continuing  item s (mesures acquises) and of new  dem ands (m esures  
nouvelles). It is these latter items which are usually the source of greatest 
debate. M inisters generally wish to spend m ore than those preparing  the 
budget are willing to accept. Ministerial dem ands are discussed in a series of 
conférences budgétaires.
These conférences take place at a num ber of different levels, depending 
on the gravity of the dispute. The first level brings together one of the sub­
directors of the direction du Budget, the perm anent m inisterial budgetary  
representative, m inisterial advisers and various m em bers of the different 
sub-sections of the direction du Budget.^ W hilst m any m atters are agreed 
upon in these meetings, problems often still persist, in which case there is an 
appeal procedure through which the M inister m ay go. Firstly, the Minister 
will m eet the directeur du  Budget himself. If problems persist there will be
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further m eetings between the Minister and the Budget M inister, followed, if 
necessary, by a meeting w ith the Finance Minister and, if all else fails, with 
the Prim e Minister. Although, in private, the President and his advisers m ay 
also be called upon to intervene, their arbitration is usually reserved for the 
m ajor bu d g e ta ry  orien tations, ra ther than  re la tive ly  m inor spending  
differences.
By mid-July the final spending arbitrations have been m ade and the
Prime M inister sends out a lettre plafond to each Minister. Unlike the lettre
de cadrage, these are different for each M inistry and  form alise the points
agreed upon in the conférences budgétaires. They deal with:
La progression globale des crédits de dépenses o rd inaires, des 
autorisations de programmes et des crédits de paiement;
Les principales m esures d'économ ies, en term es de m ontants et de 
nature des décisions prises ou à prendre;
Les mesures nouvelles, dont elles précisent la nature et le quantum ; 
L 'évo lu tion  des effectifs budgétaires (créations ou  suppressions 
d'emploi).^
These letters represent the final stage of the governm ental preparation  of 
expenditure items and only in exceptional circumstances are they changed to 
any significant degree.
The next stage deals w ith the revenue side of the budget. Here, the 
preparation process is usually confined to the direction du Budget arid the 
budgetary advisers of the Finance Minister, Budget Minister, Prim e Minister 
and occasionally the President. These consultations continue until the end of 
August, w hen the bill is ready to go before the Conseil d 'E tat and  then the 
Conseil des ministres. By the end of September the bill is ready to sent to 
Parliament to be voted upon.
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The parliam entary stage is strictly governed by a set of constitutional 
and legal limits.^ Article 47 of the Constitution states that Parliament has 70 
days in which to pass the budget and that, if it fails to do so, the government 
is automatically authorised to procédé by ordinance. Firstly, the Finance bill is 
discussed for a period of up  to 40 days by the Assemblée nationale. Then the 
Sénat has 20 days to examine it, w ith the remaining 10 days being set aside to 
iron out any differences between the two Chambers. Article 40 also states that 
any am endm ent proposed by a depu ty  w hich results in an increase in 
expenditure, or a decrease in revenue is considered to be ultra vires. Only the 
governm ent has the pow er to propose such am endm ents and so deputies 
have to convince the Finance M inister and the Prim e M inister tha t their 
am endm ents are well-founded.
The Finance bill is considered first of all by the National Assembly's 
Finance Commission. It then procédés to  the floor of the Cham ber w here 
there is a discussion and vote on each article of the revenue section, followed 
by a vote on the overall budgetary equilibrium level. This is the first major 
vote. It is followed by an examination of the expenditure section of the bill, 
which involves a debate and vote on each of the different ministerial budgets, 
followed by the adoption of the services votés and finally a vote on the 
Finance bill as a whole. This procedure is repeated in the Sénat, where the bill 
is likely to undergo a different series of amendments. As a result, a mixed 
parity  commission of the two Chambers is norm ally required, in order to 
agree upon a common text. If the commission reaches agreem ent then there 
is a further vote by both Chambers. If no agreement can be reached, then the 
Assemblée nationale has the final say. Due to this process and following any 
exam ination by the Conseil constitutionnel, it is no t rare  to see the bill 
become law on December 31st just in time for the new  financial y e a r .8
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Following this brief general account of the normal budgetary procedure 
we are now  in a position to examine the case studies in detail.
The 1985 Budget
The first case study to be considered concerns the preparation and passage of 
the 1985 budget. Following the procedure in the previous chapter, we will 
first of all pu t the particular case study in context. For the 1985 budget, it is 
necessary to outline the economic and political conditions under which it was 
prepared. Having done that, we will then procédé to an exam ination of the 
expenditure  com ponent of the bill and then  tu rn  to the revenue side. 
Conclusions will be draw n once the examination of all three case studies has 
been completed.
The budgetary choices facing the governm ent in 1984 were still being 
determ ined by the nature of the policies pursued in 1981 and 1982. The effects 
of the  1981 post-election spending boom  have been w ell chronicled 
elsew here.9 In short, however, the unilateral decision to increase spending 
m assively during a time of w orld recession created an enorm ous budget 
deficit, currency problems and an ever increasing debt repaym ent bill fuelled 
by high interest rates.
The effects of the governm ent's economic policy w ere felt not only 
economically, but socially and electorally as well. Thus, gradually, throughout 
1982 the government changed tack. First of all, it announced a pause and then 
introduced a half-hearted austerity program m e. This process culm inated in 
the th ird  devaluation and severe austerity  p lan  of M arch 1983, which 
signalled the end of the French socialist economic experim ent and m ade 
financial and budgetary rigour the two core subjects of the governm ent's 
policy curriculum.
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The 1983 and 1984 budgets m ade the first and  m ost difficult policy
changes. Spending was reduced and, m ore sym bolically, the num ber of
governm ent employees was reduced, going directly against one of the 110
Propositions considered until then to be am ongst the m ost sacrosanct,
nam ely, the creation of 200,000 jobs in the state sector. The governm ent-
engendered recession that followed served to make budgetary policy making
all the  m ore difficult. For exam ple, governm ent income from  VAT fell,
w hich in turn  reduced revenue and necessitated further expenditure cuts for
fear of seeing the budget deficit increase even further. Elementary economics
show ed that the governm ent was in a vicious circle from  which it d id  not
have the means to break out.
The governm ent's room for m anoeuvre, therefore, was small. In such
a situation, the influence of the direction du Budget became ever greater. As
Jean-Dominique Comolli, Fabius's budgetary adviser, noted:
En 1984 on était dans une période de réstriction budgétaire très forte. H 
n 'y  avait pas 36,000 façons de mener un  politique budgétaire.lO
In con trast to its anom alous role in 1981 w hen it had  to recom m end
additional spending plans to a governm ent which did not possess sufficient
ideas about how to spend public money, in  1984 the direction du Budget had
to draw  up  a long list of spending cuts. As a result, the role of the Prime
M inister and the Finance Minister was reduced. They become m ore reliant
than  usual on the adm inistrators of the budget division. As Comolli again
stated:
La m arque d 'u n  Premier m inistre, elle dépend beaucoup de l'aisance 
finançière de la période. En 1985 et 1986, il n 'y  avait pas la m oindre 
m arge finançière. Donc, l'initiative du  Prem ier ministre, comme celle 
du  Ministre des Finances, est très limitée.
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This restriction could be seen at the time of the lettre de cadrage. In 1984, the 
m ajor budgetary  orientations were effectively set for the Prime Minister by 
the  overall economic situation and by the proposals of the direction du 
Budget. In add ition . Parliam ent's already subord inate  role w as fu rther 
reduced. W ith regard to the 1985 budget, Jean Choussat, the directeur du  
B udget a t th a t tim e, stated: "Je ne crois pas q u 'il a it joué un  rôle 
fo n d a m e n ta l" I l  The mid-1980s, therefore, saw  a dim inished role for the 
budget's political actors and an increased role for the administrative ones.
This general statem ent has to be nuanced, however, and one political 
figure w ho had a very clear influence on the 1985 budget was the President. 
Quite exceptionally, he publicly laid down two conditions that the budget had 
to abide by. The first concerned the general level of m andatory tax deductions 
iles prélèvements obligatoires) and  w as announced d u ring  a television 
interview  on TFl on Septem ber 15th 1983: "L 'année prochaine, au  m om ent 
où  nous préparons le budget de 1985, il faudra que [le montant] baisse d 'au  
m oins un  point." This m easure was announced w ithout any prior w arning 
being given to M auroy, or Jacques Delors, the Finance Minister. Its overall 
effect on the state budget and the social security budget was to necessitate 
savings of around 80 billion francs in 1984. The budgetary exercise was m ade 
doubly difficult by the further presidential announcem ent that the budget 
deficit would not be allowed to exceed 3 per cent of the GNP. The m ain role of 
the President's budgetary advisers throughout 1984 was constantly to inform 
the governm ent that these decisions w ere irreversible, despite the harsh  
budgetary choices that they necessitated.12
The other m ajor occurrence in 1984, which had  certain effects on the 
budgetary process was the change of Prime Minister. Laurent Fabius officially 
replaced Pierre M auroy as Prime M inister on July 17th 1984. At the sam e
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tim e, Jacques Delors left the Finance M inistry to be replaced by Pierre 
Bérégovoy, although H enri Emm anuelli rem ained as Budget Minister. In 
addition, there w as a near complete change of m inisterial cabinets. Few of 
M a u ro /s  advisers rem ained to work under Fabius and  the same was true at 
the Finance Ministry.
W hat was striking about the m em bers of the new  budgetary  team, 
however, was the close w orking relationship that they im m ediately struck 
up. Relations betw een Delors, Em m anuelli and  M auroy, including their 
advisers, had not been altogether harm onious. The same was not generally 
true am ongst the m em bers of the new governm ent. Fabius and  Bérégovoy 
w orked together particu larly  closely, w hilst a large proportion  of their 
budgetary advisory staff consisted of former inspecteurs des finances who, had 
previously enjoyed close personal and professional contacts. M ore than one 
person interviewed stated that the familiarity between advisers and Ministers 
facilitated the task of taking the most difficult decisions. There was a m utual 
confidence between those involved.^3
Equally im portant was the different approach that Fabius brought to 
the prem iership, at least w ith regard to the budget. In terms of policy outlook, 
little distinguished M auroy from Fabius. The new  Prim e Minister, however, 
was a technocrat, w hereas M auroy was a notable. W hen asked about the 
relative influences of the two Prim e Ministers, Choussat noted that in terms 
of policy:
La vraie différence est en tre  un  M auroy prem ière m anière et un 
M auroy deuxième manière. Je ne vois pas de différence notable entre 
M auroy deuxième m anière e t Fabius. La différence c'est que Mauroy est 
un  hom me politique et Fabius aussi, mais Fabius est, en même temps, 
un  technicien. H accède plus facilement aux dossiers techniques.^^
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Fabius's expertise was perhaps at its m ost evident during the preparation of 
the budget in all its complexity. In addition, it should not be forgotten that 
Fabius w as the Budget M inister him self betw een 1981 and  1983. This 
familiarity w ith the subject contrasts strongly w ith M a u ro /s  lack of budgetary 
expertise.
It is clear, therefore, that there were a num ber of im portant economic, 
political and personal factors present throughout the 1985 budgetary process 
that had a bearing on the final contents of the bill. These factors have been 
considered in some detail here, partly because they help to explain the case 
studies to follow, bu t also because the preparation of any budget is such a vast 
project that the num ber of detailed case studies able to be exam ined is 
necessarily very lim ited. However, we will now  m ove on to consider the 
expenditure component of the 1985 budget.
W ith the President having ordered a cut in taxes and a stabilisation of 
the deficit, the government was left with no option bu t to cut spending. As all 
governm ents in all countries know, however, such a task is not at all easy. 
M inisters fight their comers, pressure groups defend their interests and  the 
public rarely take kindly to a loss of services. In France, it was particularly 
difficult to cut spending because of the vast num ber of continuing items of 
expenditure (services votés). Each year, these items represent around 90 per 
cent of the total spending component of the Finance bill. Each year they are 
renew ed quasi-automatically and appear in their near entireity in the budget 
de réconduction. They consist mainly of the governm ent wage bill and  basic 
running  costs and m ean that the opportunity  to m ake cuts lies only at the 
m argins, unless the government is willing sharply to cut back on services and 
personnel. Any government would find this difficult to do, but particularly so
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the socialists after 1981 as their level of support am ongst public sector 
employees was great.
Faced w ith this situation, in 1984 the direction de Budget was to 
m inim ise the increase in new  spending (les mesures nouvelles). According to 
one form er Budget M inister, this is the situation w here the direction du 
Budget is generally at its most p o w e r fu l .1 5  Each spending M inistry has its 
expenditure closely m onitored by a sub-section of the Budget division. In 
m any cases, the Budget division, due to its greater technical and hum an 
resources, knows the subject m atter better even than the budgetary experts in 
the  M inistry  itself. This expertise m eans that, du ring  the conférences 
budgétaires, the representatives of the Budget division are in a position to 
refu te the  spending dem ands of the M inistry in question. In 1984,^ the 
direction du Budget was particularly vigilant and recom m ended that only the 
m ost urgent proposals be accepted. In this period of budgetary restraint, the 
Prim e M inister and Finance M inister had  little option b u t to agree and, 
indeed, they did  so not ungratefully, as they w ere the ones w ho were 
ultim ately responsible for cutting spending so as to m eet the President's 
conditions.
This cut back on the new items, however, was not enough to balance 
the  budgetary  equation. H aving foreseen this difficulty, in M arch, the 
directeur du Budget had already personally proposed a 1 per cent across-the- 
board cut in adm inistrative personnel: "[La solution] que j'ai proposée était 
b rutale, som m aire, simpliste. Le m êm e tarif pour tou t le m o n d e "  ^ 6. This 
proposal was accepted by Delors and M auroy in preference to the other option 
w hich  w ould  have involved setting  up  a com m ission of enquiry  to 
recom m end cuts for each individual M inistry separately. This 1 per cent 
across-the-board cut was combined with a 2 per cent cut in spending and they
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w ere both  revealed to Ministers in the lettre du cadrage sent out on March 
30th.
At this point the strategy of Choussat, Delors and Mauroy was to shock 
the spending M inisters into accepting the cuts. As one new spaper noted: 
"D ans u n  p rem ier tem ps, on  ra tibo ise  to u t le  m onde. E nsuite , 
éven tue llem en t, on d iscu te" 17. As everyone realised , how ever, some 
M inistries had better grounds than others to escape the sweeping cuts and, 
d u rin g  the ro und  of prim e m inisteria l a rb itra tions in June, certain 
departm ents were prioritized.
Firstly, there were those areas which the President considered to be a 
priority , notably defence and the Research M inistry 's budget. The Prime 
M inister fully agreed w ith the President's choice. Secondly, there w eré the 
areas in which the President showed a personal interest, such as the Culture 
M inistry 's budget. Thirdly, there were areas, such as education, w here the 
lobby was powerful enough to overturn the cuts. Finally, there were several 
areas w here it was considered to be prudent to avoid cuts, so as to w ard off 
any possible social discontent. For example, the level of overcrow ding in 
prisons m eant that the Justice Ministry's budget was spared, while Rocard at 
the Agriculture Ministry also avoided the cuts.^® It is interesting to note that 
all the people interviewed insisted that Rocard had been favoured because of 
the specificity of his M inistry and  not because of his im portant position 
w ithin the party. The battle between the courants in the PS became influential 
only at a later date. While the Prime Minister was personally responsible for 
taking these decisions, it would be unrealistic to suggest that he initiated the
a
choices. They emanated m ainly from the President and from economic and 
social factors largely beyond his control, even if, in m any cases, he agreed with 
the resulting decision.
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The final spending arbitrations were m ade by M auroy in the first week 
of July. It was clear to him at this stage, however, that he w as going to be 
replaced as Prime Minister. Therefore, he refused to sign the lettres plafond 
leaving this responsibility to Fabius.^^ The latter, however, not being content 
w ith  accepting M auroy's arbitrations, proceded im m ediately to review  the 
decisions. In consultation with Bérégovoy and their two cabinets, he changed 
a num ber of budgets, notably reducing the spending of the form er communist 
Ministries who had been slightly favoured by M auroy in order to keep them 
in the governm ent. The other major change w as the increase given to 
Fabius's successor at the Industry Ministry.
The parliamentary stage saw few im portant changes to the expenditure 
side of the budget. There were no dem ands for greater spending from the PS 
and the governm ent was never going to accept similar com m unist dem ands 
given their recent departure. The provision parlementaire, how ever, should 
be noted . This item  is the sum  w hich is allocated each year by the 
governm ent to accom m odate som e of the parliam en tarian s ' dem ands. 
A round 0.1 per cent of the budget is set aside for this purpose. In 1984, this 
am ount was between 200 and 300 million francs. In 1984, only the Assemblée 
nationale  benefited  from  the provision parlementaire, th e  governm ent 
feeling that it was not necessary to include the Sénat due to the opposition 
m ajority there and the upper C ham ber's lim ited role in policy making. 
W hilst this item should not be ignored, it is an annual occurrence and, in 
overall budgetary terms, the amount of money involved is small.
On the income side of the budget, one of the m ost difficult decisions 
concerned a reform of the taxe professionnelle. This was a business tax set up 
in 1976 whose rate varied according to a firm 's capital. Naturally, the business 
peak association, the CNPF, had always been opposed to it, calling it a tax on
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investm ent. From 1981 onwards, the opposition parties, too, w ere in favour 
of reducing, or even abolishing it. More im portantly, M itterrand himself was 
on record as saying that it was a "taxe imbécile".
In 1984, the governm ent saw that the prom ise to reduce the level of 
prélèvements obligatoires presented a perfect opportun ity  to  abolish this 
generally unpopular tax. Its abolition, however, proved to be m ore difficult 
than  w as at first envisaged. The debate betw een those in  favour of its 
abolition and those opposed can be seen at tw o different levels w ithin the 
governm ent. The higher level set Delors against M auroy and  Emmanuelli. 
The form er, on the advice of the direction du Budget and  his cabinet, was in 
favour of reducing the tax, bu t not of abolishing it. Mauroy, also on the advice 
of his advisers, preferred to see it abolished. At this level, however, according 
to Comolli: "il n 'é tait pas un  débat sérieux"20. The Prime M inister and the 
Finance M inister appeared to to follow rather blindly  the advice of their 
advisers, out of loyalty and not personal conviction.
The debate was much more serious betw een Hervé H announ, one of 
M auroy 's budgetary  advisers, and Jean Choussat, the directeur du Budget. 
H announ was fervently in favour of seeing the tax abolished: "H a estimé que 
sa mission était de faire disparaître la taxe professionnelle''^!. Accordingly, he 
drew  up  a series of complex proposals which w ould see it abolished and 
replaced by any num ber of different options. It was the very complexity of the 
so lu tions th a t w as C houssat's  m ain argum en t against its abolition. 
Emmanuelli recounts how his own proposals were rebuffed by the direction 
du Budget:
n  y avait des gens qui nous passaient des notes tous les jours disant que 
ce n 'es t pas possible. H s'est passé comme ça. Moi. j'avais fait un  
schéma, mais c'était trop d i f f i d l e . 2 2
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Choussat was able to convince Delors of the folly of abolishing the tax because 
of his and his direction's greater technical knowledge of the subject matter. He 
himself states:
U n Ministre des Finances est toujours attaché aux im pôts existants. H 
est sous la pression des services des Finances. Les hom mes politiques 
n 'en  comprennent rien. Ce qui est vrai d'ailleurs. Parler de fiscalité c'est 
beaucoup plus difficile que de parler des dépenses. Les techniciens ont 
un grands poids dans ce débat.23
For M auroy and Emmanuelli the abolition of the tax was highly symbolic
politically, bu t this argum ent was one which those opposed to the reform at
the direction du Budget could easily rebuff because of the complexity of the
problem. Choussat again stated:
P ierre M auroy n 'a  jam ais v raim ent com pris com m ent fonctionne 
l'adm inistration. Il pense qu 'on  peu t supprim er un  im pôt en hu it 
jours.
Thus, the debate was largely conducted at a technical level betw een Hannoun 
and Choussat. The former was unable to p u t forw ard any sim ple counter­
arguments to the latter. Despite being a former inspecteur des finances, he did 
not have the resources to outsm art the direction du Budget.
Nevertheless, the question was raised in a form al m eeting w ith the 
President before M auroy's departure in early July. M itterrand arbitrated in 
Delors's favour and a 10 billion franc reduction was agreed, although it is 
unclear how strongly the Prime Minister argued his case. W hen Fabius was 
appoin ted  one of his first decisions w as to confirm  this arbitration.^^ 




The change of government in March 1986 and the up tu rn  in the state of the 
French econom y after 1985 m eant that the situation facing the budgetary 
actors in 1986 was noticeably different to the circumstances in 1984. While 
procedural similarities remain, therefore, betw een the tw o budgets, they are 
sufficiently different in policy content so as to allow useful comparisons to be 
d raw n betw een them . Before exam ining the expend itu re  and  revenue 
com ponents of the 1987 budget, w e will first place the bill in its general 
economic and political context.
The legislative elections and the subsequent change of govem nient in 
March 1986 provoked an initial delay in the budgetary  process. W hilst the 
direction du Budget had carried out its norm al preparatory calculations at the 
beginning of the year, Chirac was appointed around the time when ordinarily 
the lettre de cadrage w ould have appeared. M oreover, the new  government, 
w ith its Finance M inister, Edouard Balladur and Budget M inister, Alain 
Juppé, decided that the preparation of the 1987 budget w ould have to take 
second place to the 1986 collectif budgétaire, or mini-budget.
The preparation of a m ini-budget during the course of the budgetary 
year is som ething  tha t occurs alm ost annually . G overnm ents find it 
p ropitious to adjust their initial calculations according to the changing 
economic and political environment. In 1986, the m ini-budget was used as a 
way of quickly passing a series of im portant economic reforms prom ised in 
the electoral platform. Most of these reforms, such as the abolition of the 
wealth tax, had  been prepared  before the election by special opposition 
working parties. Once in power, the m ost im portant reforms had to be passed 
immediately, so that their effects w ould be felt before the 1988 presidential 
election.
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The Ministers and their cabinets, therefore, spent the first three weeks 
in office preparing the collectif budgétaire. Only once this law  w as voted by 
the Assemblée nationale in early May could w ork on the 1987 budget properly 
start. Due to the work already completed by the direction du Budget and due 
to the budgetary policy consensus that reigned between Chirac, Balladur and 
Juppé, the delay was quickly made up. The lettre de cadrage w as sent out by 
Chirac on May 30th. These were im m ediately followed by the conférences 
budgétaires, which were completed by the beginning of July, so that the lettres 
plafonds were sent out between July 15th-19th. The revenue side of the bill 
w as prepared  during August, w ith the major policy decisions being taken 
a ro u n d  A ugust 22nd and the final arb itrations tak ing  place on 25th 
September. The bill was then sent to Parliam ent on the norm al preso^bed 
date where it was passed and prom ulgated on December 31st.
A part from a slight initial delay, therefore, the 1987 budget follows the 
same timetable as any other. However, the m anner in which it was prepared 
does differ significantly to the 1985 budget. As w ith the 1986 Broadcasting Act, 
the m ost fundam ental change was the absence of any presidential influence 
in the preparatory process. The unw ritten rules of cohabitation applied to the 
Finance Act as to any other bill. A part from Ulrich's relations w ith  Bianco, 
the only people authorised to have any contacts w ith  the  Elysée were 
B ahadur's  directeur de cabinet, Jean-Claude Trichet, and  Juppé 's , Daniel 
Bouton. How ever, these contacts served m erely to inform  the President's 
advisers of the budget's progress, rather than to bargain over its contents. 
Both Chirac's and Bahadur's economic and budgetary advisers attested that 
there was no interference from the Elysée during this period.26
The o ther major change also results from  the specificity of the 
cohabitation period and concerns the ahocation of responsibiUties between
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Chirac, Balladur and Juppé. The Prime Minister, w ith the 1988 elections in
m ind, w anted  to cultivate a quasi-presidential im age for him self and ,
therefore, decided that he should not be seen to intervene in the details of
policy preparation, bu t w ould rem ain above this process setting  only the
general policy directions. W ith regard to  the budget, he w as unw illing to
m eddle in the spending and revenue arbitrations. This decision was also
inspired by the fact that the cuts to be made were severe and it was felt to be
p ru d en t tha t the Prim e M inister should no t be seen to be personally
responsible for t h e m . 2 7  Following a suggestion from Balladur, Chirac agreed
to give the  Finance M inister "une délégation t o t a l e " 2 8 .  H e w as to be
responsible, therefore, for the vast majority of budgetary  arbitrations. This
extra responsibility for the Finance Minister also led to a more im portant role
for the the Budget Minister, as will be demonstrated below.
Such a situation was brought about by cohabitation, b u t also because
Chirac had  "une confiance t o t a l e " 2 9  i n  both Balladur and Juppé. Both were
senior members of the RPR, both had worked closely w ith Chirac in Paris and
all three shared the sam e economic credo. The result was that, w hilst the
Prime Minister guarded his influence over the major policy decisions, he was
less present in the budgetary  m inutiae than, for example. Fabius had been
previously. The same w as true for his economic and budgetary  advisers,
Em m anuel Rodocanachi and  G érard Rameix. As Balladur and  Juppé 's
common budgetary adviser stated:
Je les informais des choses. Je leur passais des papiers. Ils étaient au 
courant, mais ils étaient un peu  plus spectateurs qu 'acteurs. C 'est un  
peu extrême ce que je dis, mais c'est un  peu ça. Us étaient là pour faire 
en  sorte que s'ils savaient que le Prem ier m inister a ttachait une 
im portance particulière à tel ou tel point, le M inistre des Finances en 
soit informée.30
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The Prim e M inister, how ever, was in no w ay unable to  intervene. He 
regularly  m et w ith Balladur and Juppé, both separately and  as part of the 
frequen t m eetings of the m ajority. H e w as personally  inform ed of the 
b u d g e t's  progress by one of the Finanace M inister's advisers, Jacques 
Friedm an, w ho was the go-between between him  and Balladur. Rodocanachi 
had  weekly meetings w ith the Finance M inister and all the junior Ministers 
u n d er his authority , w hilst he w as also present at the arbitrations that 
Balladur presided over. While Rameix attended the arbitration m eetings that 
Juppé organised. M oreover, as we shall see, there w ere occasions w here 
Chirac d id  intervene personally and he did sign the lettre de cadrage and the 
lettres plafonds, thus accepting political responsib ility  for them . H is 
w ithdraw al, therefore, from the budgetary process is more a sign of strength 
than of weakness. Having pu t the budget in context w e will now turn  to the 
expenditure side of the bill.
The RPR-UDF electoral platform contained little detail about the then 
opposition's spending plans. It was m uch more precise about its commitment 
to cut the budget deficit and about its fiscal policy. It was clear, however, that 
in  o rd er to m eet its o ther prom ises, significant cuts in  governm ent 
expenditure w ould be required. In the collectif budgétaire cuts am ounting to 
10 billion francs were agreed upon. The harshness of the cuts came as a shock 
to some governm ent members, bu t it was a deliberate signal to the spending 
M inistries that the new  adm inistration was going to keep to its election 
promises and that, consequently, further cuts would be n e c e s s a r y .31
In fact, the 1987 budget contained a 40 billion franc spending decrease. 
This figure was included in the lettre de cadrage and was arrived at as a 
balancing figure once the calculations had been m ade about the reduction of 
the budget deficit and tax cuts.32 in  an attem pt to find areas of saving, Juppé's
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directeur de cabinet, Daniel Bouton, proposed tha t each M inistry should
undergo a so-called 'exerdce de budget base zéro'. This exercise obliged each
M inistry to reconstruct and justify its spending needs dow n to the last franc,
rather than simply automatically renewing its projects from one year to  the
next. Bouton used his new  found influence upon Juppé to have the exercise
accepted, although he states that he w ould have proposed it to the socialists
had they been re-elected in March 1986.^3
The results of this administrative exercise were patchy. In some cases
im portant areas of saving were identified. However, the spending patterns of
some Ministries were not suited to this sort of procedure. One exam ple was
the Telecommunications M inistry, which proceded to m ake personnel cuts,
but not as a result of this e x e r d s e . 3 4  The Culture M inistry refused even to
partic ipa te  in  it, arguing  th a t it had  a m inim um  level of budgetary
requirem ents and that it could only reconstruct its needs from this figure
u p w a r d s . 3 5  As J-M. Fabre noted generally about the exercise:
Cette histoire de budget base zéro s 'est mise en oeuvre au sein de la 
direction du  Budget et nous, au cabinet, on ne l'a  pas repris. C 'était 
p lu tô t une référence qu 'on avait dans le dossier pour procéder à des 
arbitrages qui étaient rélativement dassiques.^6
There are tw o reasons, however, as to w hy the 1986 conférences budgétaires
were slightly anomalous. Firstly, there was a large degree of consensus within
the governm ent that drastic spending cuts had to  be made. A t least on the
expenditure side of the budget, the disagreements w ithin the governm ent on
economic policy were small. Most people gave top priority to tax cuts and
reducing the budget deficit and they w ere aw are that this policy entailed
spending reductions. As Balladur's budgetary adviser stated: "II y  avait un
grand accord politique pour réduire les dépenses de m anière à réduire le
déficit et surtout à réduire les i m p ô t s " 3 7 .  This consensus facilitated the task of
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Balladur and Juppé. It m ust also be noted that, since 1981, the right had 
consistently criticised the socialists for overspending and, thus, once in office, 
they w ere likely to want to reduce expenditure.
Secondly, in at least one case, a Minister, guided by his liberal beliefs, 
p roposed  to cut spending by m ore than the am ount asked of him  at the 
arbitration meeting. Alain Madelin, Industry Minister and leading member of 
the economically neo-liberal Parti Républicain (PR), w anted to slash the level 
of subsidies his M inistry accorded to industries in trouble. A reduction in 
such subsidies was already governm ent policy, b u t M adelin w ent m uch 
further than Balladur and Juppé had proposed. Such zeal is certainly atypical 
of the classical arbitration process.
In general, however, despite these provisos and the  base budget 
exercise, the spending arbitrations reflected the norm al bargaining process 
that takes place each year between the parsimonious Finance Minister and the 
p rofligate  spending M inisters. Bouton described th is process as: "une 
d ialectique de négociation entre  que lq u 'u n  qui dem ande beaucoup et 
quelqu 'un  qui a peu à o f f r i r " 3 8 .  As usual, the direction du Budget organised 
the prelim inary round  of arbitrations. The next stage, how ever, saw  an 
increased role for the Budget Minister. Juppé had the consent of Balladur and 
Chirac to arbitrate  personally on all bu t the m ost im portan t points of 
d isagreem ent, rather than simply preparing the dossiers tha t the Finance 
Minister w ould decide upon. He received each Minister in the presence of the 
directeur du  Budget, Fabre, Bouton, Blanchard-Dignac and Rameix. One of 
those present notes: "J'ai eu le sentiment que le M inistre du  Budget a essayé 
de régler un  maximum des choses à son n i v e a u " 3 9 .  A round 50 per cent of all 
budgetary  arbitrations were m ade at this level. This figure is m uch higher
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than norm al and includes, for exam ple, an  agreem ent on the Education 
M inistry's budget, something almost unheard of at this early stage.
O ne of the reasons for the h igh  success rate  is the priv ileged 
inform ation to which Juppé access. The direction des Impôts calculated 
that the income from taxes, especially corporation tax, was likely to be higher 
in 1986 than  had  been forecast in the budget de réconduction. Therefore, 
Juppé w as left w ith a certain leeway th a t he w ould not otherw ise have 
possessed:
Beaucoup de budgets étaient réglés au niveau de Juppé parce qu'il avait 
des marges de manoeuvre. Notam m ent, il y a eu une grande surprise, 
c 'était la révalorisation des recettes qui est intervenue au courant de 
l'année 1986 et qui a dégagé des m arges de manoeuvre. Le Ministre du  
Budget les connaissait. H a lâché un  petit peu à son n iv e a u .4 0
Y
The spending Ministers, however, were ignorant of this w indfall and, thus, 
when Juppé agreed to certain items that they originally feared w ould be cut, 
they agreed to let other m atters drop. From a position of strength, Juppé kept 
within his spending targets.
There were, how ever, lim its to Juppé 's authority  and  Balladur was 
called upon  to arbitrate in a num ber of different areas, although, in m ost 
cases, w ith the notable exception of the C ulture M inistry, only one or two 
outstanding points in any particular budget were left for him to decide upon. 
There were several reasons w hy these problem s could not be fixed at Juppé's 
level. Some M inisters refused to  accept the level of cuts that the Budget 
M inister had  dem anded. For exam ple, this w as the case of the C ulture, 
Telecommunications, T ransport and  Em ploym ent M inistries. For others, it 
w as felt to be politick tha t they be seen to be arb itrated  by Balladur. 
Méhaignerie, for example, the leader of the  CDS, fell into this category. The 
same was true for the Interior M inister, Pasqua, w hose budget caused no
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problems, bu t who, nevertheless, saw Balladur. W hile other budgets, such as 
tha t of the Co-operation M inistry, w ere considered to be too im portant 
strategically for Balladur not to look at them.
W hilst the delegation of responsibility to Balladur was certainly great, 
some budgets inevitably found their w ay up  to Chirac himself. The Prime 
Minister had  m ade it clear from the outset that he w ould deal personally with 
the A griculture budget. This decision reflected the Prim e M inister's interest 
in and knowledge of the subject as a former Agriculture Minister. Similarly, 
he indicated his desire to study the budget of the DOM-TOM Ministry, again 
reflecting a personal interest. In both of these cases, however, it should also be 
noted that they w ere sensitive political issues, French farm ers having a 
seemingly spontaneous tendency to riot, while the N ew  Caledonian problems 
were of the gravest order.
A nother budget that Chirac arbitrated on was tha t of the Defence 
M inistry. N orm ally, defence is considered to belong to the President's 
domaine réservé, bu t during cohabitation the Prim e M inister assum ed at 
least a joint responsibility in this area. W hilst the President was informed of 
the details of the Defence budget, observers agreed that the final arbitrations 
belonged to Chirac and not M itterrand. The same w as not necessarily true, 
however, for the preparation later in the year of the loi de programmation 
militaire, w ith which the President was closely associated.
The Culture M inistry's budget was the only other to be arbitrated at 
M atignon. Here, there w ere particular problem s over the grands travaux, 
such as the Bastille Opera, the Louvre project and the Villette science park. 
The Finance M inistry felt that at least one of these ambitious schemes should 
be scrapped. They focussed on the Bastille Opera, w ork on which had only 
just started and which, if stopped immediately, w ould entail the waste of only
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a rela tively  sm all am ount of m oney. Léotard, how ever, w as violently 
opposed to this proposal and, indeed, to  any of his spending plans being 
dropped.41 His meeting w ith Juppé was perfunctory and  his m eeting w ith 
Balladur was inconclusive. Chirac, therefore, was called upon to arbitrate. The 
tactics used by the Culture M inistry were classical. Léotard's threatened to 
resign, he evoked the importance of his position as leader of the PR and he 
m ade a concerted effort to show how the grands travaux w ould be of benefit 
to Chirac and  Juppé at the Parisian level. W hile several m inor issues were 
lost, for the most part Chirac arbitrated in Léotard's favour. Even then, some 
of the lesser items were regained, as his budgetary advisers cleverly lobbied 
deputies, so that they w ere later reproposed  as p a rt of the provision  
parlementaire.
Turning to the revenue side, even before the M arch elections there 
were difficulties between the RPR and the UDF over the future governm ent's 
fiscal policy. The UDF, led by the barristes, favoured a large reduction in the 
budget deficit, whilst the RPR and a section of the UDF, notably the PR, 
w anted substantial tax reductions. The electoral platform  was a compromise 
betw een these two dem ands. It was agreed that there should be an equal 
reduction of both.
The collectif budgétaire was used by the new  governm ent to fulfil a 
num ber of electoral promises, but the preparation of the 1987 budget was the 
first major opportunity to debate exactly which policies ought to be adopted. 
For m uch of the time, however, it was a very one-sided debate w ithin the 
governm ent. The barristes, due to their leader's  objections to the very 
existence of cohabitation, had refused any senior governm ent posts. Only 
M éhaignerie agreed to head a largely technical Ministry. The RPR, however.
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held  the m ost im portant economic and budgetary  posts. D uring the early
stages, therefore, the barriste input was négligeable.
Juppé proposed a plan to reduce the budget deficit by 15 billion francs
each year for three years, so as to w ipe ou t the deficit apart from interest
charges. This p lan was accepted by Balladur and subsequently by Chirac.
Indeed, this process is typical of the preparation of fiscal policy. The Prime
M inister was involved in the definition of global policy options, but the
detailed w ork was then undertaken by the Finance M inistry. Patrick Suet,
Juppé and Bahadur's fiscal adviser, stated:
Vraiment, c'est Bahadur et Juppé qui ont réglé la partie fiscale. Je n 'ai 
pas l'im pression que le Prem ier m inistre s 'en  soit mêlée, son cabinet 
non plus.42
In 1987 the only detahed fiscal questions decided by the Prime Minister Were
farm ing tax regulations. Nevertheless, the Prime M inister was always in the
position to refuse a particular proposal when he saw fit. Fabre noted:
La fiscalité norm alem ent est quelque chose qui est très déléguée au 
M inistre des Finances. Le Prem ier m in istre  in te rv ien t su r les 
orientations pohtiques de la fiscahté. Sur les grandes options fiscales. 
Mais, une fois les orientations arrêtées, c'est tehem ent technique que 
c'est' quelque chose qui ne peut pas être pris en m ain par le Premier 
ministre.43
The Prim e M inister's role, therefore, is im portant at the beginning of the 
preparatory process, but also at the end when the detahs have been draw n up. 
A t this stage they will be presented to him for his acceptance, or rejection. It 
was this double intervention that characterised the 1987 budgetary process.
Despite the electoral promise, it was decided by Balladur and Juppé that 
tax reductions should take priority over a reduction of the budget deficit. This 
decision w as m ade largely  for econom ic reasons, a lthough  political 
considerations were not absent. It was decided to reduce the deficit by 15
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billion francs and taxes by 27 billion francs, a m uch higher figure than was 
originally thought possible and which was facilitated by the windfall receipts 
from which the government benefited in July and A ugust 1986.
The m ain debate then centred around how  to divide the tax cuts 
betw een individuals and companies. The electoral platform  had conunitted 
the governm ent to a substantial cut in personal taxation and both Balladur, 
Juppé and the influential liberal trio, Léotard, Longuet and Madelin, were all 
in favour of this m easure for economic and political reasons. The barristes 
and the non-PR com ponent of the UDF, how ever, favoured substantial 
reductions in company taxation andXor investm ent incentives.
The debate once again centred on the taxe professionnelle. The barristes 
favoured o f  reducing it, in return  for an increase in the level of credits 
d'investissement, Balladur was resolutely opposed to this latter proposal. The 
debate was largely technical and focussed on economic reasons for and against 
the particular m easures, rather than  political ones. O n the one side, the 
direction du Budget, Balladur, Juppé and their cabinets were all opposed to 
any idea of abolishing the taxe professionnelle and preferred to take steps to 
reduce the level of corporation tax, rather than increase the level of crédits 
d'investissement. Their view was supported by the liberals who had several 
m eetings to coordinate their ideas and  to decide how  best to go about 
convincing the Finance M inister to stick to his line. On the other side. Barre 
p u t forw ard his case in new spaper articles and  speeches, rather than  in 
meetings w ith  the government. Personal contacts were left to M éhaignerie 
who had the easiest access to Balladur and Juppe, bu t also to Bruno Durieux, 
w ho m et w ith  Juppé on several occasions in the  latter stages of the 
preparatory  progress. Also present w ere Edm ond A lphandery, the UDF's
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budgetary spokesperson in the Assemblée nationale, and Michel d 'O m ano,
the President of the Assembly's Finance Commission.
B alladur and  his supporte rs  w ere adam an t th a t the  econom ic
argum ents in favour of increasing investm ent subsidies w ere poor, bu t
realised that it would be politically difficult to insist upon only a small cut in
the taxe professionnelle as well. Therefore, he accepted the proposal from one
of his advisers to cut the latter by five billion francs, an am ount sufficiently
substantial so as to quieten the barriste lobby. Chirac accepted B alladur's
recom m endation.
This m easure alone, however, d id  no t satisfy the UDF. One of the
principal figures at this stage was d 'O rnano. On a num ber of occasions in
Septem ber, d 'O rnano  m et Juppé and  Balladur and  argued  for fu rther
m easures in favour of companies. The level of the reduction in the taxe
professionnelle was partly  due to his insistence. This pressure, however,
continued and  was accentuated w hen the bill w as p laced  before the
Assemblée nationale. D 'Ornano conducted meetings w ith the parliam entary
majority and found a favourable response to his proposals. Therefore, during
the m eeting of the National Assembly's Finance commission he proposed
two im portant amendments that the governm ent felt obliged to accept at the
cost of around two billion francs. While the governm ent was not opposed in
principle to the am endm ents, they w ould not have been passed w ithout
d 'O m ano's insistence. As Suet noted:
On a accepté un  certain nom bre d 'am endem ents parlem entaires 
coûteux. D 'Ornano est quelqu 'un d'extrêm em ent dur. Il a fallu lâcher 
pas mal de mesures. H est le seul homme qui a p esé .^
Indeed, d 'O m ano deliberately upped the ante knowing that in the political
climate that reigned he was likely to s u c c e e d . ^ 5  From his experience in 1981,
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Chirac knew  that in any future second ballot of a presidential election he 
w ould  need the full support of the barristes in  o rder to beat M itterrand. 
Therefore, he could not afford to alienate them. H e was also aware that the 
governm ent had only a slender parliam entary majority and that to pass its 
legislation it needed the full support of the UDF. D 'O m ano exp^ited this 
situation to the full and obtained certain concessions, in  return  for which he 
assured  that there w ere no dissenting votes w ithin the majority. In each 
parliam entary vote the majority was solid and the budget passed with little 
difficulty.
The 1990 Budget
Following his appointm ent as Prim e M inister in May 1988, Michel Rqcard 
im m ediately had to im m erse himself in budgetary  arbitrations that were 
already at a rather advanced stage. The preparation  of the 1990 budget, 
therefore, was the first for which he was completely responsible. In practice, 
this responsibility was shared w ith the Finance Minister, Pierre Bérégovoy, 
and  the ebullient Budget M inister, Michel Charasse. As m ight further be 
expec ted , cohabita tion  hav ing  ended , the  P res id en t's  role w as not 
insubstantial and, consequently, the Matignon, Bercy, and Elysée axis was the 
dom inant political force in the preparation of this budget.
This budget saw a num ber of minor, but not unim portant procedural 
changes. The initiative for these changes belonged m ainly to the direction du 
Budget, bu t they were fully endorsed by both Rocard and M itterrand. The first 
change came on April 13th w ith an extraordinary m eeting of all government 
Ministers to discuss the governm ent's overall budgetary  strategy. Normally, 
discussion in  this period is confined to the Finance M inistry, the Prime 
Minister and the President and, indeed, in M arch and April these three had
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discussed at length all of the different options available. The m eeting, 
how ever, did m uch more than just rubber stam p decisions taken elsewhere 
and a full debate about budgetary policy took place. The decision taken to 
follow Bérégovoy's proposal and reduce the budget deficit by 10 billion francs 
to 90 billion francs w as accepted by all those present at the m eeting rather 
being than imposed upon them from above.
A further innovation followed the day after w ith the appearance of the 
lettre de cadrage. In previous years there had been only a single letter, a copy 
of w hich w as received by each M inister. This year the  le tte r w as 
individualised. Each Minister received a separate letter outlining the major 
budgetary orientations for the year to come, bu t also fixing a spending limit 
for his \  her particular departm ent. In practice, this strategy pre-empte<$ the 
lettre plafond and reduced the M inister's capacity for overestim ating hisXher 
spending needs in the conférences budgétaires. The result was also to reduce 
the involvem ent of the Prime Minister in the arbitration process, as he was 
signalling the limits within which Ministers had to keep in April, rather than 
two m onths later after the final arbitrations.
The direction du Budget was behind this reform, bu t Rocard readily 
accepted it. In 1988, he had been forced to arbitrate each departm ent's budget 
dow n to the last million franc project. Rocard considered this to have been an 
unnecessary and time consuming process and an experience which he was 
not going to repeat.46 As w ith the changes which took place in 1986, this 
reform  should  not be seen as reducing the Prim e M inister's influence. 
Instead, it shifted it to an earlier stage in the process, upstream  of the detailed 
spending arbitrations. Although, even here he rem ained the person to whom 
all Ministers appealed.
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As usual, the final spending arbitrations took place in mid-July, after 
which the revenue side of the budget was prepared. These arbitrations took 
place in early September and the bill was passed by the Conseil des ministres 
on September 20th. The PS parliam entary group, however, was unhappy with 
the fiscal m easures in the bill and its pressure m eant that the governm ent 
w as forced to amend the bill substantially after its final and decisive meeting 
w ith the party  on October 17th. This aspect of the bill will be studied in detail 
below .
As w ith the passage of the 1989 Broadcasting Act, the absence of a PS 
parliam entary majority m eant that the passage of the bill through P a r f i r e n t  
was m ore complicated than usual. In 1988, the governm ent had  been able to 
pass the budget w ithout recourse to Article 49-3 because on each vote it had 
w on the support of either the PC, or the UDC. In 1989, this proved to be 
impossible. The UDC leader, Méhaignerie, declared in early October that his 
group w ould vote against the bill. The same was true for the PC with whom 
no acceptable deal could be agreed, even after negotiations between the leader 
of the parliam entary group, André Lajoinie, and one prom inent PS Finance
commissioner.47
D espite the opposition of these tw o groups, the Prim e M inister's 
parliam entary advisers were still confident that Article 49-3 could be avoided. 
They had  received assurances from a sufficient num ber of individual UDC 
and independent deputies, so that they believed they w ould not have to 
resort to a no-confidence vote. However, the leader of the PS parliam entary 
group, Louis Mermaz, refused to accept this strategy and insisted that Article 
49-3 be used. He felt that it would be better for the PS's image to resort to this 
article, rather than relying on a few cobbled-together centrist votes.^8 The 
preparation of the PS's party  congress a few m onths later w as certainly the
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m ain inspiration behind M erm az's decision. As a result, therefore, Rocard 
was obliged to use 49-3 twice in order to pass the bill. After a referral to the 
Conseil constitutionnel the bill became law on 30th December 1989.
The first major expenditure choices were signalled w ith the appearance 
of the budget de réconduction. Here, the Finance M inistry estim ated that the 
GDP w ould increase by 5 per cent in 1990. This became the guideline figure 
w hich to a large extent determ ined the m inisterial spending levels in the 
lettre de cadrage. This figure was set as the level for the overall increase in 
public expenditure. If some Ministries were felt to be in need of an increase 
greater than  5 per cent, then others w ould  have to  see their spending 
increased by less than this amount. In fact, four categories of M inistry were 
identified by Matignon and Bercy
The first category consisted of the prioritised departm ents. They would 
be allowed to increase spending by more than 5 per cent. In fact, however, 
these priorities were not fixed by Rocard, or Bérégovoy, bu t were outlined in 
M itte rran d 's  1988 electoral cam paign. H e m ade very  clear public  
comm itm ents to large spending increases in the budgets for the Education, 
Research and Co-operation Ministries. One of the m ost im portant roles that 
the President's advisers played after 1988 was to ensure that these priorities 
were abided by. In interviews with people at M atignon and Bercy, however, it 
was confirmed that at no time was it ever a question of them  ever trying to 
change these priorities, or even of not keeping to them. Rocard's unw ritten 
contract w ith M itterrand included the clause that he w ould faithfully execute 
the President's m andate. These budgets d id , how ever, go to the Prim e 
M inister for arbitration. He was to decide how  far over the 5 per cent limit 
they w ere to be set, w ith Bercy in favour of a sm aller overshoot than  the
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Ministers. It was up  to Rocard to arbitrate, although he clearly d id  so in close 
liaison w ith the Elysée.
In the second departm ental category spending increased only in line 
w ith  inflation, then running at around 3 per cent. This increase affected, for 
exam ple, the PTT, Justice and  the Interior M inistries. W hilst in  the th ird  
category spending was only allowed to rem ain at the previous year's levels 
and, thus, did not account for the increase in inflation over the year. In these 
two categories the Prime Minister played a m uch greater role. H e w as in the 
position to decide which Ministries w ould be included in which category, 
although this was in no w ay an individual decision and again Bercy and the 
Elysée were closely involved.
Even in these tw o categories, the President personally in tervened 
during the final arbitrations in July to dem and an increase in spending for a 
num ber of budgets. This was the case notably for the Culture Minister, Lang, 
and  the H ousing M inister, Delebarre. Lang's close personal links w ith 
M itterrand and the President's intense interest in the grand projects of his 
second septennat, m eant that, while not part of those priorities listed in the 
Lettre aux Français, the C ulture M inistry was able to enjoy a larger than 
average budgetary increase. M oreover, Lang was very clever to exploit his 
relations with M itterrand, so as to appeal directly to the President and  short- 
circuit the Prime Minister in the appeal process.50 He wrote several letters to 
the President appealing for more money and, while he was not systematically 
granted it, he did benefit on a num ber of occasions.
D elebarre 's situation  w as slightly different. A lthough the  overall 
increase in his M inistry's budget was only 5.3 per cent, only slighter higher 
than the average figure, spending on special low cost housing projects (le 
logement social) increased by 17 per cent. This increase came at a very late
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stage in the arbitration process. It was due to two reasons. Firstly, the Finance 
M inistry greatly underestim ated the H ousing M inistry 's basic needs in its 
initial budgetary calculations in March. This m istake w as identified during 
the budget conferences and D elebarre 's budget increased accordingly.51 
Secondly, M itterrand took a personal interest in the social housing question. 
In a speech during the sum m er to the HLM federation, he announced that 
the governm ent had to make a greater budgetary effort in favour of social 
housing. M oreover, in the light of the liberal changes necessitated by 
European economic integration, particularly in the fiscal dom ain, M itterrand 
insisted that further social measures be taken to redress the balance. Rocard 
had  no option bu t to comply w ith the P residen t's w ishes, although the 
opposition to this m easure came more from Bérégovoy and Charasse, ^than 
from  the Prim e Minister.52 Consequently, on July 26th, the Prim e Minister 
announced that 2.3 billion francs w ould be added  to the social housing 
budget.
The fourth and final category consisted of the Defence M inistry 's 
budget. This budget was set apart as a special case because 1989 also saw the 
preparation of the revised loi de programmation militaire for 1990-1993. To a 
large extent, the Defence budget for 1990, therefore, depended on long-term 
strategic defence decisions, which in tu rn  depended on the international 
situation and also on the governm ent's other long-term priorities. The most 
notable of these priorities was the 24 billion franc increase in the Education 
M inistry's budget over five years and an annual 15 billion tax reduction due 
to E uropean  harm onisation . These constra in ts p u t p ressu re  on  the 
governm ent and  the P resident to decrease spend ing  on  the  m ilitary  
program m e which was set to cost the country 470 billion francs in five years 
tim e.
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The initiative to cut the m ilitary program m e in  o rder to fund the 
governm ent's other priorities came from those at the Finance Ministry. They 
suggested a 70 billion franc cut, som ething that the Defence Minister, Jean- 
Pierre Chevènement, violently opposed, as it w ould m ean the abandonm ent 
of one his M inistry's prestige projects. Chevènem ent w as willing to accept a 
30 billion cut coming from personnel reductions, bu t he w ished to leave the 
m ajor projects ii^ tac t. It was these tw o contrasting proposals that were 
presented to Rocard in an arbitration meeting in late June. N ational defence, 
how ever, has long been part of the President's reserved dom ain and the 
Prim e M inister was aware that he did  not have the authority personally to 
arb itrate. W ith the Prim e M inister refusing to take the side  of either 
Chevènem ent, or Bérégovoy, the m atter w as settled in a defence council 
meeting at the Elysée where a figure of 45 billion was agreed u p o n . 5 3
In fact, the tactics used in the bargaining process over this budget were 
typical of the arbitration process as a whole. The Finance Minister argued that 
the governm ent's budgetary calculations w ould be shattered if the level of 
cuts he proposed were not made. The Defence M inister proposed certain 
reductions, so as to appear conciliatory, but on the m ain and costly issues he 
was insistent, even threatening to resign if any m ajor projects w ere cut. 
How ever, the Prime M inister was not in the position to arbitrate, defence 
being out of his sphere of competence.
In the other budgetary negotiations, the process was very similar as 
were the tactics used by both sides. The Prime Minister, however, was better 
placed to arbitrate. It should be rem em bered, though, tha t the  President 
always reserved the right to intervene when he considered it to be necessary. 
It should  also be rem em bered tha t the Prim e M inister w as sometimes 
w eakened vis-à-vis the Finance M inister. M atignon does n o t have the
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adm inistrative resources to question the figures that are presented to it by 
Bercy. Therefore, it is not unheard of for Bercy deliberately to underestim ate 
the governm ent's economic leeway, so that the Prim e M inister feels obliged 
to be very strict w ith Ministers in the arbitrations w ith which he is faced. This 
was the situation in 1 9 8 9 . 5 4  In fact, the level of public spending rose by only 
4.7 per cent, less than originally foreseen in the lettre de cadrage.
On the income side, the major influence on the governm ent's fiscal 
policy w as the im pact of European economic harm onisation. In 1984 and 
1986, its effects had been slight. In 1984, the prospect of the Single European 
Act deterred the government from raising VAT, even if it d id not lead to any 
reduction. In 1986, the reduction in corporation tax w as consistent w ith 
economic harm onisation, bu t it was m ainly due to political circumstances 
and B ahadur's economic philosophy. In 1989, economic in tegration was 
im m inent and the government had to take steps to prepare it.
Bérégovoy was particularly anxious to take the necessary steps to 
harm onise France's fiscal policy with that of its EC partners. One of the first 
changes needing to be m ade was an increase in the incentives to save (la 
fiscalité d'épargne). This same topic had been the subject of a detailed report 
by  the PS depu ty , C hristian  P ierret, pub lished  in  June 1989. In the 
propositions delivered to Rocard in August 1989, Bérégovoy included several 
of the report's reconunendations, although he w ent further than  Pierret had 
considered to be prudent.
Another area in which it was essential to m ake changes was the VAT 
structure. France had a very high top rate of VAT, w hich needed to be 
reduced in order to align the country with the rest of Europe. Both Bérégovoy 
and Rocard were agreed that steps had to be taken, although they and their 
advisers differed over the details of the reform. Rocard favoured a reduction
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of the top rate on cars only, whereas Bérégovoy favoured an across the board 
reduc tion  for sim plic ity 's sake and  as a sign  of F rance 's E uropean 
com m itm ent. The Prim e M inister agreed, unw illing to m ake this issue a 
divisive one.
The th ird  m easure that Bérégovoy w anted to introduce was the most 
controversial. He proposed a reduction in the level of corporation tax from 39 
per cent to 37 per cent for companies which reinvested their profits. This 
proposal m et with opposition from the Prime Minister, w ho felt that priority 
should be given to reducing the level of tax on dividended profits, aligning 
the tw o at 39 per cent. Bérégovoy, however, insisted that his proposal was 
consistent w ith the President's desire for economic harm onisation and  he 
also w anted to give the financial m arkets a sign that the country w anted to 
help business activity.
Consistent w ith the usual process, the President was called upon to 
endorse these changes. W hilst his electoral m andate unequivocally outlined 
his com m itm ent to European in tegration, he w as concerned that these 
reforms smacked too much of liberalism. Therefore, he agreed to accept them 
only if the governm ent w ould increase the social aspect of the budget, 
proposing an increase in the wealth tax and increased spending on social 
projects.55 This the governm ent agreed to do. In voicing his concern at the 
liberal aspects of the budget, however, the President was articulating the 
worries of a large part of the PS. In fact, the most concerted opposition to these 
reforms came from the PS parliam entary group and the party  itself.
Parliam ent's interest in and its influence on the revenue side of the 
budget are generally m uch greater than  on expenditure m atters. Revenue 
questions are m ore highly publicised than their spending counterparts. The 
public impact of changing the tax structure is m uch more imm ediate and the
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debate surrounding it is often couched in m uch more political terms. In 1989, 
the  debate  betw een the p a rty  and  its parliam en tary  g roup  an d  the 
governm ent centred around  fiscal policy. It w as difficult, how ever, to 
distinguish between the influence of the party  and the influence of the PS 
group. This was because the leading figures in the group all held im portant 
positions in the party  and because the leading party  m em bers w ere all 
deputies.
The m ost im portant figures in the debate w ith the governm ent were 
Dominic Strauss-Kahn, the President of the N ational Assem bly's Finance 
Commission; Alain Richard, the group's budgetary spokesperson; Raymond 
Douyère, a leading commissioner; Louis Mermaz, leader of the PS group in 
the Assembly; Pierre Mauroy, PS general secretary; and Henri Emmanuelli, 
num ber tw o in the party. The problem s betw een the governm ent and the 
party  w ere caused by two main reasons. Firstly, there were genuine policy 
disagreements. Strauss-Kahn, for example, was opposed to the governm ent's 
reform s on economic grounds. Secondly, there w ere institutional problem s 
betw een the party  and the government.56 The governm ent's legislative co­
operation with the UDC over the preceding 18 m onths had  left the PS with 
the feeling tha t its influence had  decreased to the  po in t w here the 
governm ent took little  notice of it w hen draw ing  up  policy. W ith the 
know ledge that the party  conference was only a few m onths away, party  
leaders were determined to try and influence the budget where they felt it to 
be necessary.
Strauss-Kahn was opposed to the reduction in the VAT level for sound 
economic reasons. He believed that any such reduction w ould only increase 
the level of im ports and w ould create a balance of paym ents problem  as 
French industry  w ould not be able to cope w ith the subsequent increase in
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dem and. The government, however, presented the party  w ith a fait accompli, 
announcing the reduction in the Conseil des M inistres on September 6th 
1989. W hilst all agreed that, once decided, the reform had to be put into effect 
im m ediately, the party  w as angry that it had  no t been included in the 
discussions surrounding it and had leam t of the decision at the same time as 
the public.57
The party  was even more aggrieved w hen the governm ent used the
sam e strategy to announce the corporation tax reduction on September 13th
as part of Rocard's second employment plan. As Strauss-Kahn noted:
C 'était une bonne stratégie de faire passer la réforme. H s'agissait d 'un  
fait accom pli de la p a rt d u  M inistre  des Finances, sinon le
gouvernem ent.58
W hilst the Finance Commission could have refused to accept both of fhese 
reform s, it could only have overtu rned  them  w ith  the governm ent's 
agreem ent, as the Constitution prohibits any parliam entary  am endm ents 
which reduce the level of governm ent income. Bérégovoy, however, w ould 
not contemplate reversing these measures. For him  the m atter was an issue 
of confidence. He w as behind the reform  and, now  that they had  been 
announced, if he backed dow n it would be a sign of weakness to which the 
m arkets w ould react adversely. In a particularly storm y meeting w ith the PS 
group on October 3rd, Bérégovoy threatened to resign if the party  did  not 
accept the reduction in corporation tax.59
Faced with this ultimatum, the party decided to agree to the reform and 
it w as passed by the Finance Com m ission on October 11th. In return , 
however, the group started to formulate a list of dem ands which it w ould 
insist upon in the final govemmentX party  arbitrations later in the month. 
M atters came to a head at the final arbitration m eeting on October 17th at
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M atignon. Representing the governm ent were Rocard, Bérégovoy, Charasse 
and  Poperen , the  M inister for P arliam entary  R elations. The PS w as 
represented by Mauroy, Emmanuelli, Strauss-Kahn, Richard and Douyère.
The party had a list of dem ands that it presented to the government. In 
return  for lowering corporation tax, Strauss-Kahn w anted the governm ent to 
increase the level of death duties. Bérégovoy was absolutely opposed to this 
proposal saying that it would underm ine business confidence and w ould be 
electorally unpopular. However, he proposed to set up  a commission to study 
the m atter in time for the 1991 budget. He also suggested an increase in the 
w ealth tax as a compensatory social measure. W hilst the Prime Minister had 
publicly opposed any further increase in this tax the previous year, on this 
occasion he realised that he had to agree to it in order to pacify the party. As 
one of Rocard's advisers states: "H faut bien com prom ettre. C 'est l'habilété 
politique. H a fallu lâcher quelque chose au groupe".
The group also proposed a significant increase in  the level of taxation 
on the profits of bo th  com panies and  ind iv idua ls derived  from  the 
appreciation on property  and  other items. The g roup  argued that this 
m easure  w as necessary in view  of the exigencies of European fiscal 
harm onisation, France's levels being rather low. This rather ironic argum ent 
was strengthened because Strauss-Kahn had previously secretly contacted the 
heads of various leading companies asking them  if any such increase would 
effect their investm ent plans. The response w as th a t it w ould  not.^O 
Bérégovoy, therefore, was deprived of using this argum ent and accepted to 
increase the level of taxation on companies from 15 per cent to 19 per cent, on 
condition that the level for individuals rem ained the same.
The group was also able to pass an am endm ent reform ing the taxe 
professionnelle, so that it favoured low er income earners. They were also
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successful in getting Bérégovoy to agree to set up studies similar to the one on 
death  duties for this tax, as well as the taxe d'hahitation and the Dotation  
Globale de Fonctionnement. The overall resu lt of the  m eeting w as a 
compromise between both sides, but it was particularly instructive in that its 
puts clearly into focus some of the dynamics of the decision m aking process.
For exam ple, although a com prom ise w as reached, the successful 
argum ents p u t forw ard by the group w ere based on soundly  researched 
economic principles. Also, the governm ent, norm ally seen as the dom inant 
partner in its relations with the party and its parliam entary group, was clearly 
forced to cede on a num ber of issues. This situation was due to a num ber of 
reasons. The position of the Finance M inistry w as w eakened due to the 
debilitating tax-collectors' strike, whose claims were regarded sympathetically 
by a large part of the PS. By refusing to give in to the tax-collectors, Bérégovoy 
reduced his bargaining power on budgetary matters. Similarly, by insisting on 
the reduction in corporation tax, Bérégovoy built up  resentm ent w ithin the 
PS and found his room to m anoeuvre on other issues reduced. He was also 
faced w ith a noticeable lack of overt support from the President and  Prime 
Minister. W hilst on a South American tour w ith M itterrand in early October, 
Mermaz had urged the party to insist on its own reforms. Given their timing, 
these com m ents w ere taken to have the P residen t's support. Similarly, 
Rocard, while in favour of the reduction in corporation tax, was unwilling to 
enter publicly into a damaging debate.
The u lte rio r m otive beh ind  m any of these  positions w as the 
forthcoming party  congress. For example, whilst there always tends to be a 
certain  institu tional antagonism  betw een the Finance M inister and  the 
President of the Finance Commission, the relations betw een Bérégovoy and 
Strauss-Kahn in 1989 were not helped by the fact that the form er was a
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fabiusien and the latter a jospiniste. Similarly, Rocard was unwilling publicly 
to  intervene because he w as try ing to create the im age of him self as a 
potential unifier of these two factions at some future date. The party congress, 
however, served to confuse the institutional debate between the government 
and the party, rather than aggravating it because the different factions were 
present in the government just as they were in Parliament. It also may have 
served to defuse the debate at certain times, as well as to envenom it at others. 
For example, Strauss-Kahn argued that the party  failed to force through the 
change in death duties because: "les fabiusiens nous ont lâchés".^^ Bérégovoy 
m ade th is issue into a factional one, precisely so as to  ensure that the 




The dynam ics of the budgetary  policy m aking process provide a good 
illustration of the politics of the governm ental decision m aking process. 
Although there are special procedures which are unique to the preparation of 
the Finance act in France, the process still resembled to a large extent the one 
which w as encountered in the previous chapter. Policy outcomes w ere the 
result of a hierarchical arbitration process in which the Prime M inister's role 
was central.
Indeed, m any of the forces which, in the last chapter, w ere seen to 
im pinge upon the policy process w ere also p resen t in the case studies 
p resen ted  in th is chapter. For exam ple, just as in the preparation  of 
broadcasting policy the bureaucrats of the SJTl had a certain influence, so in 
the preparation of budgetary policy the role played by the direction du Budget 
w as also im portant. Indeed, arguably  the influence of the perm anent
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adm inistration was greater in the case of the budget, because of the fact that 
the  p reparation  of budgetary  policy necessitates the co-operation of all 
governm ent M inistries and because of the technical nature of m any of the 
decisions which have to be made.
Similarly, in both policy areas, although the Prime M inister played a 
central role in the arbitration process for both expenditure and revenue items, 
the influence of the President m ust also be noted. O n several occasions 
during  both the preparation of the 1985 and 1990 budgets, the President 
intervened directly and publicly in the policy process to dem and that certain 
policy decisions be taken. On these ocasions, the Prim e M inister and the 
Finance M inister had no option bu t to acquiesce to the President's wishes. 
Clearly, the exception to this observation occurred during cohabitation when 
the President played only a residual role in the policy process.
A t the sam e tim e, how ever, this chapter p rov ided  certain o ther 
insights into the dynamics of the policy process w hich were not apparent 
from the study of broadcasting policy. Firstly, the impact of the international 
econom ic environm ent upon  the dom estic decision m aking process in 
France m ust be noted. It was clear that governm ent's room  for m anoeuvre 
and, hence, the capacity to influence policy of the  dom estic actors and, 
therefore, of the Prim e M inister w ere constrained  du rin g  periods of 
international economic recession, such as in 1984. However, in periods of 
international economic expansion, such as 1989, the scope for governmental 
and prim e ministerial intervention was m uch greater. It was also noted that 
the role of the bureaucracy was greater during  periods of recession than 
periods of expansion.
Secondly, in contrast to anything w hich w as seen in  the previous 
chapter, the im pact of intra-party disputes had  a profound effect on the
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outcom e of the 1990 budget. H ie  im portance of the disputes w ithin the PS 
increased throughout the period under consideration and became noticeably 
m ore virulent in the run-up to the 1990 party  congress at Rennes. Whereas 
the study of the 1985 budget could be undertaken with only slight reference to 
intra-party rivalry, the preparation of the 1990 budget was greatly influenced 
by this problem . Indeed, the Rocard's actions were, on  several occasions, 
determ ined by his perception of how  best to operate in the face of these 
rivalries.
Finally, the im pact of individual personalities w as m ore apparent in 
this chapter, notably, during the preparation of the 1985 budget. The change of 
Prime Minister during 1984 at the height of the budgetary arbitration process, 
h ighlighted the differences betw een M auroy, w ith  his background ^ s  a 
notable, and Fabius, w ith his training in the Inspection des Finances and his 
experience as Budget M inister. U ndoubtedly their differing backgrounds 
helped to account, in part, for their different approaches to and influence on 
the budgetary policy process. However, the constraints of the wider system 
within which they operated m ust also be noted. Indeed, we will argue that it 
is these constraints w hich are ultim ately determ inant. In o rder better to 
understand the nature of these constraints, we will now  turn  to the px>licy 
making process under crisis situations.
C hapter 5
Crisis Policy Making: L The Devaquet University reforms, 1986
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The study  undertaken in the previous tw o chapters took the form  of a 
decision-based approach. By examining specific case studies it was possible to 
build  up  a picture of the Prime M inister's role and influence. By taking two 
particu lar subject areas we saw  that the observations derived  from  an 
exam ination of the first area were confirmed and extended by the results of 
the second. We argue that these conclusions hold good for other policy areas, 
although there is insufficient space in this particular study  to conduct any 
further sectoral analyses.
Nevertheless, it is still necessary to provide further information, so as
'»ncfease,
to be able to further our understanding of the dynam ics behind the policy 
m aking process and to appreciate better the Prim e M inister's role therein. 
Therefore, instead of embarking upon another analysis of routine decision 
making in a specific policy sector, this time we have decided to examine non­
routine policy making during times of public policy crises. We have chosen to 
study  periods of crisis, because such periods concentrate m ost clearly the 
issues at stake in the policy process and clarify the interests of the actors 
present. As one of the most central of these actors, the role and influence of 
the Prime Minister will be pu t into relief.
We have chosen, therefore, to exam ine tw o public policy decisions 
which were m ade during periods of governmental crisis. The first case study 
examines the period of governmental difficulty in Novem ber and December 
1986, w hen the wave of student protests against the Chirac governm ent's 
higher education reforms was so intense that it provoked the resignation of 
the M inister for H igher E ducation, A lain D evaquet, and  forced the 
w ithdraw al of the bill in question. The second deals w ith  the problem s 
surrounding  the devaluation of the franc in M arch 1983, w hen both the
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future of the Prime Minister in office and of the franc in ^ u ro p e an  Monetary
System were in doubt.
It m ust be appreciated, however, that the concept of a political crisis is
itself highly problem atic. Therefore, in  this chapter and the next, before
em barking upon a detailed exam ination of the crisis period itself, we will
briefly define the type of crisis period in each case.
Dunleavy and O'Leary have argued that a political crisis m ay take three
different forms: a terminal crisis; an endurable crisis; and a curable crisis.^ The
problem s surrounding  the D evaquet bill fell into one of the latter two
categories. That is to say, a period of chronic political difficulties and sub-
optim al performance, or, conversely, a period of short-run political problems
which could be resolved. ,
Opinions differed as to the precise nature of the governmental crisis in
November-December 1986. Student leaders felt that som ething approaching
the form er definition was more appropriate, whereas representatives of the
governm ent tended to dow nplay the situation, arguing  tha t som ething
approaching the latter was accurate. At least there was agreement, however,
tha t there w as a crisis of some sort during  this time. This is also the
conclusion of Michel Dobry who has m ade a particular study  of political
crises.2 He argued that:
On a alors assisté bel et bien à l'affaissement des logiques routinières du 
jeu politique; les points de repère habituels, les m anières d 'anticiper 
l'avenir, de calculer, de prévoir l'efficacité de ses propres coups se sont 
alors effondrés et pour une très courte période, on est entré dans 
l'incontrôlable, dans une conjoncture m arquée par une bonne dose de 
fluidité politique.3
By common consent, therefore, there was a tim e of political crisis during 
some part of November and December 1986.
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In fact, we have decided to concentrate upon the events in the period 
betw een the outbreak of the first s tuden t strike w hich w as called on 
Novem ber 17th and the decision by Chirac to w ithdraw  the bill on December 
8th. W hile not all of this period could be considered as exhibiting the 
characteristics of a crisis, it d id  incorporate the m ost unstable period just 
before the bill's w ithdrawal. It also included the events leading up to this 
decision w hich provided the necessary background context for the crisis 
period.
Before em barking upon a detailed exam ination of this three week 
period, we will give a brief chronological account of the complex series of 
events which led up to the withdrawal of the bill. Having done this, we will 
then examine how  the government reacted to the student protests and see 
w hat role the Prim e M inister played during  this period. Once we have 
com pleted this, we will then draw  some conclusions about w hat this crisis 
period told us about the Prime M inister's position in the system.
A Chronology of events surrounding the Devaquet H igher Education Bill
On April 4th 1986 in a speech to the Assemblée nationale, Chirac announced 
his governm ent's intention to draw  up a bill which w ould reform the higher 
education system. In this speech there was little detail. The Prim e M inister 
was content m ainly to reiterate the pledge contained in  the RPR-UDF 
electoral p latform  w hich had  prom ised  grea ter au tonom y for French 
universities. Alain Devaquet, an academic and  Parisian RPR deputy, was 
given the  responsibility  for d rafting  the bill. H is responsib ility  was 
immediately challenged, however, when Jean Foyer, an RPR deputy, tabled a 
p rivate  m em bers bill designed to reorganise com pletely the university  
system. Foyer proposed a series of reforms that were m uch m ore radical than
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those envisaged by Devaquet and which were inspired by the w ork of a set of
neo-liberal academics and deputies in the GERUF group. Foyer's bill aimed to
introduce m arket forces to the higher education system by giving universités
almost complete autonomy to run  their own affairs. For example, they would
be able to set their own level of tuition fees; they could decide their own entry
requirements; and they would be able to deliver their own degrees, in place of
the existing national degree system.
Devaquet was fiercely opposed to the ideas of the GERUF group and to
the content of Foyer's bill. Consequently the first draft of the governm ent's
bill bore little relation to the Foyer text. In fact, Devaquet's first draft was
draw n u p  very quickly and was ready by M ay 18th. The speed of its
preparation was criticised during the crisis period by students and others,who
felt that they had  not been consulted over its contents. Devaquet insisted,
however, that there had been ample consultation especially in meetings after
the first d raft and  that the bill h ad  subsequently  been am ended to
accommodate the objections raised in these meetings.^
O nce p rep a red  the bill w en t th ro u g h  a series of r é u n i o n s
interministérielles which began in mid-May. One of the key figures at these
m eetings was the academic Yves D urand. He was a leading figure in the
GERUF group and had been appointed as Chirac's adviser on university
affairs in M arch 1986. The relations betw een D evaquet and D urand were
strained right from the start. D urand used his position to  try  and alter
Devaquet's text in a way consistent with GERUF's ideas:
Tout au long de ces mois, j'ai dû  m alheureusem ent constater, par moi- 
même ou par les comptes rendus de mes collaborateurs qui avaient 
affaire à lui, que le recteur D urand n 'était que le représentant vigilant 
et m ilitant des organisations auxquelles il appartenait, résolum ent 
décidé à faire prévaloir leurs idées et leurs fins.5
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M oreover, Devaquet was also heavily criticised in Parliam ent by the RPR 
group which accused him  of betraying the Prime M inister and the party 's 
electoral platform. They called for the introduction of major amendments. 
The antipathy between Devaquet and D urand and the m istrust between the 
M inister and  a section of his ow n parliam entary  group w as to have a 
significant influence on the events in November and December.
Due to the influence of D urand and Foyer the bill was altered in a 
num ber of respects, notably at a m eeting chaired by Chirac on June 3rd. 
However, by the end of the month it was sent before the Conseil d 'E tat and it 
was approved by the Conseil des ministres in a form acceptable to Devaquet 
on July 11th. Devaquet and his advisers hoped that the bill could be debated 
over the sum m er as they feared student protest against it if it were delayed 
until the autum n s e s s i o n . ^  There had already been some very minor protests 
outside of Paris in April and May. This request, however, was refused by the 
UDF M inister for Parliam entary  Relations, A ndré  Rossinot. H e gave 
preference to M éhaignerie's housing bill in the Assemblée nationale, while 
the  Sénat was busy slow ly rew riting  L éotard 's broadcasting  bill. The 
university reform bill, therefore, had to wait until October to be debated.
The Sénat finally debated the bill betw een 23rd-29th October. It was 
passed w ith little difficulty and encountered criticisms from  only a few 
socialist senators. There had been little press or public interest in the debate. 
The different student organisations, however, had started to try and mobilise 
their members against the bill. On October 21st, 400 students launched w hat 
came to be known as the 'appel de Caen' which called for a total withdrawal of 
the bill. As yet, however, student action was confined to a small group of 
union militants who had little impact on the mass of students who had just 
started the new academic year.
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The first main student initiative came at the university of Paris Xm  at 
Villetaneuse on Novem ber 17th. A lthough the principle of going on strike 
had  been passed four days earlier, it was on this date that the students there 
voted by a large majority to strike and to try and extend it to students at other 
faculties. In fact, by November 22nd the strike had  spread to students in a 
series of other universities in the Parisian region and outside. Moreover, the 
strike had also spread quickly amongst the lycéens and from the 21st onwards 
their num bers were to swell considerably the ranks of the student protestors.
On Novem ber 22nd the long-arranged Etats généraux of the UNEF-ID 
w ere transform ed into the Etats généraux des étudiants en lutte and a 
dem onstration was announced in Paris on the 27th.7 Also on the 22nd the 
m ovem ent received the  su p p o rt of P residen t M itte rrand  w ho said: 
"Com m ent voulez-vous que je me sente déphasé par rapport à eux (les 
jeunes)". Furtherm ore, the 28th saw  the long-planned rally in Paris of the 
FEN which announced its support for the students. This dem onstration was 
m uch larger than the government had expected and, indeed, the government 
consisten tly  underestim ated  the m ovem ent's s tren g th  over the  next 
fortnight.
The national student dem onstration on the 27th also proved to be a 
great success and by this time disruption was w idespread in m ost of the 
country 's universities. Another demonstration was fixed for December 4th. In 
an attem pt to calm the situation, on the 28th the governm ent announced the 
postponem ent of the bill's examination by the Assemblée nationale. Chirac 
then personally announced on Novem ber 30th that the governm ent was 
aware of the opposition to the bill and that it would spend the next couple of 
weeks re-examining it and making any changes that were felt to be necessary.
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This prom ise d id  not deflate the m ovem ent and  w as seen by the 
students as an attem pt to buy time by Chirac w ith the hope that the protests 
w ould die down. In fact, the student organisations, buoyed by favourable 
television coverage and opinion polls, d id  their best to ensure that the 
dem onstration on the 4th was to be an even greater success. For UNEF-ID, the 
dem onstration was the most potent weapon against the governm ent and its 
success depended on the num ber of people joining the marches.®
Figure 1: Calendar of events; November 17th - December 8th 
Mon. 17th Strike vote at Villetaneuse
Sat. 22nd Creation of the Etats généraux des étudiants en lutte
Sun. 23rd FEN demonstration in Paris (100,000 attend)
M itterrand's declaration at Auxerre 
Thurs. 27th First national student dem onstration 
Fri. 28th Renvoi en commission of the bill
Sat. 29th Difficulties within UNEF-ID
Sun. 30th Chirac appears on Questions à Domicile 
Mon. 1st Darriulat alleged to have met Monory
Tues. 2nd Election of student delegation to meet Monory
Weds. 3rd Thomas meets Toubon
Thurs. 4th Second national student dem onstration 
Student delegation meets Monory 
Rioting in the evening 
Fri. 5th Governm ent crisis meeting
Chirac leaves for London with M itterrand 
M onory's television appearance 
Devaquet writes resignation letter 
Rioting and death of Malik Oussekine 
Sat. 6th Beginning of two day RPR festival
Chirac and M itterrand return from London 
Sun. 7th Chirac has an audience with M itterrand
Mon. 8th W ithdrawal of bill
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The dem onstration on the 4th proved to be a great success w ith 
betw een 500,000 and  700,000 pro testo rs m arching in  Paris alone. The 
governm ent, however, refused to back dow n. M onory, the UDF Education 
Minister and Devaquet's superior, had already agreed to meet a delegation of 
striking students on the evening of the 4th. This meeting, however, was a 
failure w ith neither side either w anting to negotiate, or being allowed to 
w hen an attem pt was made. Instead, the dem onstration degenerated into 
violence between the police and students and a night of rioting ensued. The 
students blam ed the police and the police blam ed casseurs w ho they claimed 
were deliberately provoking violence from within the student ranks.
The next day was m arked by intense governm ental activity which 
culm inated in a rather unapologetic television broadcast by Monory. It also 
saw  the overnight resignation of Devaquet in response to the transfer of 
responsibility for the bill to the Education Minister and the violence that had 
occurred the previous day. Worse was to follow w hen during the evening of 
the 5th and 6th rioting again broke out. In the police operation to disperse the 
crowds a student, Malik Oussekine, was chased by two policeman and was 
struck. He died of his injuries in hospital a few hours later.
During the next two days the crisis was at its height. Chirac, however, 
had gone to London the previous day and there appeared to be a lack of 
governm ental leadership . The s tuden t o rganisers called for a fu rther 
dem onstration on the 10th. There w ere clear signs that the p ro test was 
spreading to other non-student unions. M oreover, certain m em bers of the 
governm ent gave the impression of being less than sym pathetic to w hat had 
happened during the night. In a speech to the RPR's 10th anniversary festival 
on December 7th, Charles Pasqua, the Interior Minister, suggested that the 
student m ovem ent was trotskyist inspired and that the governm ent w ould
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never give in to street violence. While there had  been violence and while 
trotskyists were present in the national delegation, this was a view which 
seemed caricatural to the mass of ordinary students and their parents alike.^
Behind the scenes, however, there was intense pressure on Chirac to 
w ithdraw  the text. Government solidarity had never existed in private over 
w hat to do and now divisions were appearing in public as certain prom inent 
M inisters called for the text to be w ithdraw n. On the m orning of the 8th, 
Alain Madelin, the Industry Minister, publicly condem ned Oussekine's death 
and said that the bill should be scrapped. Faced w ith pressure from within his 
governm ent Chirac decided to end the escalation of violence and at 1 p.m. on 
December 8th it was announced that the bill had  been withdrawn.
The repercussions of this troubled period for the governm ent did not 
end there. On the 9th Chirac announced a pause in its reform program m e. 
There was a silent student dem onstration on the 10th. Both the Assemblée 
nationale and the Sénat set up  special com m issions of enquiry  which 
produced voluminous reports and provoked charges of a governm ent cover 
u p .10 W hile the two policemen involved in the death of Malik Oussekine 
were acquitted only in 1990. This study, however, will concentrate on the 
events between November 17th and December 8th and we will now consider 
the response of the government to the student protests during this period.
M achinations w ith in  the governm ent
In this section we will concentrate upon the events as w itnessed from the 
governm ent's point of view. We will focus upon  tw o things in particular. 
Firstly, we will identify the divisions within the governm ent over w hether 
the bill should have been kept, or w ithdrawn. Secondly, we will identify the 
different governmental strategies that were adopted during the crisis period.
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As we focus upon both of these different aspects of the governm ent's action 
we will identify the role of the Prime M inister and see to w hat extent he 
determ ined the government's response to the student protests.
From the first weekend of the crisis onw ard (22nd\23rd November), it 
was possible to identify three different attitudes w ithin  the governm ent. 
There w ere those who refused to alter the text and w anted to defend the 
unam ended version; there were those who wished to modify it to a greater or 
lesser extent in an attem pt to appease the students; and there were those who 
w ished to w ithdraw  the text imm ediately and unconditionally. D uring the 
crisis period there was a gradual shift from the first position to the second and 
then finally to the third. We w ould not w ish to suggest, however, that this 
was in any way a linear progression as opinions were relatively slow to move 
until the death of Malik Oussekine. It was only on M onday 8th that the 
pressures to w ithdraw  the bill became so strong as to convince the Prime 
Minister to abandon it.
The strategies adopted during the crisis period could largely be seen to 
correspond to the divisions w ithin the government. A t the beginning, when 
there were only a few voices calling for the bill's w ithdrawal, the government 
adop ted  several of w hat m ight be called 'classical' strategies: m edia 
appearances to explain the bill, public meetings w ith the protestors to pu t 
forw ard the governm ent's case; and  the collation of inform ation by the 
renseignements généraux. As the crisis spread, so the m easures taken to deal 
w ith it became less routine. The renvoi en commission was an exam ple of 
this. Finally, during the period of greatest fluidity it became difficult to talk of 
a governm ental strategy at all. A t this poin t the action of governm ent 
m em bers was more inspired by private rivalries, personal initiatives and 
finally open rebellion than by any pre-determined strategy. We will now chart
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the divisions, identify the strategies and account for them  both. In doing so 
w e will h ighlight some of the m otivations behind the decision m aking 
process and define some of the limits of governmental action.
A lthough the strike at Villetaneuse was called on Novem ber 17th, it was not
until the weekend of the 22nd \  23rd that any particularly exceptional action
was taken. In part this was not surprising. Opposition to the bill, for example,
during its passage through the Sénat had been no greater than on any other
bill. Similarly, although the strike did  spread quickly, it was not until the
22nd that there was any national co-ordination. Moreover, on the 17th itself,
Devaquet had fulfilled a long-arranged meeting w ith Phillipe Darriulat, the
leader of UNEF-ID, where the contents of the bill were discussed, but where it
was never suggested that it was unacceptable to the union, or that it should be
w ithdraw n. Instead , discussion centred  a round  som e ra th e r technical
am endm ents and Darriulat was content merely to state his opposition to the
contentious parts of the bill.D
It w as only during the w eekend of N ovem ber 22nd /23rd  that the
situation became at all worrying for the governm ent. The états généraux of
UNEF-ID w ere transform ed in to  the états généraux des étudiants en lutte;
M itterrand m ade his comments at Auxerre in support of the movement; and
the dem onstration by the FEN proved to be a great success. The first person
w ith in  the governm ent to appreciate the po ten tial seriousness of the
situation was Charles Pasqua. He was particularly shocked by the num ber of
people w ho attended the FEN demonstration:
Deux jours plus tôt, pendant une réception à l'Elysée, Charles Pasqua 
fanfaronne devant quelques journalistes. "Ils ne seront que dix mille",
assure-t-il. ^ 2
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In fact 200,000 people turned up  to dem onstrate and m any of these were
students. Pasqua immediately ordered the services under his control to gather
information about the student movement and its likely strength. The results
w ere alarm ing and on the 24th at the first governm ent meeting held on the
studen t problem  Pasqua shocked everyone by calling for the bill to be
withdrawn. He stated:
... on ne pourra pas tenir devant la m ontée de m écontentem ent. Ce 
projet, on sera de toute façon obligé de le retirer. M aintenant on peut 
encore sauver la face, prendre l'initiative. H va être trop tard.^^
Pasqua's suggestion, however, was rejected. For the Prime Minister and the
rest of the government it appeared to be a prem ature reaction and, moreover.
Pasqua had  only recently been em barrassed in the Chalier affair which had
lowered his bargaining power amongst the other governm ent members.
There were further governm ent m eetings on the 25th and 26th where
the student issue was brought up. At these Pasqua reiterated his views, but
found some support only from Pierre M éhaignerie, the leader of the CDS.
The centrists had been careful to m ake and m aintain contacts w ith SOS-
R adsm e w ho were very close to one of the three major factions w ithin the
UNEF-ID, Questions socialistesM  Through his contacts M éhaignerie had
come to the same conclusions as Pasqua about the nature of the problem.^5 in
a m eeting of the CDS leaders in the evening of the 24th, M éhaignerie
proposed that the passage of the bill should be delayed and that changes
should be made. 16 It should be noted that Monory, however, also a member
of the CDS, was not present at this meeting.
In the few days up to the first national dem onstration on the 27th the
govenm ent had  a num ber of d ifferen t stra teg ies w hich  it pu rsu ed
sim ultaneously. D evaquet and  M onory s ta rted  to  appear m uch m ore
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frequently on television and radio to explain the intentions that lay behind
the bill. Moreover, they argued that there had  been a m isunderstanding over
the b ill's contents which was due in part to  a deliberate m isinform ation
cam paign by student activists at all levels w ho w ere engaged in a systematic
d isto rtion  of the b ill's  p r o v i s i o n s . ^ 7 M onory also began calling chefs
d'établissements and recteurs on a twice daily basis in order to keep himself
informed of the state of the movement.^®
In addition, the governm ent started to enter into secret negotiations
w ith  representatives of the UNEF-ID leadership. In the days before the
national s tu d en t dem onstration  in  Paris on N ovem ber 27th, one of
D evaquet's advisers was in regular contact w ith Alain Bauer, a m em ber of
UNEF-ID’s majority faction. These contacts allowed the two sides to exchange
inform ation about the previous day 's events, bu t also for Bauer to suggest
w hat action the m ovem ent m ight consider as acceptable if it w ere to be
proposed by the government. As Bauer pointed out:
n  n 'y  avait pas que une échange d'information. C 'était très complexe. Je 
ne négociais pas. Je disais: "à mon avis ..." etc., "si on fait cela ..." etc. Je 
n'avais rien de particulier à proposer, sauf le r e t r a i t . ^ ^
W hat Bauer d id  suggest, how ever, was tha t the governm ent ought to
announce that the bill w as going to be re-exam ined by  the N ational
A ssem bly's social affairs commission (le renvoi en commission) by 1 p.m. at
the latest on Novem ber 27th, the day of the dem onstration. This w ould be
taken as a positive sign by the movement and w ould provide the basis for
further negotiations. Bauer felt that he had received an assurance from the
governm ent that this re-examination would be announced by the suggested
tim e.
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The governm ent, however, prevaricated and  the announcem ent did  
not come until the following day. Its first reaction was to argue that the 
dem onstration had not been a success and that the num bers m arching were 
m uch less than the organisers were claiming. This strategy, how ever, was 
clearly insufficient as television pictures show ed that there had been a large 
turnout. Instead, the Prime Minister decided to drop the am endm ents of the 
N ational Assembly commission which w ould have hardened the bill. This 
decision served to get rid  of at least one possible source of provocation and 
was one w ith which Devaquet was in agreem ent. Chirac also proceded to 
consult his coalition colleagues about which course of action to take. Once 
again, however, only Pasqua and Méhaignerie suggested that the bill should 
be withdrawn.
Pasqua 's advice, how ever, d id  have an influence on Chirac. The
following m orning (Friday 28th) Chirac m et Monory, Devaquet and Maurice
Ulrich to discuss the next course of action. At this meeting, Chirac proposed
that the bill should be abandoned. The two Ministers, however, were strongly
opposed to this. Giesbert recounted the conversation:
Pour Chirac, qui a beaucoup consulté pendant les dernières heures, il y 
a trois solutions et elles ont toutes les inconvénients: le retra it sera 
considéré comme une reddition; le m aintien conduira à l'épreuve de 
force; le compromis ne m ettra sans doute pas fin à la contestation 
étudiante. Parce qu'il n 'a  jamais aimé les terrains minés, il penche, cela 
va de soi, pour la prem ière solution. Ses deux m inistres ne veulent 
rien entendre. Ils se détestent cordialement, mais, sur cette affaire, ils 
font bloc.20
Feeling that he could not go against the tw o M inisters responsible, Chirac 
agreed to back down. However, it was clear that something had  to be done 
and the Prime Minister decided to delay the passage of the bill by having the
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N ational Assem bly's commission re-exam ine it and  to announce that it
m ight be amended to meet the students' demands.21
Instead of sending a clear signal to the students that it understood their
w orries and  that it w ould try  to take their dem ands in to  account, the
governm ent's delay in announcing the re-examination of the bill was seen by
the students as a delaying tactic. Indeed, Devaquet adm itted that this was the
real aim behind the d e d s i o n . 2 2  As Bauer noted, however, the governm ent's
concession had come too late and the movement, flushed w ith the success of
the demonstration, now  wanted more than vague promises of amendments: 
Le gouvernement était toujours décalé. Le gouvernem ent était d'accord 
pour le renvoi, mais il l'a  fait le lendemain. Dans un  jour beaucoup de 
choses se sont passées. Il y avait un décalage entre la décision et la mise 
en marche de la dédsion.23
The students, led by the Questions socialistes faction and their spokesperson,
Isabelle Thomas, decided to step up  the cam paign for the bill's complete
w ithdraw al and received blanket m edia coverage over the weekend where
this dem and was constantly reiterated. Thus, w hen Chirac appeared on the
television programme,Questions à Domicile , on Sunday 30th and personally
announced that the bill m ight be rew ritten  if necessary, he gave the
impression of having ignored the students' demands.
The governm ent's prevarication was caused p rindpally  by its internal
divisions. Pasqua and Méhaignerie wanted to see the bill w ithdrawn, whereas
Monory and a substantial cross-section of the RPR parliam entary group and
its coalition partners refused to envisage this option. There were several
reasons w hy Chirac finally decided to follow M onory's advice rather than
Pasqua's. One of the principal reasons was that on the 29th the Education
Minister threatened to resign if the bill were withdrawn.24 Devaquet also felt
that if it were to be w ithdraw n he too would have to resign. Chirac felt that
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the loss of an im portant text and two government Ministers would have had 
an adverse effect on his ow n and the governm ent's popularity . Just as 
im portantly, Chirac did not w ant to alienate Monory in any way. He was one 
of the few UDF notables who were willing to support Chirac ahead of Barre in 
the forthcom ing presidential election.25 His resignation, therefore, w ould 
have been a blow to Chirac's campaign. It m ust also be noted that there were 
still only a few people at this time who wished to see the bill abandoned. Most 
of the coalition leaders d id  not w ant to see the governm ent capitulate to 
pressure from students in the street, although they were willing to accept that 
the  bill should  be delayed and  perhaps rew ritten . O ne of the  o ther 
contributing factors was the fear that the withdrawal of this bill would have a 
knock-on effect on the rest of the governm ent's legislation. Notably, it was 
felt that the Nationality bill w ould be the next bill to come under pressure. 
Indeed, this fear was realised as the N ationality bill was one of the first 
casualties w hen the governm ent announced a pause in  its legislation on 
December 9th immediately after the withdrawal of the Devaquet bill.
The presence of all of these factors m eant that there appeared to be a 
certain prevarication in the decision m aking process. In part, the problems 
facing the government were logistical in that some leading figures could not 
be reached as they had already retu rned  to their constituencies for the 
w eekend. M ainly, how ever, the Prim e M inister w anted  to avoid rash 
decisions and was trying to satisfy as m any of the conflicting dem ands with 
which he was faced. This could account for w hy the government seemed to be 
reacting slowly to the problems it faced. W hat is more, Devaquet argued that 
the events were so complicated that it w ould be w rong to suggest that the 
government had a set of options from which it chose its next strategy:
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On aurait tort de nous imaginer pesant nos informations, inventoriant 
les stratégies possibles, évaluant leurs c o n s é q u e n c e s . ^ ^
According to Devaquet, decision making during this period did  not seem to
bear the hallmarks of a rational process.
One of the strategies that may have been adopted, however, was the
decision to exclude Devaquet from the decision m aking process. One of the
first to receive this im pression was Bauer. He felt th a t after the first
dem onstration the Minister had been effectively w ithdraw n from the group
of people within the government who were deciding w hat course of action to
take. H aving received this im pression Bauer no longer concentrated on
contacting Devaquet's advisers after the demonstration on the 27th.27 Instead
he contacted M onory's advisers, notably his directeur de cabinet, Bertrand
Saint-Semin, while at the same time he was in  contact w ith Yves D urand at
M atignon.
This im pression was confirmed in an interview  w ith Daniel Vitry,
while Devaquet also felt that he was no longer at the centre of things by the
end of November, although he described this in a coded and poetic way:
A partir du  prem ier décembre, le vent s'enfuit, le brouillard bat les 
arêtes et, comme étranger au monde, asphyxie tout. Silence total. Je ne 
vois plus, je n 'entends plus mes 'com pagnons' de cordée, je respire le 
chemin à travers le b r u m e .2 8
Devaquet was the first to adm it that he was an inexperienced M inister and
that he had m ade mistakes. Moreover, it was clear that the government really
needed a scapegoat and that a decision to sideline Devaquet was a precursor to
this action.
D evaquet's m ain evidence that he had  been elim inated from  the 
decision making process came w ith the claim that he had not been informed 
of the m eeting that allegedly took place betw een M onory and Darriulat on
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M onday December 1st. Devaquet claimed that he had  only learnt of it at the 
same time as everyone else, namely, w hen he read the report of the special 
parliam entary committees.29 in  his testimony to these committees, however, 
Monory said that he had informed Devaquet of it very soon after it had taken 
place. This conflict between the two M inisters only served to complicate the 
account of this meeting, the existence of which D arriulat has, in any case, 
alw ays denied. Nevertheless it d id  seem clear that D evaquet played little 
positive role in the following week.
In fact, it was Monory in his testim ony to the N ational Assembly's 
special commission who first stated that he had secretly m et w ith Darriulat in 
person on December 1st at the Education M inistry w ith a view to negotiating 
an acceptable version of the bill. D urand and Saint-Sem in confirm ed this 
version of events in their testimonies and  said that they too were at the 
meeting. All three stated that in principle an agreem ent had  been reached 
w hereby D arriulat w ould be present in the delegation which was to meet 
M onory and Devaquet on the 4th. Am endm ents w ould be discussed at this 
m eeting  and  the follow ing day  D arriu la t w ou ld  suggest th a t the 
studentcoordination accept them. Darriulat, however, vehem ently denied to 
the special commission that such a m eeting ever took place, claiming that 
M onory had  invented it. Indeed, in our interview w ith Darriulat, three years 
after this testimony, he continued to deny that such a meeting ever occurred. 
He also denied that he had ever considered being p art of the student 
delegation, which was confirmed in an interview w ith Bauer.
Despite D arriulat's insistence that this meeting never occurred, it was 
adm itted by Jean-Christophe Cambadelis that D arriulat had  been in contact 
with M atignon during this period and that he had used A ndré Bergeron, the 
head of Force Ouvrière (FO), as an interm ediary.^0 Bauer noted that Bergeron
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had  contacted Chirac in p reparation  for the Prim e M inister's im portant 
te lev ision  in terv iew  on N ovem ber 30th and  th a t he h ad  taken  the 
opportun ity  to present him self as a go-between in o rder to facilitate a 
negotiated s o l u t i o n . 3 1  Moreover, given Bauer's contacts w ith the government 
there was ample opportunity for negotiations to have taken place between the 
leadership of UNEF-ID and the government.
W hether the m eeting d id  take place and w hether D evaquet was 
inform ed of it or not, the logic of this meeting and of the other undisputed 
contacts w as consistent w ith  w hat had  been decided  after the  first 
dem onstration. Nam ely, that the bill was likely to be am ended in a way 
acceptable to both sides after the meeting on the 4th. It was clear, however, 
that there was a certain am ount of confusion w ithin the governm ent about 
w hat was going to happen. One of the themes of Devaquet's book was that 
inform ation did not flow sm oothly between the different centres of decision 
w ith in  the governm ent. This observation w as confirm ed by V itry and 
according to Toubon could be p u t dow n partly  to the strained relations 
between Devaquet and Durand, but also by M onory's unwillingness to be seen 
publicly to be draw n into the crisis. He preferred to see D evaquet take 
responsibility for events.
This lack of policy co-ordination w ithin the governm ent was one of 
the reasons w hy Toubon, the general secretary of the RPR, accepted an 
invitation to meet the representatives of Questions Socialiste on W ednesday 
December 3rd. Toubon felt that the forthcom ing m eeting w ith the student 
delegation had to be prepared and was unaware that Monory and Durand had 
been conducting negotiations with the student m ovem ent to this end. On the 
advice of one of the members of his cabinet, Toubon agreed to meet Isabelle 
Thomas and two other student representatives on the evening of the 3rd.
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Julien Dray, the leader of the Questions socialistes faction, had  contacted 
Thom as that same m orning and  inform ed her tha t she should prepare to 
m eet Toubon. The details of the m eeting had been arranged between Dray 
and the young RPR deputy, Eric Raoult. While the two never m et personally, 
they used their m utual contacts at the St-Maur faculty in  Paris to arrange a 
meeting. At the meeting Thomas suggested the ways in which the bill could 
be m ade acceptable to the movem ent and she w as given the assurance that 
Devaquet would be informed of her suggestions in time for the meeting with 
the  delegation the following day. There w ere at least tw o agreem ents, 
therefore, betw een different union  factions and  d ifferent governm ent 
Ministers both preparing an honourable compromise the next day.
An honourable compromise, how ever, d id  no t occur. The m eeting 
w ith the student delegation was a fiasco. The explanation for this lay at least 
in part w ith Monory. Devaquet in his book and  Vitry in an interview  both 
stated that just before they were due to meet the delegation the Education 
Minister did not seem inclined to talk about w hat course the meeting should 
take.32 It was largely for this reason that Devaquet felt that he did  not have 
the authority at the meeting to suggest the am endm ents to the bill that had 
been draw n up the previous day and been passed on to him  by Toubon. 
M onory d id  not pu t forward any signs of com prom ise and Assouline, the 
delegation's spokesperson, did not propose any amendments.
This meeting, therefore, saw an apparent reversal of M onory's strategy. 
The Education Minister has argued that he was not allowed to propose any 
am endm ents because David Assouline, the leader of the delegation, had 
firm ly taken the decision not to allow  any discussions to take place.33 
However, according to the students present and according to Devaquet and 
Vitry, the blame could be said to lie equally w ith the Education Minister who
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seemed unwilling to negotiate. In fact Monory refused to negotiate because he 
felt that the situation had changed over the previous two days and that now 
the governm ent might be in a position to win.
Some observers felt that the elections to the student delegation on the 
2nd had  m arked a decisive change in the nature  of the protests. These 
elections saw  the apparent take-over of the m ovem ent by trotskyists. The 
new spapers talked of the m ovem ent being hi-jacked by the extreme left.^4 
Isabelle Thomas had not been elected; Darriulat had not p u t himself forward 
for election; and the delegation was to be led by David Assouline, a member 
of the trotskyist LEAS faction w ithin UNEF-ID. Monory shared this analysis 
and  his suspicions w ere seem ingly confirm ed by  a telephone call from 
Assouline on the m orning of the 4th where he was told that he, Assouline, 
and not Darriulat w ould be leading the delegation.35 M atignon's imm ediate 
response was to issue a press release giving details of Assouline's curriculum 
vitae. M any of these details turned out to be false, bu t at the time they served 
to confirm  the im pression  th a t the extrem e left now  contro lled  the 
m ovem en t.
The belief in government and journalistic circles that there had  been a 
trotskyist takeover of the movement was false. According to Cambadelis and 
in a version confirm ed by Rosenblatt, over the course of the previous 
weekend the UNEF-ID majority faction and the Questions socialistes faction 
had  agreed tha t a s tuden t delegation should  be elected to m eet the 
g o v e r n m e n t . it was also agreed tha t they w ould join forces to place 
Assouline at the head of the delegation so as to ensure that he too w ould be 
forced into a process of negotiation to which he and his faction was still 
officially hostile. This m istrust of the LEAS was a constant factor during this 
time. Thomas voiced these doubts:
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Je ne sais pas s'il [Assouline] veut gagner. H y a toujours un  doute sur
l'extrême g a u c h e . 3 7
Assouline's presence at the head of the delegation, therefore, was not a sign 
that the trotskyists had  taken over the movement. On the contrary, it was an 
a ttem pt by the other more m oderate UNEF-ID factions to ensure that the 
m ovem ent w ould both rem ain unified and negotiate w ith the government.
If the movement had really been taken over by the trotskyists, then the 
governm ent w ould have been in a m uch stronger position. It could have 
hoped  to see the m ovem ent split. It could have portayed  the students ' 
dem ands as being extrem ist and it w ould have hoped to have w on back 
public support by taking a firm line against them. Such a change w ould also 
have p u t the PS in a difficult situation as it could not have been seen to 
suppo rt a m ovem ent orchestrated by the extrem e left. M onory seem ed 
personally to re-evaluate his tactics in the light of these considerations and 
decided not to hand out any olive branches to the student delegation.
This personal in itiative w as confirm ed the follow ing day  and 
provoked cries of a coup d'état from am ongst some m em bers of the Prime 
M inister's cabinet.^^ There was a governm ent m eeting in the m orning to 
discuss the events of the day before. It was clear from this that opposition to 
the bill was growing from within the governm ent's ow n ranks. Notably, the 
liberals, Léotard and Madelin, argued that it was time to w ithdraw  the bill. 
They w ere backed up  by M éhaignerie, Juppé and  M ichel d 'O rnano . 
Paradoxically, however. Pasqua now supported the text having reversed his 
position during the previous few days. H e argued that if the governm ent 
w ere to abandon the bill now it w ould be seen to be weak and as having 
capitulated to the mobs on the street.39 Pasqua was supported by Monory, but
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also by several im portant figures w ithin the RPR, such as the form er Prime
M inister, Pierre Messmer.
A t this meeting it was decided that Monory should take charge of the
situation himself, Chirac personally asked Monory to "reprendre l'affaire en
m ains". This decision was to provoke Devaquet's resignation later that day
w hen he was informed of the decision by Balladur. In practice, he had  already
been p u t to one side, but the decision was now confirmed. It was also decided
that Monory should appear on television later that day and that the substance
of this appearance w ould be fixed a t a m eeting in  the afternoon. Chirac,
however, had to leave immediately for London w here he was accompanying
M itterrand at an EC summit. Balladur, therefore, chaired this m eeting and he
p ro p o sed  th a t the M inister shou ld  announce th a t the  governm ent
understood the students' demands and that it w ould w ithdraw  the offending
parts of the bill. Monory, however, refused to accept this proposition. At an
earlier meeting with Léotard he had said:
Je suis en train de prendre la responsabilité d 'u n  dossier dont on m 'a 
in terdit l'accès pendant neuf mois. Ou bien je prends les choses en 
m ain, ou bien je m 'en vais.
W hile a t the later m eeting w ith Balladur he said: "Je ne pouvais pas
prononcer ce mot-là [retrait]."40 Indeed, during the television appearance later
that day no mention was made of w ithdraw ing any part of the text and the
im pression was given that the governm ent's position had not changed since
Chirac's statem ent the previous weekend. This refusal to make any mention
p
of the w ord 'retrait' was highly unpcpilar with m any governm ent Ministers.
As Toubon noted:
L orsque les choses son t devenues très chaudes, [M onory] a 
systém atiquem ent essayer non pas de désam orcer le conflit, mais de 
sorte de court-circuiter Devaquet, et le gouvernem ent en général, en
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préconisant une négociation, une m odification du  texte de manière, 
disons, isolée. Sans concertation ni avec Devaquet ni avec Matignon. Il 
a joué cavalier seul. H a essayé de tirer son épingle du  jeu.^l
We have to note, however, that any question of Monory being disloyal to the
Prim e M inister during  the crisis w as flatly denied by Saint-Sem in w ho
asserted that his Minister had always been "complètement loyal à l'égard du
Prem ier m i n i s t r e "  .^ 2  As w ith the account of the m eeting w ith  D arriulat
earlier in the week, there are different and  utterly  contradictory versions of
w hat happened during this period.
The death of Malik Oussekine during the night of December 5 th \6 th
was to be the catalyst for the abandonm ent of the text as a whole. Although
m any deputies had returned to their constituencies for the weekend, it was
clear from  the num erous meetings and telephone calls that took place that
pressure was increasing to abandon the bill. Previously, there had been little
serious talk in the governm ent m eetings about w ithdraw ing the text as a
whole. This was because the bill also included some im portant changes to the
structure of university governing bodies against which the students did not
pro test. D uring the course of the crisis, therefore, bo th  D evaquet and
M onory's advisers had been drafting rew ritten versions of the text, whereby
the contentious articles w ould have been dropped, bu t these reforms kept. By
this weekend, however, m any felt that only the w ithdraw al of the text as a
whole w ould satisfy the students and public opinion.
This feeling was transm itted to Chirac by several leading governm ent
figures w hen he returned from  London on Saturday in  the late afternoon.
Despite the death of Malik Oussekine there w ere still contacts between the
governm ent and the students. On Saturday 6th Bauer m et Pasqua in the
church of Saint-Étienne du  M ont, while on the 7th Thomas had a second
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m eeting w ith Toubon. On both of these occasions, however, the governm ent
w as to ld  th a t the m ovem ent w as uncontro lab le  and  th a t only  the
abandonm ent of the bill w ould  bring  it to  an end. Bauer received the
impression that Pasqua was preparing the way for the bill’s withdrawal:
En fin d 'après-m idi j'ai décidé que, malgré tout, je devrais rencontrer 
m on interlocuteur qui m 'attendait à partir de 4 heures dans une église. 
Le Ministre de L'Intérieur. J'avais l'im pression qu'il avait le pouvoir de 
prendre des décisions concernant la suite des événements. Le retrait.^^
N either Bauer nor Thomas, how ever, had  anything to propose b u t the
w ithdraw al of the text. It was clear to the UNEF-ID leadership that unless the
bill was w ithdraw n the protests w ould spread to other societal groups. At the
same time there were already fears of possible public order problems during
the  dem onstra tion  fixed for the  10th. N atalie  P révost described  the
atm osphere in the offices of UNEF-ID on Saturday December 8th:
Du samedi au dimanche [6th-7th], le bureau national de I'UNEF-ID est 
harcelé par les d irigeants des grandes organisations politiques et 
syndicales, qui veulent toutes se rallier à la manifestation du  10 ... Bref, 
selon un proche de la direction de l'UNEF-ID, personne ne contrôle 
p lus le m ouvem ent, propulsé par sa propre dynam ique. La m ort de 
Malik l'a  fait basculer dans quelque chose d 'autre, l'a  élargi à d 'autres 
catégories de la population.^
The message that UNEF-ID could no longer control the m ovem ent and that
only the w ithdraw al of the bill w ould now  be acceptable to the students was
passed on to both Pasqua and Toubon and subsequently to Chirac.
D uring  the  course of the  w eekend C hirac  also m et various
representatives of the majority, including Balladur, m any of whom  had now
reached the conclusion that the bill had to be abandoned. The Prime Minister
also had an audience with the President, although, once again, there were two
m utually  contradictory accounts of this private m eeting. W hat was clear.
164
however, was that the President supported the students and that the opinion 
polls were also showing overwhelming public support for them.45
Sunday, December 7th, also saw  a day  of frantic m eetings and 
telephone calls. Chirac was contacted by both Bergeron and Maire, the leader 
of the CFDT, both of whom  informed him of the discussions they had held 
w ith  Darriulat. Initially, they had  both told the students that the time had 
come to end the protests. They were told, however, that UNEF-ID could no 
longer control the movement and that, if they wished to see the protests end, 
then they should pu t pressure on the governm ent to w ithdraw  the text. It 
also became clear that Raymond Barre was set to intervene the following 
week in favour of the students. While M itterrand w ould use a long-standing 
radio  engagem ent to support the movement. The Prim e M inister also m et 
Léotard and Madelin and was told by the latter that he had written an article 
w hich w ould appear in Le Matin on M onday m orning saying that the bill 
should be withdrawn.
It was difficult at this time, however, for Chirac to abandon the text. 
One of the reasons for this was that the RPR's 10th anniversary celebrations 
were taking place over this weekend and it would not have been a propitious 
occasion to announce such a decision. More im portantly, however, the Prime 
M inister still believed that Monory w ould refuse to w ithdraw  the bill. The 
M inister had given no indication to Chirac that he had changed his mind. 
Over the weekend, however, the Education M inister was the target of fierce 
lobbying by m embers of his ow n party  and from coalition partners all of 
whom  w ished to end the crisis and argued that this m eant w ithdraw ing the 
bill. It was only on M onday m orning when he returned to Paris for a further 
crisis meeting that he informed the Prime Minister that he had changed his 
m ind. Chirac who had not personally decided on the best course of action to
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take now  found that almost all of his senior colleagues w anted the bill to be
dropped. The Prime Minister, therefore, agreed that this w ould be for the best.
The delay in taking the decision led to criticisms that there was a lack of
prim e ministerial leadership and that throughout the crisis Chirac had  been
vacillating. Also, the fact that he left for London at the height of the affair was
criticised by m any people. According to  Toubon, how ever, the Prime
M inister's attitude throughout the period was consistent:
Le Prem ier m inistre et ses collaborateurs ont certainem ent observé la 
situation pendant quinze jours et ont pris plein d'avis. Certainem ent 
que pendant ces deux ou trois sem aines M atignon s'est beaucoup 
interogé. Le Premier ministre n 'avait certainement pas au  départ pris la 
décision ni de m aintenir le texte, ni de  le retirer. C 'est au  fil des 
événements que peu-à-peu il a forgé sa position.46
It was clear that the final weekend saw a major shift of opinion w ithin the
governm ent and that M onday saw Monory change his mind. It was only at
th is stage, w hen it w as clear tha t both  M onory and an overw helm ing
majority of government members and senior party  figures favoured the bill's
withdrawal, that Chirac decided that it should be abandoned.
C onclusion
During a public policy crisis, we might expect to see a concentration of power 
within the highest ranks of the core executive, as political leaders try to assert 
their au thority  over the situation. Therefore, on this occasion, during  
cohabitation, we m ight have expected to have seen an increase in prim e 
m inisterial leadership. Such an increase, however, d id  not occur. At no stage 
d id  Chirac take the initiative for, or be seen to take the  lead in the 
m anagem ent of the crisis. Instead, for the m ost p a rt there w as a form of 
collective leadership with the governm ent's strategy being decided amongst a
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small group of senior Ministers and advisers. A lthough, tow ards the end of 
the period, there were also individual initiatives by senior figures, notably, 
M onory, Toubon and Madelin.
The m ain reason for this absence of prim e ministerial leadership was 
derived  from  the problem s arising from  m anaging the governm ental 
coalition. The rivalries that existed between the UDF and RPR and, indeed, 
betw een the individual components of the UDF, m eant that Chirac could not 
take the initiative during the crisis period w ithout the risk of seeing all or 
p a rt of the coalition collapse. This placed the Prim e M inister in a delicate 
position, particularly as he was a candidate at the forthcom ing presidential 
election and also because his right-wing rival, Raymond Barre, was in no way 
associated with the governm ent's plight. W hile these pressures were present 
in the other decisional studies, notably during  the preparation of the 1986 
broadcasting bill, they were greater in the above study because of the crisis 
nature of the situation. As we saw, the crisis exacerbated the tensions within 
the governm ent and threw  into relief the constraints under which the Prime 
Minister had to operate.
It m ust be appreciated, however, that while crisis periods heighten the 
need for political leadership, they also make it difficult for such leadership to 
be forthcom ing. The conditions under w hich politicians have to m ake 
decisions at such times militates against the exercise of political leadership, 
even if it does not render it impossible. This is because the stakes are much 
higher during  periods of crisis than  they are during  periods of routine 
decision making. As a result, the consequences of any decisions are much 
greater. Stark choices have to be m ade and compromises are difficult to reach. 
Decisions m ay entail the departure of a M inister, as in this case, or the 
government itself, if the crisis is sufficiently acute.
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Given the nature of political crises in general, therefore, and this one 
in particular, it is not surprising that there was a period of vacillation on the 
p a rt of the governm ent. In the situation w here the benefits which w ould 
have accrued to Chirac from 'w inning' were so great and where the penalties 
for 'losing ' were equally im portant, then the fact that the Prim e M inister 
allowed for a period of reflection is understandable. Nevertheless, there were 
serious m iscalculations on the  p a rt of the  Prim e M inister and  the 
governm ent. Notably, these m iscalculations concerned the strength of the 
student movement and, equally importantly, the speed at which the situation 
was developing.
Even so, despite these miscalculations, the governm ent m ight have 
been able to w eather the storm  had  not the death  of M alik O ussekine 
occurred. His death coincided w ith the period of greatest systemic fluidity. 
N ot only w as it impossible for the Prime M inister to have foreseen this 
event, short of confining all policemen to barracks, bu t it was also very 
difficult for him  to have done anything else other than w ithdraw  the bill 
once it occurred. This exogeneous event which w as outside of the Prim e 
M inister's control served to introduce an unpredictable  elem ent to the 
decision m aking process and one which was not present in the examination 
of the previous case studies.
Chapter 6
Crisis Policy Making: ii The Politics of Devaluation, March 1983
16 9
The fourth case study examines the debate surrounding the th ird  devaluation 
of the franc in March 1983 and the decision to retain Pierre M auroy as Prime 
M inister. The debate over the franc saw a clash betw een the people who 
favoured a realignm ent of the parities of the European M onetary System 
(EMS) and those people who wanted to see France w ithdraw  from the system 
altogether. This debate coincided with and was the cause of m uch speculation 
about the position of M auroy as Prim e M inister. In the end, M itterrand 
decided tha t France should rem ain in the EMS and  he kept faith w ith 
M auroy.
This case study differs from the previous chapters because, whilst it is 
an example of a public policy decision, it is an example of a policy which did 
not require the passage of a law. Thus, the decision m aking process as 
w itnessed here is different from the one which w as observed in the other 
examples. Here, there was neither the usual process of réunions, comités and 
conseils, nor was the Parliam ent or the Conseil constitutionnel involved. 
Instead, policy was m ade in a series of inform al m eetings at the highest 
governm ental levels. Nevertheless, as an example of public policy making, 
this debate provides num erous points of comparison w ith previous chapters 
and is w orthy of consideration.
As w ith the events surrounding the D evaquet higher education bill, 
this case study examines a period of crisis. There w as a nine day period in 
which the debate over whether to w ithdraw  from the EMS or to devalue the 
franc w ithin it was concentrated. This period was one of a 'curable' crisis. 1 
D uring this time the policy process was characterised by a breakdow n of the 
routine channels of policy preparation. This situation is typical of crisis 
periods. As Dunleavy and O'Leary state:
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Almost by definition, crises are periods w hen the norm ally routinised 
operations of the bureaucracy are insufficient or cannot be relied on, 
w hen decisions have to be quickly pushed up  through the chain of 
command, and where an unusually large and direct role in controlling 
policy implementation has to be taken by political leaders.^
Even given that this policy was one which d id  not require a statute, the
decision to rem ain in the EMS was no t m arked by official, scheduled
m eetings. N or was it characterised by unofficial m eetings w hich brought
together all of the leading protagonists. Instead, the President arrived at his
decision through a series of unofficial encounters and têtes-à-têtes which
rarely brought more than three people together at any one time. There were
secret plots and there was an atomisation of the policy process.
This period also constitutes a time of crisis because of the importance of
the decision which had to be made. As Dunleavy and O'Leary again state:
Crises often  m ark tu rn ing  po in ts in overall pa tte rn s of policy 
development, because the consequences of alternative decisions can be 
m om entous. 3
The policies betw een which the President had  to choose w ere m utually  
exclusive. They represented two alternative and radically opposed solutions. 
There was no compromise solution possible. Favier and Martin-Roland have 
described the decision to rem ain in the EMS in  M arch 1983 as "une 
orientation historique".^ Giesbert has said that it is "à cet instant que se joue 
le sort du  septennat" .5
In the previous chapter it was noted tha t tim es of crisis necessitate 
strong political leadership. D uring cohabitation the Prime M inister had to 
exercise such leadership. In 1983, it behoved to the President. It is this respect 
that the present case study differs from the ones previously examined. It will 
be seen that the Prime Minister was involved in the policy process as an actor, 
bu t not as a decision maker. The decision to  rem ain in the EMS and the
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subsequent decision to retain M auroy as Prime Minister were both taken by 
M itterrand personally. Therefore, this case study provides the clearest study of 
presidential influence in the policy process.
In the first section the background to the M arch 1983 debate will be 
outlined and a detailed résumé of the crucial nine day period will be given. In 
the second section the political and politico-economic considerations behind 
the decision not to w ithdraw  from the EMS and to retain M auroy as Prime 
M inister will be considered. Some general conclusions about this period will 
then be given.
The 1983 Devaluation Debate
The 1983 devaluation can be placed in the logic of the socialist governm ent's 
post-1981 economic policy. The two strands of thought articulated in March 
1983, one supporting a w ithdraw al from the EMS, another preferring to 
devalue the franc w ithin the system, were present within governm ent circles 
from May 1981 onwards. The March 1983 debate was im portant because it saw 
the second school of thought trium ph finally and definitively over the first.
In the course of the 1981 presidential election the reflation of the 
French economy was one of M itterrand's m ain campaign issues. The PS was 
united in the pursuit of this policy. However, the extent of the reflation of 
dem and and the means by which it should be achieved w ere a source of 
d ispu te. 6 The first manifestation of the differences of opinion w ithin the PS 
on these issues came im m ediately after M itterrand 's election. W hilst a 
decision to w ithdraw  from the EMS was quickly discounted, M auroy and 
Rocard were amongst those who argued that the franc should be quickly and 
substantially devalued w ithin the system, so that the proposed reflation of 
dem and could take place under propitious conditions. M itterrand's reaction
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to this suggestion is well documented and came as he and M auroy were being 
driven dow n the Champs Elysées on May 21st 1981: "On ne dévalue pas un 
jour comme au jou rd 'h u i" .*^  Thus, from the outset M itterrand asserted the 
prim acy of political considerations over economic ones.
D uring the course of the sum m er the governm ent faced severe 
econom ic problem s. The decision to reflate had  been taken against an 
in ternational background of high interest rates, deflation and  decreasing 
inflation. The result of French policies was to cause the country's balance of 
trade deficit to increase, inflation to rise and interest rates had to be raised, so 
as to relieve some of the pressure that the franc was experiencing w ithin the 
EMS. In fact, M itterrand 's unilateral decision in M ay only delayed a 
devaluation of the currency. This devaluation came on October 4th 1981.
The intragovernm ental debate surrounding the October devaluation 
saw the first dress rehearsal of the arguments which w ould be used in March 
1983. Jacques Delors, the Finance M inister, w anted the devaluation to be 
accom panied by a set of deflationary m easures which w ould stifle rising 
dem and. He insisted that 10 billion francs should be cut from the spending 
component of the 1982 budget and that a further 15 billion francs should be 
frozen. Delors's plan, which was supported by the Germans who had to agree 
to a realignm ent of the EMS, was opposed by Fabius, the Budget Minister, 
who had conducted the budgetary expenditure arbitrations largely unaided.^ 
In the end, M itterrand arbitrated in Fabius's favour, although some budgetary 
credits for 1982 were frozen.
D espite the devaluation, the country 's econom ic problem s only 
accentuated. Bauchard has argued that, as a result of these problem s, both 
Delors and  M auroy became convinced that a fu rther devaluation  was 
necessary and that this time it had  to be accom panied by a substantial
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program m e of deflation.^ The economic advisers in their cabinets and the 
P resident's main economic advisers were instrum ental in convincing them 
that this course of action was the only one w hich was economically viable. 
The Prime Minister ordered a plan of economic rigour to be draw n up  secretly 
in the spring of 1982.
W hen this plan was presented to the President and to leading members 
of the governm ent on May 28th 1982 it was opposed by Fabius, Pierre 
Bérégovoy, then Secrétaire général de VElysée, Jean-Pierre Chevènem ent, the 
Industry  Minister, and by the communists in the governm ent. They were 
opposed to any deflation and tended to support the argum ents of several 
influential industrialists and economists w ho argued  that France should 
w ithdraw  from the EMS, so as to be able to conduct its economic policy 
w ithout w orrying about the constraints that the system  imposed. Cameron 
has stated that two industrialists, Jean Riboud, the head of Schlumberger, and 
Georges Plescoff, the head of Suez, argued that France should tem porarily 
w ithdraw  from the EMS. Both were close to M itterrand and their argum ents 
were taken very seriously by the President. 10
A decision on which policy to pursue w as not im m ediately taken, 
however. M itterrand decided to use the forthcom ing sum m it of the seven 
leading industrial nations at Versailles from June 4th-6th as the final occasion 
to persuade the Am ericans to low er in terest rates and to reflate their 
economy. W hen they refused M itterrand took the decision to devalue and 
Delors negotiated an agreement w ithin the EMS which was announced on 
June 12th. 11
A lthough the prelim inary decision to devalue had  been taken, the 
question of w hether the franc should w ithdraw  from  the EMS, or w hether 
there should  be a program m e of deflation paradoxically  had  no t been
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resolved. A t a conseil restreint devoted to this issue on June 13th M itterrand 
finally arbitrated in M a u ro /s  favour, despite the absence of a majority for the 
Prim e M inister's proposals amongst those present. 1  ^ It was agreed that there 
should be a four m onth prices and wages freeze; em ployers' social security 
contributions were reduced; company taxation was reduced; various family 
allow ance costs w ere transferred  from  em ployers to  em ployees; and  
em ployers' VAT costs were reduced. Thus, dem and was reduced and various 
supply side measures in favour of industry were taken.
H ow ever, these m easures d id  not serve to alleviate the country 's 
economic problems to any great degree. The 1982 balance of trade deficit still 
increased from 56 billion francs in 1981 to 93 billion francs. At l lp e r  cent 
inflation rem ained higher than France's closest competitors. The franc was 
under pressure w ithin the EMS and measures had to be taken by the Banque 
de France to prop it up. Thus, during the winter of 1982-1983 the economic 
choices w hich had  been faced in June 1982 w ere again top of the policy 
agenda.
D uring the first two m onths of 1983 M itterrand m et on a regular basis 
w ith Riboud, Bérégovoy, Fabius and Chevènem ent all of w hom  repeated 
their call for France to w ithdraw  from the EMS. At the same time, Delors and 
M auroy, w ith the help of their closest advisers, drew  up  another, m ore 
substantial plan de rigueur in absolute s e c r e c y .  The need for secrecy was due 
to the inuninence of the municipal elections in M arch 1983. The municipals 
were the first national set of elections since the 1981 legislatives. The right 
expected to do well and it was feared by the government that any threat of an 
austerity  program m e w ould further dem obilise the left's electorate and 
increase opposition gains. Thus, w hen the leader of the CFDT, Edm ond 
Maire, announced after a meeting w ith the President on January 31st that a
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new  austerity programme was being draw n up, it was immediately denied by
M auroy and the rest of the government.
C andidates of the Union of the Left d id  bad ly  in the m unicipal
elections. On the first ballot the left lost 16 tow ns w ith m ore than 30,000
inhabitants. On the second ballot it lost 15 more. Thus, the opportunity  to
resolve the economic policy debate coincided w ith a weakening in M a u ro /s
position as Prim e M inister due to the governm ent's poor show ing in the
elections. Giesbert quotes Serge July 's editorial in Libération on M onday
M arch 14th, the m orning following the second round  of m unicipal election
results. July at this time was very close to the President and is said by Giesbert
to have articulated the President’s private opinion:
le Président a tranché ... la nom ination du  nouveau Prem ier m inistre 
et la m ise en place d 'u n  nouveau dispositif gouvernem ental chargé 
d 'appliquer une nouvelle politique.
This point marks the beginning of the nine day period which saw the debate
over w hether to remain in or pull out of the EMS and over w hether Mauroy
should rem ain as Prime Minister.
On M onday m orning M itterrand m et M auroy and proposed that he
should form a new  government which w ould oversee the w ithdraw al of the
franc from the EMS. The Prime Minister refused, bu t the tw o agreed to meet
later in the day to discuss the m atter a g a in . 16 In the meantime, M auroy met
w ith Delors w ho reassured him that he was in agreem ent w ith the Prime
Minister. Therefore, safe in the knowledge that he had  at least one senior
governm ent mem ber w ho supported his position, M auroy repeated to the
President during their evening m eeting that he w as unw illing to head a
governm ent which pulled out of the EMS. Although M itterrand's analysis of
the situation differed from the Prime M inister's, he agreed that Jean-Louis
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Bianco (who had replaced Bérégovoy as Secrétaire général de VElysée in June 
1982) should leave im m ediately for Bonn w here he w ould sound out the 
G erm an governm ent and  the Bundesbank as to  the  possib ility  of a 
revaluation of the Mark. He was also sent to discover their reaction to the 
idea of France leaving the EMS. H e reported  back the  next day that a 
revaluation was possible in return for a French devaluation and an austerity 
program m e. This was the policy that Mauroy and Delors favoured.
The question of whether Mauroy should rem ain as Prime Minister was 
also the subject of much debate and manoeuvering. M auroy himself received 
contradictory advice as to whether he should stay on. Senior members of his 
cabinet argued that it w ould be better for his personal image if he was to 
leave, rather than stay on and be responsible for im plem enting a policy to 
w hich i t  was publicly known that he was h o s t i l e .  ^ 7 H ow ever, the Prime 
M inister's closest governmental and parliam entary colleagues, Jean Le Garrec, 
Roger Fajardie and Christian Pierret, all argued that he should remain. A t the 
same tim e M itterrand, then still intent on introducing 'Vautre politique' and 
believing M auroy to be hostile to it, offered the prem iership to Delors in the 
afternoon of Tuesday March 15th on condition that he accept the w ithdrawal 
of the franc from the EMS. Delors refused the offer arguing that he could 
not accept responsibility for such a policy.
A lthough the question of w ho should be Prim e M inister rem ained 
unansw ered for several days, the question of which policy should be adopted 
was effectively resolved on W ednesday M arch 16th. D uring his traditional 
pre-Conseil des m inistres m eeting w ith M itterrand on that day, the Prime 
M inister announced that he had changed his m ind and w as willing to take 
responsibility for a w ithdraw al of the franc from  the EMS. It is not clear 
w hether by so doing M auroy was playing for tim e in the belief that the
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P residen t w ould change his m ind and tha t he could rem ain as Prim e 
Minister, or whether he had simply agreed to accept responsibility for a policy 
to which previously he had been opposed. Nevertheless, it appeared as if the 
partisans of Tautre politique' had won the day.
However, M itterrand in typical fashion was not to be hurried. He made 
no m ention of which policy was going to be followed during the subsequent 
Conseil des ministres. Instead, at the end of the m eeting, M itterrand asked 
Fabius to contact the Treasury division of the Finance M inistry and obtain 
information about the economic consequences of leaving the EMS.
The in sp ira tion  beh ind  M itte rran d 's  decision  to  seek fu rth er 
clarification about the consequences of 'l'autre politique' can be traced back to 
the previous d a y . 19 On Tuesday, M auroy had met Delors and Jacques Attali at 
M atignon. Attali, the President's special adviser, w as strongly in favour of 
rem aining in the EMS. He argued that in order to have their policy accepted, 
they needed to convince someone close to the President who was currently in 
favour of w ithdraw al to change his mind. It was agreed that Attali w ould 
suggest to the President that he should ask Fabius to contact the directeur du 
Trésor, Michel Camdessus. Delors knew  that Cam dessus w as opposed to 
'l'autre politique' and that Fabius would be alarmed by the figures w ith which 
he w ould be presented.
The strategy devised by Mauroy, Delors and Attali worked. Camdessus 
argued that w ithdraw ing from the EMS w ould necessitate a steep rise in 
interest rates, thus preventing the increase in investm ent which Fabius and 
others had envisaged. Defferre was presented w ith the same scenario from 
the governor of the Banque de France, Renaud de la Genière.^0 W hen they 
both presented their information to M itterrand, the President decided that
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there was no alternative but to rem ain in the system. Favier and M artin-
Roland quote Fabius as having said:
Je crois avoir joué le rô le  de  déclencheur de  la  décision de 
M itterrand.^ 1
W hile Fabius is no doubt correct, the inspiration behind the President's
decision can be traced back to Mauroy, Delors and Attali.
Following the President's decision Delors was charged w ith conducting
negotiations w ith the Germans w ith regard to a readjustm ent of the parities
w ithin the EMS.22 On Tuesday he had contacted the Germans informally on
th is issue. On W ednesday he contacted the G erm an Finance M inister,
G erhard Stoltenberg. The latter came secretly to Paris the following day in
order to negotiate w ith Delors in person. However, an agreem ent could not
im m ediately be reached and discussions continued over the w eekend in
Brussels w here Finance M inisters from  all countries in the EMS w ere
m eeting. O nly on M onday M arch 21st w ere term s agreed w ith  w hich
everyone was satisfied.
During the period from W ednesday 16th to M onday 21st the notion of
w ithd raw ing  from  the EMS w as used  only as a bargain ing  tool {u n
épouvantail)'^^ by Delors in order to scare the other countries into accepting a
realignm ent of parities favourable to France. As July noted:
il est de fait que Jacques Delors dans ses négociations monétaires va 
utiliser cette menace pour assouplir les positions allemandes. Mais nul 
n 'ignore que Jacques Delors est justem ent le contradicteur, l'opposant 
le plus résolu à cette politique de rupture avec l ' E u r o p e . 2 4
Thus, whilst it may have appeared to outside observers as if France was still
contem plating leaving the EMS, in fact, the debate had  already been sealed.
There was not to be a withdrawal. Instead, Delors was under orders from the
President to negotiate a devaluation on the best possible term s for France.
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One of the strategies he used to achieve this aim was to act as if France would 
w ithdraw  if the deal were not sufficiently attractive. However, the impact of 
this strategy was not great as Genscher has stated that he was never afraid that 
France w ould leave the system.25
It is noticeable that M auroy played no p a rt in these negotiations, 
although he did  rem ain inform ed of procedings by w ay of his brief, but 
regular contacts w ith M itterrand and Delors. Indeed, for all of this period 
M auroy felt that he was going to be dismissed as Prime Minister. Pfister has 
described this period of inactivity as "insupportable" .26 M auroy even went so 
far as to w rite a long resignation letter ready to give to the President on 
T uesday M arch 22nd. At the sam e tim e his directeur de cabinet, Michel 
Delebarre, was hurriedly trying to rent a studio in Paris from which Mauroy 
would be able to conduct his post-prime ministerial affairs.
There w ere tw o m ain candidates to replace M auroy. The first was 
Delors w hom  M itterrand thought w ould accept the post now  that the franc 
was staying in the EMS. It has been argued by Pfister and Bauchard that Delors 
himself thought that he was going to be appointed Prime Minister on Sunday 
March 20th w hen he suddenly rushed back from Brussels for a meeting with 
M itterrand.27 However, Giesbert argued that this was simply a ruse to up  the 
ante and  force the hand of the Germans.28 This is confirm ed by Delors 
him self:
II s'agissait pour moi de dram atiser auprès de  mes partenaires car je 
n 'arrivais pas à obtenir satisfaction. Je menaçais alors d 'un  clash ... je 
n ’avais pas l'idée d 'être Premier ministre.29
W hen he returned from Brussels on Tuesday M arch 22nd Delors was in a
strong position to gain the Premiership.
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The second candidate w as Pierre Bérégovoy, now  the M inister for 
Social Affairs. He was one of the main proponents of 'l'autre politique' and, 
even after it had been decided to remain in the EMS, he still felt that he might 
be appoin ted  Prim e Minister. On Thursday M arch 17th M itterrand asked 
Bérégovoy to draw  up a government and the Minister took this as a sign that 
his appointm ent as Prime Minister was i m m i n e n t . ^ 0
The matter was finally settled in the afternoon of Tuesday March 22nd. 
M itterrand  lunched w ith Delors, Bérégovoy and Fabius. After lunch he 
offered M atignon to Delors who accepted on condition that he be allowed to 
rem ain as Finance Minister à la Raymond Barre in 1976. M itterrand refused 
and passed over Bérégovoy in favour of retaining Mauroy. Thus, at the end of 
a nine day period of waiting, M auroy was charged w ith form ing his third 
governm ent and w ith  presenting the new  austerity  program m e to the 
country.
Political and economic motives for the 1983 devaluation
The reasons behind the twin presidential decisions to stay in the EMS and to 
retain  M auroy were no less complicated than the m otivations behind the 
public policy choices which were identified in previous chapters. This section 
will identify these motivations. It will be seen that, although familiar political 
constraints were apparent in the decision m aking process, the decision to 
rem ain in the EMS was partly  the result of pressures arising from  the 
in te rn a tio n a l political econom y. Also, w hile  the  P residen t w as the  
undisputed decision maker for both issues, his decision was influenced by 
the actions of a not insubstantial num ber of o ther political actors. Before 
engaging upon an analysis of the President's decisions, it is necessary to
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explain precisely the two com peting policy options and  to identify their 
supporters.
The people who supported a w ithdraw al of the franc from the EMS 
w ere variously described to be in favour of a policy of "neo-protectionism"31, 
" n a tio n a l-p r o te c tio n n is m e " ^ ^  and  " g a u llo -p ro te c tio n n is m e ''^ ^  The 
supporters of this policy argued that w ithdraw ing from  the system  and 
allowing the franc to float freely w ould not only bring about the necessary 
devaluation in its value, but w ould also avoid the need for a simultaneous 
austerity program m e which the Germans insisted upon as the prerequisite of 
any realignm ent of EMS parities. Thus, France w ould  be able to lower its 
interest rates and encourage industrial investm ent. At the same tim e as a 
w ithdraw al from  the EMS, France w ould im pose m andatory  deposits on 
im porters in order to reduce the balance of trade deficit. It w ould also raise 
national barriers to free trade w ithin the lim its laid dow n by the EC and 
GATT agreements. It was this latter proposal that was essentially protectionist 
in nature. Although the supporters of this view did propose an extension of 
the prices and wages freeze with exceptions for trades unionists, this strategy 
was essentially one of economic expansion and m onetary independence.
This view was supported by a num ber of senior governmental figures 
and by some of the President's closest advisers. Amongst these were Ministers 
such as Pierre Bérégovoy, Jean-Pierre Chevènem ent, Gaston Defferre and 
Laurent Fabius. Two of the President's advisers on economic policy, Alain 
Boublil and Charles Salzmann, were also in favour of it along w ith several 
senior industrialists. These figures included Jean Riboud, Georges Plescoff 
and Jean Deflassieux, head of Crédit Lyonnais. It was also supported by some 
leading economists such as Jean Denizet, Pierre Uri and Serge-Christophe 
Kolm. In addition, senior party  figures, such as Jean Poperen and  Louis
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M erm az, argued in favour of w ithdraw al, while the communists were also 
generally favourable.
This view was opposed by an equally firm  set of ideas which was 
supported by an equally influential group of people. They argued that it was 
essential to rem ain in the EMS, bu t that a realignm ent of parities was 
necessary. The Mark was to be revalued by as m uch as possible and the franc 
was to be devalued by as little as possible. In order to combat the trade deficit 
and to lessen future pressures on the franc, an austerity program m e similar to 
the one adopted  in June 1982 had  sim ultaneously to be engaged upon. 
However, in addition to another wages and prices freeze there would have to 
be an increase in social security contributions and an increase in income tax. 
These latter measures would serve to reduce the public's purchasing power.
In addition to these argum ents, the people in favour of rem aining in 
the EMS argued that a w ithdraw al w ould be disastrous for the country 's 
economy. They argued that French protectionism w ould only lead to tit-for- 
ta t m easures against French exports from other countries. They also argued 
that their opponents underestim ated the dependence of the French economy 
on the international market.34 Moreover, they d id  not realise the precarious 
state of the country 's financial reserves which m eant that the Banque de 
France w ould only be able to support the franc for a short time after its 
flotation. After this tim e interest rates w ould have to rise and an even 
harsher dose of austerity would have to be undertaken. It was this message 
that Camdessus passed on to Fabius on W ednesday 16th March. As Fabius has 
noted:
Je tire de cet entretien la certitude que si nous sortons du  SME, les 
avantages attendus d 'une  telle décision nous conduiront à une plus 
grande rigueur, car le franc va dégringoler.35
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It w as this argum ent w hich convinced M itterrand  to abandon  T a u tre  
politique'.
Those people who wished the franc to rem ain in the EMS were small 
in num ber, bu t they occupied some particularly influential positions. As was 
clear from the preceding exposé, the tw o m ost im portant partisans of this 
view  w ere M auroy and Delors. They were supported  by a group of senior 
p residen tia l advisers w hich included Jean-Louis Bianco, Jacques Attali, 
Elisabeth Guigou, Christian Sautter and François-Xavier Stasse. They were in 
close contact with senior figures in the M auroy and Delors' cabinets. The head 
of both the Treasury Division at the M inistry of Finance and the governor of 
the Banque de France were also in favour. Favier and M artin-Roland note 
that certain heads of industry, such as François Dalle from L 'Oréal, also 
supported  this line. Therefore, w hilst the partisans of this policy w ere less 
num erous than their opponents, they constituted a form idable political and 
intellectual bloc against Tautre politique'.
For some of the supporters of both camps the motivation behind their 
stance was purely economic. Thus, Riboud, Plescoff, Uri and Denizet argued 
in  favour of w ithdraw ing because of the benefits that they thought w ould 
accrue to French industry from this policy. Conversely, Camdessus and de la 
Genière were opposed to this policy because of the financial and  m onetary 
problem s that they believed it w ould cause. A purely economic m otivation 
was also, in part, the reasoning behind M auroy's attitude. For example, on 
Tuesday M arch 15th two of M auroy's advisers, Jean Peyrelevade and Henri 
Guillaume, were so convinced of the economic m erits of staying in the EMS 
that they suggested to M auroy that he should see a presentation about the 
alternative option from two of its proponents, Jean Deflassieux and Pierre
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Uri. As M auroy 's advisers had  thought, the Prim e M inister w as left
unconvinced by the cogency of their presentation.36
For most people, however, the motivations behind their support of a
particu lar policy w ere prim arily political. The tw o m ain political reasons
present were determ ined by the different ideological conceptions of socialism
that the protagonists held and by their personal ambitions.
Hall has identified three different conceptions of socialism which were
in competition after the 1981 election.37 He classifies these tendencies as 'a
neo-M arxist enclave' su rround ing  Chevènem ent; 'la  deuxièm e gauche'
around Rocard; and "an eclectic group of social democrats" which included
M itterrand w ho stood in the m iddle. While the definition of the th ird  of
H all's categories smacks of a catch-all group whose broad characterisation only
serves to m ask a m ore complex web of beliefs, the partisans of the first
category are certainly identifiable during the March 1983 debate.
Chevènement's brand of socialism was state centred. H e felt that only
the state, not the market, could produce wealth which d id  not disadvantage
some to the profit of others. Moreover, he felt that this wealth could only be
p ro d u ced  beh ind  restrictive trade  barriers as far rem oved from  the
international economy as possible. He believed in national independence for
practical and  symbolic reasons. This was the  gaullist com ponent of his
socialism. This conception of socialism was present during the March debate.
As Chevènement has written:
N ul ne peu t nous obliger à accepter su r le p lan  m onétaire ou 
commercial les règles de jeu biaisées qui réduisent toujours plus notre 
m arge de m anoeuvre. N on à l'a lignem en t de la France su r le 
m onétarism e am biant.3 8
It is natural from this base that Chevènement should have supported a policy
of w ithdraw al from the EMS, protectionism and reflation in one country.
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C hevènem ent w as supported  by a group led  by  Poperen which 
included m any communists whose reasoning was similar, bu t not exactly the 
same. They believed that any austerity p lan w ould disproportionately hurt 
the w orking class. Such a policy was denounced as ' r é v i s i o n n i s m e ' . 3 9  it was 
the task of a PS\PC  governm ent to defend the interests of this class and, 
therefore, they argued for Tautre politique' as it seem ed to be a way of 
avoiding this austerity.
In contrast to these two approaches, there w as the conception of 
socialism favoured by Delors. He preached 'financial rectitude '.'^  This belief 
was the rationale behind his call for a pause in reform s in Novem ber 1981 
and his support for the three devaluations up  to and  including the March 
1983 example. For Delors, reforms which im proved the social conditions of 
the less well off could only be em barked upon if the country had  a firm 
financial base from which to operate. This m eant low inflation and a strong 
currency. Only an austerity programme could bring about these conditions.
The "eclectic" nature of the third group which Hall identified m eant 
that its com ponent parts did not necessarily favour either position. Thus, 
Bérégovoy and M auroy who w ould both norm ally be classed in this group 
supported  opposing policies. The fact that M itterrand also belonged to this 
group w ould help to explain why he was able to change his m ind and move 
from one policy to the other in a short space of time. In fact, several more 
specific reasons behind the President's decision will be examined below.
The other main political motivation behind the actions of some of the 
protagonists lies in their personal ambitions. However, unlike the situation 
experienced in previous case studies, these ambitions were only loosely tied 
to competing courants w ithin the PS. As w as show n above, Chevènem ent's 
position was caused prim arily by his ideological beliefs, rather than self­
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concern, although he w ould  have come ou t of the  m atter politically
strengthened if his preferred policy option had been adopted. In fact, the
competition between the different factions of the MitterrandXMauroy courant
sta rted  after 1984 and  was particularly  v iru lent after 1988. In 1983 the
com petition was largely conducted betw een individuals w ith  conflicting
personal interests, rather than between well organised courants.
It is apparent, for example, that M auroy at first refused to accept the
President's decision to conduct Tautre politique' because he was sure, having
consulted w ith Delors during the afternoon of M onday March 14th, that he
w ould not be isolated w ithin the government when arguing to rem ain in the
EMS. Such a position would have been untenable and he w ould have been
forced to resign, or capitulate leaving him  in a weakened situation. It is also
possible that he changed his m ind on W ednesday M arch 16th and decided
that he w as willing to accept responsibility for leaving the EMS because
several of his senior political advisers counselled him  to act accordingly.
Personal ambitions were not absent from Bérégovoy's calculations. As
the m ain proponent of Tautre politique' he stood to gain m ost from its
adoption. Even after the policy had been rejected, he still harboured his
personal ambitions:
Cette politique de rigueur échouera. On sortira du  SME et dans six mois 
je serai Premier ministre.^ ^
A lthough he em erged from this period w ith a m ore senior position in the
governm ental hierarchy, he was still frustrated in  his am bition to become
Prim e Minister.
By contrast, Delors's ambition to be Prime M inister w ould have been 
realised had he not dem anded too m uch of M itterrand on Tuesday 22nd 
March. Delors felt that he w ould only have sufficient political w eight as
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Prim e M inister to be able to combat Bérégovoy and Fabius, his personal 
rivals, if he controlled the Finance M inistry as well as Matignon. M itterrand 
could no t accept these term s as it w ould threaten his authority  over the 
government. Therefore, the President rejected Delors's conditions.
W hatever the motivations of the various actors, the responsibility for 
deciding which policy option to take and who to  appoint as Prime Minister 
belonged to no-one other than the President. H e was the 'ultim ate arbiter' 
w ho was, in his own words, "le premier responsable des affaires p u b l i q u e s "  .^2 
Indeed, not only did the President take these decisions himself, bu t he was 
recognised by all concerned as the only person w ho had the authority to take 
them . In this sense, his responsibility was never challenged. His authority 
was seen m ost vividly w ith the Delors\  M auroy\A ttali plan to change the 
President's mind. Although they targeted Fabius directly, they knew that by so 
doing they would reach the President.
The question then arises as to w hy these decisions should have been 
the sole responsibility of the President. With regard to the decision to remain 
in the EMS, the usual answer to this question is that since the mid-1960s the 
area of currency stability has always been part of the President's domaine 
réservé and that the March 1983 decision was merely a further example of this 
s itu a tio n .43 in  the sense that Presidents have intervened personally in this 
area on several occasions, this schema may accurately reflect the policy 
process. However, it is unrew arding academically as it does not point to the 
reasons w hy Presidents in tervene so. It leaves the orig inal question 
unansw ered.
In M arch 1983 there were several im portant reasons as to w hy the 
President was left personally to decide. The main reason was that the nine day 
period was a period of crisis. As was stated in the introduction to this chapter.
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crisis periods call for political leadership. The President as the  ultim ate 
political authority had to give such leadership. M oreover, the view  that the 
President had no option but to assume responsibility for decision m aking is 
reinforced w hen we consider that M auroy, the only other senior political 
figure w ho m ight have been able to arbitrate betw een the different options, 
was himself personally implicated with one of the policies. Therefore, he was 
in no position to take the final decision. The only person w ho w as in such a 
position was the President. The fact that the decision lay in an area which was 
traditionally considered to be part of his reserved dom ain only reinforced the 
necessity for a presidential arbitration which was in fact determ ined by other 
reasons.
By contrast, the fact that the President was responsible for appointing 
the  Prim e M inister needs very  little  com m entary . The P resid en t is 
constitu tionally  responsible for nam ing the Prim e M inister. Therefore, 
necessarily the decision as to whom to appoint belonged to the President. This 
situation d id  not mean that M itterrand d id  not consult w ith his colleagues. 
Indeed, all accounts of this period suggest that the President talked about the 
different prim e ministerial options to a w ide range of people. Nevertheless, 
the final decision belonged to Mitterrand.
Although attention was focussed upon the President after the second 
round of the municipal elections, neither the decision to rem ain in the EMS, 
no r the  decision as to w hom  should  be P rim e M inister w as taken 
im m ediately. The first of these two questions w as settled by W ednesday 
March 16th, after which time any threat of leaving the EMS was sim ply ‘un  
épouvantail to scare the Germans into accepting a realignm ent of parities on 
term s favourable to the French. The second question was resolved after a 
period of nine days. The reasons behind the delay over both questions are
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twofold. Firstly, as Machin and W right have argued, the presidency is an
institution which is structurally weak. They state:
occasional indecisiveness is scarcely surprising in  a President who is 
immersed in foreign, European, defence and a whole range of domestic 
issues, who has only a small personal staff, is confronted w ith multiple 
and  cross-cutting pressures, and w ho receives advice from  several 
q u a rte rs .^
D uring a time of crisis when the repercussions of policy decisions are great, 
the President, faced w ith the above structural constraints, is likely to take 
som e tim e in reaching his decision. Secondly, the delay w as partly  due to 
M itte rran d 's  personal style of w orking. He liked  to sol/icit advice 
sim ultaneously from several different quarters. He liked then to have that 
advice confirm ed from  other sources. He w orked in this w ay during  the 
M arch 1983 crisis. As M itterrand himself has stated about the beginning of the 
crisis period:
Je ne désirais pas sortir. L 'appréciation é ta it difficile. M on opinion 
n 'é tait pas faite et je souhaitais avoir assez d 'argum ents pour ne pas le 
faire.45
Thus, M itterrand's personal style counted for w hat journalists described as a 
period of hesitation and indecision by the President.
The President's final decision not to w ithdraw  from the EMS was taken 
for a variety of economic and political reasons. The decision itself was taken 
after he was presented with Fabius's report on the economic consequences of 
leaving the EMS. These consequences themselves were the result of France's 
position in the international political economy. This situation has been 
described by Machin and W right as "the dictatorship of the conjunctural".^^ 
Therefore, in this sense the decision was im posed upon France and  upon 
M itterrand from outside. According to Jospin, the President saw  his decision 
in this way:
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Il a eu Timpression de faire une concession extrêmem ent difficile à la 
réalité imposée par les autres, de devoir se plier à une sanction exigée 
par l'étranger. C 'était pour lui la fin d 'une  certaine France originale, 
socialiste, mixiste, fière de sa personnalité face à l'égoisme féroce des
libéraux.47
Thus, policy m aking was not an essentially dom estic affair, bu t involved
international considerations and pressures as well.
The overriding political reason was M itterrand 's desire not to break
w ith  the EC. For Jospin this aspect represented the other m ain motivation
behind M itterrand's decision. He states:
deux éléments essentiels ont guidé sa décision de rester: le sentiment 
que la sortie su serpent serait une fuite en evant dram atique sans 
garantie d'efficacité pour le redressem ent de la balance commerciale; 
l'am bition de conduire une grande politique e u r o p é e n n e . ^ 8
Attali followed the same reasoning. For him  the decision to stay in the EMS
m eant that: "Tout en Europe, économ iquem ent, politiquem ent, restait
possible" .49
A further reason lay in the political strengths of the people w ho argued 
for the different policies. Those people in favour of rem aining in the EMS 
w ere led by M auroy and Delors. They had considerable political weight. 
A lthough M auroy finally agreed to accept responsibility for leaving the EMS 
if the President so decided, Delors refused. The President could ill afford to 
lose Delors from his government.
Moreover, the position of those in favour of Tautre politique' was not 
strong. The m ost senior political figure to support it w as Chevènement. 
However, he was never a mitterrandiste and his opinion had  less importance 
for the President accordingly. In addition, his political w eight had recently 
declined since secretly he had m ade it known before the municipal elections 
that he was going to resign from the governm ent. O ther M inisters who
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suppo rted  this policy, such as Bérégovoy and  Fabius, d id  no t have the
political stature at that time to rival M auroy or Delors.
Similarly, the communists, who m ight be thought to have been in a
position to have played an im portant part in the President's decision, were
also outside of the process. A lthough they w ere p art of the governm ental
coalition, they d id  not have access to the President's inner circle. More
im portantly, they could not threaten to w ithdraw  from the coalition at that
tim e because they w ould have been seen by their supporters to be breaking
w ith  the Union of the Left. They w anted to avoid this situation. Marchais
followed this line of reasoning:
Pourquoi nous ne sommes pas partis? Tout sim plem ent parce que les 
femmes et les hommes qui avaient voté à gauche en 1981 ne nous 
auraient pas compris. En partant à ce m oment-là nous aurions pris la 
responsabilité de la division.50
M itterrand was aware that the communists w ould accept either policy option
and, thus, he was free from this constraint w hen taking his decision.
W hilst it has been argued that the President was responsible for staying
in the EMS and for retaining M auroy as Prim e M inister, it is im portant to
avoid the conclusion that he took these decisions alone. In fact, one of the
striking aspects about the March 1983 crisis was the num ber of people who
w ere instrum ental in the decision m aking process. In the first place, as was
seen earlier, senior G erm an officials p layed  an im portan t role. Their
influence was particularly m arked on Tuesday March 15th when Bianco went
to Bonn to sound out representatives of the governm ent and the Bundesbank
as to the likelihood of the Mark being revalued in return for a devaluation of
the franc. He returned with the belief that they w ould agree to such a policy,
bu t only in return for a French austerity progranune. As a result of this visit.
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M itterrand was aware that the policy supported by Delors and M auroy was 
feasible. By contrast, Tautre politique' appeared to be a leap in the dark.
The President's decision was also greatly influenced by the w ork of the 
M a u ro y \D elors\  A ttali axis. They w ere successful in having their policy 
adopted by the President because they were familiar w ith the exigencies of the 
policy process. They knew which channels to follow so as to influence the 
President. Thus, they suggested that Fabius should contact Camdessus and 
report back to M itterrand. Moreover, they were well positioned to influence 
the President. M auroy m et M itterrand at least once a day during the early 
period of the crisis. Delors also had individual meetings w ith the President. 
In addition, he sent M itterrand num erous notes in which he outlined the 
dangers of w ithdraw ing from the EMS. Finally, A ttali as the President's 
special adviser w ith  a room  adjacent to M itterrand 's m ain office w as 
particularly well placed to follow the debate and to act accordingly. Their 
proximity to the centre of decision m aking along w ith the political weight of 
D elors and  M auroy w ere instrum ental in influencing the  P residen t's  
decision.
Colombani has argued that the influence of a third group of people was 
also important. He calls the people in this group "technocrats". He argues that 
a group of technocrats in the cabinets at the Elysée, M atignon and the Rue de 
Rivoli worked together to draw  up a coherent austerity program m e based on 
the franc rem aining in the EMS and avoiding the problem s that they saw 
w ith its w ithdrawal. He identifies these people as François-Xavier Stasse at 
the Elysée, H enri Guillaum e and Pascal Lamy at M atignon and Philippe 
Lagayette at the Finance Ministry. According to Colombani:
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En fait, un véritable réseau s'était constitué entre l'Elysée, M atignon et
la rue de Rivoli ... Ils ont joué un  rôle essentiel de juin 1982 à mars
1983, c'est-à-dire au moment des choix économiques décisifs.^ 1
There is no doubt that this group of people played a very im portant role in 
the preparation of the final decision. They provided Delors and M auroy with 
inform ation useful to their case. Moreover, the position that Stasse held at 
the Elysée was also strategically im portant because he was in contact with the 
other presidential advisers, the majority of whom were also hostile to leaving 
the EMS.52
N evertheless, it w ould  be w rong to call th is g roup  of people 
technocrats. The w ord has little m eaning in this case. If it refers to their 
com m on educational background, then Delors, Rocard and Chevènem ent 
shou ld  also be called technocrats. H ow ever, these people  are  clearly 
politicians. In fact, all of the people w hom  Colom bani identifies w ere 
themselves political figures and not technocrats. They worked in the cabinets 
of the country 's three m ost senior political figures. It is im possible to 
dissociate their action from the interests of the people they served and from 
the m otivations that have already been identified. Thus, w hilst they played 
an im portant role during the crisis period, they should not be treated as a 
separate influence on the President's decision.
Conclusions
The importance of this case study lies in its portrayal of the President as chief 
decision maker. In the previous case studies the President has either been 
largely peripheral to the policy process, as in the case of cohabitation, or has 
been seen to intervene only intermittently, if decisively, at the end of a long 
preparatory process. On these other occasions, the Prime M inister has either
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been the m ain policy maker, or he has at least been the key figure in the 
arbitration process. The crisis surrounding the 1983 devaluation, however, 
led to an arbitration which was undisputedly presidential and of which, as a 
result, Giesbert has said that during this period, 'T rance n 'a  plus de chef du 
gouvernem en t" . ^  ^
A t the sam e tim e, however, in m any respects the decision m aking 
process exam ined in this chapter closely resem bles the one w hich was 
encountered in the previous chapter. In both cases, decisions had  to be made 
under crisis situations. W hilst in the previous chapter the situation was 
arguably more fluid, in this chapter the stakes were still very high and there 
was little room for compromise. It is not surprising, therefore, that there was 
evidence of the same sort of vacillation on the part of the President on this 
occasion as there had been by the Prime Minister in the previous chapter.
That point aside, it m ight also be argued that this case study provides 
evidence to back up  the second variant of the segm ented decision m aking 
model. That is to say, in March 1983 there was a policy crisis based on the 
problem  of currency stability. In this sense, the devaluation crisis w ould seem 
to belong naturally  to the extended version of the  P resident's reserved 
domain. However, precisely because there were both im portant international 
and  economic policy considerations a t stake and  because there w as no 
available compromise policy, it was necessary for M itterrand to assum e the 
responsibility for policy leadership himself. That is to say, there are reasons 
w hich differentiate the circumstances of non-routine policy m aking from 
those of routine policy making and which encourage the President to assume 
leadership  functions in the former. Thus, not only m ight the segm ented 
decision making model be seen to depict accurately the policy process on this 
occasion, but reasons can be provided as to w hy this should be the case. This
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advance is im portant for the model which in the first chapter was seen to 
have been purely descriptive.
Chapter 7
The Limits to Prime M inisterial Influence
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It w as clear from the examination of the case studies that, in the ten year 
period  from 1981, the influence of the Prime M inister in the policy process 
w as no t constant. It was at its greatest during the period of cohabitation, 
w hilst it was at its weakest at the m oment of the decision to rem ain in the 
EMS in 1983. In betw een these tw o extrem es, there  w ere exam ples of 
considerable prim e m inisterial influence, the 1982 broadcasting  act, for 
exam ple, and examples of marginal prim e ministerial involvem ent, such as 
the 1985 budget.
The aim of the rest of this thesis is to examine the nature of the Prime 
M inister's influence and to account for the reasons as to w hy it should-have 
fluctuated. To this end, there are several approaches which can be taken. In 
particular, there are three main ways in which an attem pt m ay be m a4e to 
m easure the level of prim e ministerial influence. These three w ays will be 
examined and the problems associated with them identified. It will be shown 
that none of these three attem pts to quantify prim e ministerial influence is 
satisfactory.
As a result, a different w ay of approaching the natu re  of prim e 
m inisterial influence will be examined. This approach considers the concept 
of 'influence' as a relationship between two or m ore people or institutions. 
According to this approach, the influence of the Prim e Minister can only be 
considered in relation to the influence of the other actors and organisations 
w hich operate in the political system. The influence of these actors and 
institu tions can be categorised as belonging to th ree  d ifferent sets of 
co n stra in ts : q u asi-p erm an en t in s titu tio n a l co n stra in ts , con junc tu ra l 
constraints and momentary constraints. The bulk of this chapter will be spent 
in analysing the nature of these constraints. The final chapter will consider 
the nature of prim e ministerial influence in the light of this analysis.
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Attem pts to quantify  prim e m inisterial influence
The first w ay in which the Prime M inister's influence m ight be quantified is 
by  charting  the  variations in the  frequency of com ités  and  conseils  
throughout the Fifth Republic.^ This approach m easures the Prime Minister's 
influence vis-à-vis the President. G iven tha t the Prim e M inister chairs 
comités, whereas the President chairs conseils, their relative influences in the 
policy process might be measured by way of the increase in the one relative to 
the other over time.
If the frequency of these meetings is calculated, the results show that 
the num ber of conseils per annum  has increased greatly since the first yëàù's of 
the Fifth Republic. Moreover, since the departure of Debré in 1961, one type of 
prim e m in isteria l m eeting, the  Conseil de  C abinet, has d isappeared  
altogether.2  These findings w ould seem to confirm the intuitive view that 
during the course of the Fifth Republic presidential influence in the policy 
process has increased.
How ever, this w ay of looking a t the influence of an institution is 
misleading. Firstly, as we have seen, the policy process included a great 
num ber of informal meetings which went unrecorded, yet which often had a 
bearing on  the final policy outcome. Secondly, during  the ten year period 
from 1981, the num ber of conseils actually decreased.^ This decline, however, 
was not necessarily the sign of a reduction in presidential influence. It may 
equally have been the result of an increase in presidential influence, as 
Suleiman has shown for the example of the Barre prem iership. Here, unlike 
the situation during Chirac's prem iership, Giscard d 'Estaing w as confident 
that Barre knew w hat the President's wishes were and that he w ould abide by 
them. Therefore, there was no need to hold conseils on every bill.^ Finally, 
this approach is lim ited because it only com pares the Prim e M inister's
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influence to that of the President. In fact, the Prime M inister's influence will 
be dependent on his relations with other people and institutions as well. This 
approach, therefore, is fundam entally flawed.
A nother way in which influence m ight be m easured is by looking at 
the size of the services which the different actors in  the political system 
control. The person comm anding the greatest num ber of services m ight be 
considered to be the one with the largest influence in the policy process. One 
w ay in w hich services m ight be m easured is by counting the num ber of 
people in a person's cabinet. On this basis, the Prime Minister and President 
w ould be seen to have the greatest influence in the system as they have the 
largest cabinets. Once again, this result m ight seem to support our intuitive 
conclusions about the regime. ,
A nother way in which the extent of an institu tion 's services can be 
m easured is by considering the total am ount of adm inistrative resources that 
it possesses. If these calculations are made, then the Prime Minister is shown 
to be the m ost influential institution in the country followed by different 
M inistries, such as Education, Finance and the Interior, w ith the presidency 
being one of the w eakest institutions in the system. These results seem 
counterin tu itive .
Even aside from these contradictory results, this approach is less=than 
perfect. For example, from the outset of the Fifth Republic the President has 
been able to colonise the services of both the Prim e M inister and different 
M inistries. Thus, although on paper the presidency appears to be a weak 
institu tion , in practice his influence is great because he has borrow ed 
resources from other areas.^ Therefore, brute figures m ask a m ore complex 
reality. Such an approach gives no real idea of the political authority that the
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different institutions possess upon which their influence in the decision 
m aking process is based.
A third  m easure of prim e ministerial influence m ight be taken as the 
incidence of times when the Prime M inister's view point is adopted  as the 
final policy outcome. This approach has the advantage that it assum es that 
the policy process is a bargaining game and that the Prime M inister is only 
one actor among many. Moreover, it accounts for the possibility that there 
can be fluctuations in the level of the Prime M inister's influence over time. 
A t times his views will be adopted more frequently than at others. On such 
occasions we m ight conclude that there was prim e m inisterial government. 
Conversely, if the President's viewpoint were consistently to be adopted, then 
we m ight say that there was presidential government.
However, in its attem pt to quantify prim e m inisterial influence, this 
approach poses as m any problems as the ones previously considered. For 
example, it is sometimes difficult to identify the Prim e M inister's viewpoint 
on a particular matter. Most governmental deliberations were secret and only 
rum ours of w hat policy the Prime Minister favoured for each bill m anaged to 
escape. Similarly, on some matters the Prime Minister d id  not even articulate 
a particular viewpoint. This silence may be an indication that he thought the 
m atter to be unworthy of his attention, or it m ay be, as in the case of thejfiscal 
component of the 1990 budget, because he feared defeat and, therefore, refused 
to comm it himself. M oreover, Prim e M inisters m ay deliberately cede on 
some issues in order to w in on others. The result of all of these problems is 
that the figures upon which the extent of prim e ministerial influence is based 
are themselves unreliable.
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In fact, it m ust be appreciated that influence is not a concept which
lends itself to quantification. George Jones's statem ent about pow er could
easily apply to the concept of influence as well. He states:
it is impossible to m easure the pow er of prim e ministers by weighing 
their possession of different amounts of different resources. The power 
of the prim e minister is affected by other actors the prim e m inister is 
dealing with; so it is fruitless to seek to calculate precisely how  much 
resources each prim e m inister has, let alone to compare the am ount 
held by one prime minister with that of a n o th er .^
The attem pt to quantify prime ministerial influence is fruitless as it treats the
different actors in the policy process as being independent the one from the
other. The concept of influence can only be appreciated as the interaction of
two or m ore people. As Jones again states:
Since pow er involves a relationship betw een at least tw o actors; the 
pow er of each is elastic, capable of expansion and contraction, 
depending on each side of the equation and the circumstances in which 
they operate. A resource is not a solid object that can be picked up. It 
has to be seen in relation to w hat others h a v e .^
As was seen in the case studies, prim e m inisterial influence is not sim ply
dependent on the relationship between the Prime Minister and another actor,
b u t on his relationship w ith a m ultitude of different people: the President,
Ministers, party  representatives, members of interest groups and people from
foreign governments and institutions, for example.
Therefore, whilst this study concerns the nature  of prim e ministerial
influence, it is impossible to consider the Prim e M inister in isolation. The
influence of the institution needs m ust be placed in the context of the entire
system. This point is tacitly acknowledged by Peter Hall in the development
of his argum ent about the institutional factors w hich have determ ined the
course of French economic policy since 1945. In his early papers on this
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subject, he argued that there w ere three institutional factors w hich were 
im portan t in the determ ination of economic policy: the organisation of 
labour, the organisation of capital and the organisation of the state, by which 
he m eant the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government.^ 
H ow ever, in  the  final version of his a rgum en t he adds tw o o ther 
institutional features to his list, namely, the position of the country in the 
international economic system and the organisation of the domestic political 
s y s t e m .9  j h e  latter is a catch-all clause which includes the electoral system, 
party  system and so on. Hall is no doubt right that economic policy making 
since 1945 was determined by a vast range of factors. In a similar vein, w e will 
argue that the influence of the Prime Minister in the policy process can only 
be considered in relation to the influence of the totality of elements in the 
domestic and international political and economic system.
Therefore, the only w ay to consider the Prim e M inister's influence in 
the policy process is to identify the other elements w ith which the head of 
governm ent has to interact. The Prim e M inister's influence will depend 
upon his relationship w ith these other elements. As the relationship between 
then changes, so the influence of the Prime M inister will change, sometimes 
increasing, sometimes decreasing. Thus, the variations in prim e ministerial 
influence tha t w ere seen during  the course of the case studies cah be 
accounted for by the shifting set of relations between the Prime Minister and 
the other actors in the policy process.
The Prime M inister's influence in the policy process is dependent upon 
his relationship  w ith  three different sets of elem ents: quasi-perm anent 
in s titu tio n a l constra in ts ; con junctu ra l con jstra in ts; an d  m om entary  
constraints. We will consider each of these three sets in turn.
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L Q uasi-perm anent institutional constraints
P rim e m in isteria l influence is lim ited  by  a se t of quasi-perm anen t 
institu tional constraints. The general boundaries w ith in  which the Prime 
M inister can influence the outcome of the policy process are determ ined by 
the relations that he enjoys with these constraints. As his relationship with 
them  varies, so his influence will vary. Indeed, over time, these variations 
m ay be considerable. However, in norm al circumstances his relations with 
them  will vary only slowly and incrementally. O nly systemic crises and 
ru p tu res  of the existing order will change these institu tional constraints 
quickly. In the absence of such violent systemic changes, these constraints are, 
therefore, of a quasi-permanent nature. In the ten year period from 1981 there 
w ere no incurable systemic crises. Therefore, the Prime M inister's relations 
w ith  them  fluctuated only mildly and his influence vis-à-vis them  rem ained 
largely constant during this period.
In France, there are three types of quasi-perm anent institu tional 
constraints. First, the position of the dom estic state  in relation to the 
international economic and political order. Second, the configuration of the 
domestic state itself. Third, the internal configuration of the executive branch 
of governm ent. Each of these three types of constraints will now  be 
considered in turn. - -
The Prime M inister's influence is first of all lim ited by the position of 
the French state in the international political and economic system. The way 
in which this system is organised imposes lim itations on the domestic policy 
preparation process. The impact of these lim itations was seen particularly 
clearly at the time of the crisis surrounding the decision to devalue the franc 
in March 1983.
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As Cerny states, France is an "intermediate economy" w hen compared
with other national economic systems JO That is to say, in terms of the types
of goods it produces and exchanges w ith other countries, there is a  structural
gap betw een France and other more advanced national economies, whilst the
country has a structural advance over other less developed economies. The
resu lt of France's position in the w orld economic order m eans that on
occasions it can only adopt with difficulty the policy it desires, because of the
consequences this policy w ould have on the country 's internal economic
situation. As Cemy states:
In reacting to the policy problem s em bedded in the "interm ediate 
econom y'"s structural position, national policy makers have a range of 
responses w ith  which to work. Each one of these responses has 
potential benefits for the national economy, b u t each can also have 
severe disadvantages in the context of the w orld economy. 11
These disadvantages were the source of the devaluation crisis in March 1983. 
The country 's economic problems were caused by its position in the w orld 
order, b u t w ithdraw ing from the EMS w ould  only have aggravated these 
problems precisely because of the structural position of France in this order. 
The realisation of w hat the consequences w ould be of leaving the EMS 
accounted for Fabius's 'road to Damascus' conversion from 'Vautre politique' 
and his subsequent advice to M itterrand to stay in the EMS.
However, it should not be concluded that France could not have pulled 
out of the EMS in March 1983. The decision to stay in the system was not pre­
determ ined and the reasons behind this decision w ere essentially political. 
N ev erth e le ss , w ith d raw a l w ou ld  have  e n ta ile d  severe  econom ic 
consequences which would have had to have been addressed at a future date. 
As Cem y again notes:
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C ountries in a w eak structural trade  position have less room  to 
manoeuvre. Policy makers are continually having to navigate between 
policy combinations which, in  particular conjunctural conditions, m ay 
prove not only to be ineffective and internally incompatible, bu t also to 
be counterproductive and to involve significant opportunity c o s t s .  12
The opportunity  costs of w ithdrawing from the EMS in March 1983 were so
great that, although it w ould technically have been possible to leave, in
practice, the economic arguments in favour of rem aining in  the system were
overw helm ing.
The other international institutional constraint which was identified 
in the case studies was the EC. It was present both as a political and  ^ s  an 
econom ic constraint. Its political im portance w as great during  the  1983 
devaluation crisis and its economic im portance w as noticeable during  the 
preparation of the three budgets which were examined, especially w ith regard 
to their fiscal component.
The EC is a good example of how these quasi-perm anent institutional 
constraints can vary in the extent to which they limit the policy process of the 
domestic state. Clearly, before 1958 the EC was absent from domestic policy 
calculations. Since the signing of the Treaty of Rome, its influence has grown, 
particu larly  after the ratification of the Single European Act in  1987. 
M oreover, its influence is likely to increase further w ith the developm ent of 
political and economic union.
Indeed , the influence of the EC grew  during  the period  under 
consideration. Its increasing role was seen in the case studies. For example, 
the EC had little impact on budgetary politics in 1984, except for agricultural 
policy. However, by 1990, there were several im portant fiscal reform s the 
inspiration for which can be traced back to the EC and the governm ent's 
desire to prepare itself for the Single European Market. Thus, for example.
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VAT rates w ere reduced, com pany taxation w as reduced and there were 
changes to savings policy. It w ould be w rong to conclude tha t the only 
m otivation behind these changes was the EC, again political reasons were 
im portant too. However, it is im portant to realise that as the influence of the 
EC grew, so the room for manoeuvre for domestic policy m akers diminished. 
Over time, the relation between the EC and the Prime M inister is gradually 
changing and the influence of the latter is decreasing.
The Prim e M inister's influence is constrained  by in ternational 
institutional factors, bu t also by the configuration of the domestic state. The 
French sta te  exhibits tw o m ain characteristics. First, the central “^ state 
dom inates all local state, or governm ent institutions. Second, w ith in  the 
central state, the executive branch of governm ent under the Fifth Republic 
has dom inated the legislative and judicial branches. These characteristics will 
be considered in turn.
As show n in the first chapter, the central state in France is highly 
developed. Hayward has described this situation as, "the monolithic character 
of the political and adm inistrative state apparatus". 13 The absence of any 
constitutional provision for federalism means that there are few limits to the 
central sta te 's law -m aking dom ain. In this sense, the local governm ental 
authorities do not act as a check on the central institutions. Therefoff, the 
capacity of the Prime Minister to prepare policy is not officially limited by sub­
central units. Thus, the potential for governm ental and  prim e m inisterial 
influence is present. This point can best be illustrated  by com paring the 
unitary state in France w ith the constitutional federalism  w hich exists in 
Germany. In the latter case, the prerogatives of the Lander imm edidiately act 
as a lim it on the capacity of the Federal Chancellor to influence the policy 
process. The same situation is not present in France.
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Therefore, at no tim e during  the case studies w as the local state
structure an impedim ent to the central state 's capacity for action. W hen local
interests were im portant, for example, over the question of whether or not to
perm it advertising on local radio  in the 1982 broadcasting act, the local
representatives were acting qua pressure group and  used the appropriate
channels to lobby the governem ent. They w ere no t acting as a legal-
constitutional block to central institutions. That is not to say that the local
dim ension is bound to rem ain weak. Indeed, M azey has argued that its
influence is gradually in c r e a s in g . 14 Nevertheless, from  the evidence of the
previous case studies, it had little impact on the policy process and was_jiot a
constraint on prim e ministerial influence.
W ithin the institutions of the central state, the executive branch of
governm ent was dom inant. In comparison w ith the legislative and judicial
branches, its control over the policy process was great. W ith regard to the
executive's relation to the legislature, Frears has noted:
The constitutional and procedural constraints can be sum m arised thus: 
com plete executive suprem acy in the legislative process, severely 
lim ited opportunités for general debates criticising the governm ent, 
virtually no opportunities for scrutinising executive acts and m aking 
the executive give an account of them.^5
Frears goes on to add  that there is little procedural opportun ity  for the
opposition to scrutinise the government. It m ight also be added that there is
little opportunity  for the majority to do so either. Indeed, w hen Parliament
did  influence the policy process, for example, the 1986 broadcasting act, or the
1990 budget, it was due to conjunctural reasons, such as party  politics, as
described below. Most of the Prime M inister's adm inistrative resources which
w ere geared  tow ards Parliam ent w ere designed  to  overcom e these
conjunctural problem s, for example, Guy C arcassonne's role as Rocard's
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parliam entary  adviser, rather than  to com bat problem s created by the 
constitutional and procedural influence of Parliament.
Nevertheless, Parliament was not impotent. As a national platform for 
debate, it had  the capacity to embarrass the governm ent. Moreover, as was 
seen by  the obstuctive tactics of the Sénat during the passage of the 1986 
broadcasting bill, it had the ability to delay and even influence legislation. On 
th is occasion, the Prim e M inister personally w as called upon to arbitrate 
betw een the Senate majority and Léotard. Inter-party rivalries were the cause 
of the problems, bu t these problems were only able to develop, because of the 
procedural capacity of the Sénat to delay governm ent legislation. However, 
this exam ple is very m uch the exception that proves the rule. In the rest of 
the case studies Parliam ent per se was only a m inor constraint on prim e 
m inisterial influence.
In certain respects, the judicial branch acted as a m uch stronger 
constraint on the executive than did the legislature. In term s of the policy 
p reparation  process, tw o institu tions of the judicial branch need to be 
considered: the Conseil d 'E tat and the Conseil constitutionnel. Of these two 
bodies, the Conseil d 'E tat was the least influential.
The Conseil d 'E tat was called upon to scrutinise all bills and to consider 
their conformity w ith the Constitution. However, it only had  the poyœr to 
adv ise  th e  governm ent as to w he ther a b ill, o r p a rt of it, w as 
unconstitu tional. The governm ent had  no obligation  to abide by  its 
recom m endations. W hilst governm ents d id  not like to ignore the advice of 
the Conseil d 'Etat, as could be seen in the case of the 1982 broadcasting act, 
they did so if they felt that the political situation dem anded it. For example, 
while some of the Conseil d 'E taf s recommendations were taken on board by 
Léotard in  the preparation of the 1986 broadcasting act, others w ere not.
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Indeed , the  fact th a t these recom m endations w ere p resen ted  to the 
governm ent in secret m eant that it was easier for them  to be ignored as there 
w ould be no public debate of the governm ent's decision. W hile leaks did 
occur, they were not frequent. Thus, the Conseil d 'E tat played the role of an 
early w arning  system  for the governm ent, rather than  acting as a major 
constraint.
By contrast, the Conseil constitutionnel was a potentially serious limit
to the executive's control of the policy process. The governm ent had to abide
by its rulings. Thus, for all six case studies which ended w ith the passage of a
law , the  Council w as called upon  to give a judgem ent as to -th e ir
constitutionality and on all six occasions found some aspect of the bill to be
unacceptable. Indeed, the Council's ruling on the 1986 broadcasting act struck
dow n such an im portant part of the bill, that it necessitated the passage of a
further small piece of legislation after the adoption of the main text.
Indeed, over the years, the Council's influence has increased markedly.
In 1971, it issued its first negative ruling against the government; in 1974,
deputies and senators were allowed to seize it; in 1982, its rulings on the
socialists' nationalisation progranune struck dow n an im portant part of the
legislation and the Council was seen to be a check on governm ental power.
The change in the Council's role and the increase in its influence has had  a
m arked effect upon the governm ent's legislative capacity.
The Council's influence was doubly im portan t because of the pre-
parliam entary exercise in auto-limitation to which governm ents increasingly
committed themselves. As Stone notes:
G overnm ents today routinely draft and accept am endm ents to their 
legislation so as to avoid negative rulings.
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This practice of auto-limitation was conceded by several senior governmental
figures during interviews w ith the author. Its im pact on the 1986 and 1989
broadcasting bills was particularly important. Indeed, auto-limitation became
increasingly im portant w ith the growth in the Council's body of case law. The
rulings which governm ents have to take into account have grow n rapidly.
For exam ple, not only has each piece of broadcasting legislation been the
subject of a Council ruling which defined certain limits to the governm ent's
action, bu t this legislation also had to take into account other Council rulings,
such as the June 1986 privatisation d e c is io n . 17
W hilst the Council's role has become more im portant over the years,
its influence should not be overestimated. As Stone notes, there w ere limits
to  the extent to which governments engage in auto-limitation:
there are certain boundaries beyond which governm ents are unwilling 
to go in the self-limitation process. These lines are fixed politically, not 
constitutionally, accounting perhaps for the poor success rate of self­
lim itation. 18
M oreover, the traditional limitations to the Council's influence need to be 
reiterated: its members are political appointees, it can only scrutinise bills, it 
has no power to seize bills itself and it cannot make retrospective judgements. 
Thus, w hilst the Council was a constraint upon the executive and the Prime 
Minister, its influence was curtailed by political and constitutional factors
The third set of quasi-perm anent institutional constraints which need 
to be examined concern the rapport de force w ithin the executive itself. Here, 
the Prim e M inister's influence has to be set against that of the President, 
M inisters and  the bureaucracy. However, it m ust imm ediately be noted that 
in this section the emphasis is upon the constitutional and  adm inistrative 
resources that these institutions possess, rather than their political resources. 
The form er resources vary only increm entally and, thus, belong in the
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category of quasi-perm anent constraints. The latter m ay change quickly and 
violently and, thus, belong in the category of conjunctural constraints.
The influence of the Prime Minister is usually set against that of the 
President. Yet, as w as show n in  the opening  chapter, the P residen t's 
constitu tional and  adm inistrative resources w ere m eagre. As Foyer and 
Lardeyret noted:
La prédom inance du  Président de la R épublique sur le prem ier 
m inistre n 'est pas établie par la Constitution ... La prim auté de fait 
exercée par le Président de la République a une origine politique et non 
poin t juridique. 19
Even on a generous literal reading of the C onstitution, the P resident's 
capacity to intervene in the policy process w ould be confined to foreign and 
defence m atters and to times of national emergency. As was seen in the case 
studies, how ever, his interventions ranged far beyond this lim ited set of 
policy areas. Moreover, the President only had  the support of a 40 person 
advisory staff. In brute terms this figure is lower than m ost M inistries and 
m uch sm aller than the thousands of people for w hom  the Prime M inister 
was technically responsible. Indeed, as was stated earlier, if constitutional and 
adm inistrative resources were to be the yardstick by w hich influence was 
m easured, then the Prime Minister w ould be the m ost powerful institution 
in the country, w ith sundry Ministers and the President trailing far behind. 
H ow ever, the  Prim e M inister clearly d id  no t occupy such a position. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the relative influence of the different parts of 
the executive was not based upon quasi-perm anent institutional factors, but 
on conjunctural and momentary factors.
It shou ld  not be concluded, how ever, th a t constitu tional and  
adm inistrative resources w ere un im portan t to the influence of different 
actors in the policy process. The case studies show ed that on occasions they
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were highly significant. For example, the constitutional situation defined the 
boundaries of presidential action during  cohabitation. Similarly, the poor 
adm inistrative  resources possessed by the C u ltu re  M inistry in 1986 as 
com pared to the Finance M inistry m eant that Léotard had  to forego the 
control over the preparation  of certain parts  of the  b roadcasting  bill. 
Nevertheless, conjuctural factors were a m uch better pointer to the relations 
between the Prime Minister, President and Ministers.
By contrast, the senior échelons of the perm anent adm inistration 
rem ained relatively im m une from  the effects of conjunctural factors. The 
French higher adm inistration possesses the sam e characteristics which are 
common to the bureaucracies of m ost developed political systems. That is to 
say, it controls the flow of information to Ministers, it has security of tenure, 
it has highly developed administrative routines and it assesses the long-term 
effects of policy outcomes. In addition, it possesses two further characteristics 
special to France which increase its capacity for intervening in the policy 
process. Nam ely, the adm inistrative training school (ENA and the Ecole 
polytechnique) and the system  of grands corps. These tw o institu tions 
produce highly trained  experts in adm inistration  and  their perm eation 
am ongst the senior adm inistrative élite is clearly discernible. Therefore, the 
perm anen t adm inistration  posseses a pow erfu l set of resources w hen  
compared w ith the Prime Minister, President and Ministers.
As was noted in the first chapter, the characteristics outlined above 
have spaw ned tw o variants of the bureaucratic politics model. Firstly, the 
perm anent adm inistration  (and cabinet system) appears as a pow er bloc 
p u rsu in g  co o rd in a ted  policy  objectives. Secondly , th e  p e rm an en t 
adm inistration (and cabinet system) is a divided élite w ith internal tensions
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and contradictions. However, each component of this élite possesses a great 
indiv idual influence.
There was no evidence from the case studies which supported the first 
view  of the perm anent adm inistration. Indeed, the notion that policy was 
being directed by a technocratic élite was show n to be analytically flawed 
during  the  devaluation crisis. A lthough cabinet m em bers and mem bers of 
the perm anent adm inistration w ished to rem ain in the EMS, they were not 
directing policy and the motivation behind their action was as m uch political 
as economic. Indeed, it was shown that these people could not properly be 
classed as technocrats. Elsewhere there was no evidence of a power*bloc 
coordinating policy.
By contrast, there was some evidence to support the second variant. 
The influence of indiv idual parts of the perm anent adm inistration  was 
clearly visible on certain occasions. For example, it was seen in the role of the 
SJTI in 1982 and 1989, in the influence of the Budget Division of the Finance 
M inistry during the preparation of all three budgets and in the role of the 
Treasury Division during the devaluation crisis. In fact, there w ere clear 
dem onstrations of departm entalism . Conflicts w ith in  the adm inistration  
were draw n along departm ental lines. Each departm ent had its ow n interests 
which its adm inistration tried to defend. Ministers were an im portant part of 
the adm inistration 's strategy to pursue its self-interest. The adm inistration 
needed the support of Ministers to  add political w eight to their case, while 
Ministers needed to press the case of their ow n departm ents to prove their 
competence. Such interministerial conflicts were most clearly seen during the 
budgetary  spending arbitrations, although they w ere also present in the 
preparation of the broadcasting acts betw een the Finance M inistry, Culture 
and Com munications Ministries and the Telecommunications Ministry.
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W hilst the highly developed adm inistrative culture in France helped 
to overcome the conjunctural factors which determ ined policy, such factors 
cannot be discounted from a consideration of its overall influence. At times, 
they increased the adm inistration's influence. For example, the recession in 
the early 1980s increased the power of the Budget Division as it tried to reduce 
the am ount w hich M inisters received in budgetary  spending arbitrations. 
Similarly, in the economic boom  of the late 1980s the D ivision's influence 
decreased.
In add ition , o ther elem ents of the executive possess im portan t 
elem ents of control over the adm inistration. Firstly, the Prim e M inister, 
President and M inisters have a considerable pow er of patronage. Secondly, 
the cabinet system reinforces the position of the political components of the 
executive as they are provided w ith a loyal team of policy advisers. Thirdly, 
the Prime Minister and President have the position of arbiters in the conflicts 
betw een the several Ministries. This position does not m ean that they are 
neutral. It was seen that they promoted their own preferred policy options, for 
exam ple, determ ining the com position of the regulatory  au thorities for 
broadcasting. Instead, it means that there is the opportunity  for decision 
m aking above the ministerial level. The perm anent adm inistration is poorly 
placed to control decision m aking at this level. O rganisations which=were 
well placed to influence policy at this level, for example, the SGG, showed no 
signs of having m ade an impact on the content of policy. Therefore, while the 
perm anent adm inistration possessed the resources to challenge the influence 
of the Prime Minister, President and Ministers in the policy process, it d id  not 
have the capacity to dom inate them . The political com ponent of the 
executive was faced with a im portant constraint, b u t not an insurm ountable 
one.
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Therefore, it can be seen that there a num ber of quasi-perm anent 
institutional constraints which affected the Prime M inister's influence on the 
policy process. Some of these factors lim ited the Prime M inister's influence, 
for exam ple, the position of France in  the w orld  economic and  political 
system  and  the strength  of the perm anent adm inistration. O ther factors 
increased his capacity to intervene in the policy process, for example, the 
strength of the central state and the executive branch of governm ent and the 
h igh  level of his adm inistrative resources. The extent to  w hich these 
constraints lim ited the Prime M inister's capacity for action varied, bu t only 
slowly, except in the case of total ruptures in the fabric of the existing political 
system.
It m ust also be noted, however, that these institutional constraints 
were not free from the impact of the conjunctural constraints to be examined 
below. W hile they can be analysed separately, they were not independent and 
isolated. Indeed, this conclusion is consistent w ith the notion of the influence 
being a relationship between two or more people or organisations. Given that 
the Prim e M inister's influence can only be considered in relation to the 
influence of the totality of factors which operate in  the political system, it 
w ould be surprising if there were to be no interaction between institutional 
and conjunctural constraints. This interaction did  take place. -
IL Conjunctural constraints
The second set of elements upon which the Prime M inister's influence 
depended was com prised of conjunctural constraints. W hilst the general 
lim its to prim e m inisterial influence w ere determ ined by his relationship 
w ith the set of quasi-perm anent institutional constraints, these conjunctural 
constraints delineated more specifically his impact on the policy process. They
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w ere subject to m uch m ore rap id  varia tions th a n  the  in stitu tio n a l 
constraints. Therefore, they account for w hy the Prim e M inister's influence 
fluctuated so greatly during the ten year period since 1981. W hereas, during 
this period, the impact of institutional constraints varied only incrementally, 
the  im pact of conjunctural constraints varied considerably. There are four 
com ponents to this set of constraints: electoral politics, party  politics, 
personality and public opinion. Each component will be considered in turn.
The first com ponent of the set of conjunctural constraints is the 
outcome of presidential and legislative elections. The results of these two sets 
of elections were the major conjunctural factors which determ ined w hether 
there was to be presidential government or prim e m inisterial government.
The results of these elections were so im portant because of the ^ m i-  
presidential nature of the Fifth Republic after the 1962 constitutional reform. 
U nder sem i-presidential régimes, these tw o sets of elections are both, to a 
greater o r lesser extent, determ ining elections. U nder the sem i-presidential 
system , there can be tw o general outcomes following these elections: the 
President can belong to the same party , or parties w hich m ake up  the 
parliam entary majority; or the President can belong to an opposing party, or 
set of parties than that of the parliam entary majority. The existence of these 
two possible outcomes leads to a system which Prêches has described as 
possessing "une plasticité r é p u b l i c a i n e "  .2 0
This 'plasticity' is general to semi-presidential régimes. The Irish case 
has provided a good recent example of the change from  a coincidence of 
presidential and parliam entary majorities to the presence of tw o opposing 
m ajorities following the election of M ary Robinson. France, how ever, is 
unique am ongst semi-presidential régimes in that the coincidence of these
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tw o m ajorities, or their disjunction, was the m ain determ inant on policy 
m aking.
The reason for France's unique situation was not constitutional. As 
was show n in the first chapter, the President had no clear constitutional base 
for intervening in the policy process. Instead, it was due to historical reasons. 
The Third and Fourth Republics failed in part because of their incapacity to 
produce effective political leadership. The constitutional fram ework of the 
Fifth Republic gave the opportunity  for the Prim e M inister to assum e this 
leadership. It was clear, however, w hen de Gaulle refused to accept the 
prem iership, bu t insisted on taking the presidency in 1958, tha t the Prime 
M inister's role in policy making w ould be challenged. The legitimacy that de 
Gaulle derived as a result of his wartim e exploits and then from his election 
in both 1958 and 1965 m eant that he was able to usurp the Prime M inister's 
constitutional supremacy. The precedent was set for his successors to emulate 
his actions.
Both de Gaulle's decision and the im pact of the 1962 constitutional 
reform focused attention upon the presidential election as the key political 
event. P arties and  ind iv idua ls have come to  o rganise the ir activ ity  
exclusively so as to w in this election. However, victory in the presidential 
election was not sufficient for the President to be guaranteed o f  control of 
the policy process. S \h e  also needed the support of a parliam entary majority. 
Thus, the tw o sets of elections were im portant in determ ining w hether the 
President or the Prime Minister could assume leadership.
Therefore, the results of both elections and the subsequent coincidence 
or disjunction of presidential and parliam entary  m ajorities w ere the key 
conjunctural determ inants of prim e ministerial influence. To date, the most 
usual situation has been the coincidence of majorities, or as Servent has put
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it: ' l a  conform ité des majorités" .21 Only the 1986-88 period saw  opposing 
majorities, although the President was only backed by  a relative majority in 
Parliam ent after the 1988 legislative elections. One reason for the relative 
absence of opposing majorities is that the system was designed to encourage a 
coincidence of m ajorities. The P residen t h ad  the  pow er to  dissolve 
Parliam ent and this weapon has been used on several occasions, notably in 
1981 and 1988, so as to ensure that a parliam entary majority friendly to him 
was elected by way of a presidential coat-tails effect.
The President was elected on a particular policy program m e such as the 
110 Propositions, or the Lettre aux Français. The parliam entary majority, was 
com posed of people w ho have supported that program m e. Therefore, the 
P resident w as able to appoin t a Prim e M inister w ho ensured  that the 
program m e, or as much as the President thought fit, was then legislated. In 
this situation the Prime Minister was aware that he ow ed his appointm ent to 
the President. He was also aware that he was responsible to a Parliam ent 
which w as loyal to the President and not to him. It is natural in such a 
situation that political leadership should behove to the President and not the 
Prime Minister. In the sense that during these times the President was the 
source of m ost policy initiatives and that he asserted the de facto right to 
intervene in the decision making process w hen he so desired, there can be 
said to have been presidential government.
The 1981-1984 period was an example of this situation and was reflected 
in the case studies which were exam ined. The 1982 broadcasting act, in 
particu lar, saw  the P residen t in terven ing  personally  on m ajor policy 
decisions, w hilst various mem bers of his entourage oversaw  the detailed 
preparation of the bill. In this case political leadership d id  not belong to the 
Prime Minister, but to the President. As Feigenbaum has stated:
2 1 9
D uring the 'norm al' situation of a President w ith a friendly majority in
the National Assembly, decision m aking has been hierarchical.^^
H ow ever, this situation d id  not m ean th a t the Prim e M inister and  his 
advisers w ere politically  im potent, b u t ra th e r th a t they  w ere clearly 
subordinate to the President. In this sense, prim e m inisterial influence was 
not necessarily négligeable, bu t it was less than presidential influence.
The case of a disjunction of presidential and parliam entary majorities 
occurred during  cohabitation. A lthough, this situation has only happened 
once to date, it has been envisaged on several other occasions, notably in 1978 
before the legislative elections of that year. M oreover, although in  1986 
cohabitation took place as a result of the President's party  losing the mid-term 
legislative elections, there is nothing to p reven t such a situation  from 
occurring at the beginning of the presidential septennat, if the President were 
to lose the  an ticipated  parliam entary  elections. This situation  nearly  
happened  in 1988. It is, how ever, m ore likely tha t legislative elections 
m idw ay th rough  the p residential term  w ould  lead to the cohabitation  
scenario.
U nder cohabitation, the parliam entary majority was loyal to the Prime 
M inister and hostile to the President. On this occasion the Prim e M inister 
assum ed the responsibility for policy leadership. The Prim e M inister was 
personally  identified w ith a legislative program m e w hich had  been the 
election platform  upon which the RPR/UDF coalition had  cam paigned and 
had  subsequently won a m ajority in the Assemblée nationale. The Prime 
M inister, therefore, enjoyed the loyalty of the parliam entary m ajority as he 
executed the coalition's legislative program m e. The President, by contrast, 
w as only able to fulfil his m eagre constitu tional functions. The Prim e 
Minister was able to supplant policy leadership from the President because his
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po p u lar m andate , albeit indirect, w as new er than  the  P residen t's . As
Colombani and Lhomeau noted:
[Une] légitimité qu 'il s'attribue en sa qualité de chef du  gouvernement 
de  la majorité élue le 16 mars. Légitimité p lus fraîche que celle du 
Président de la R é p u b l i q u e . ^ 3
This theoretical argum ent backed up  the practical situation  of prim e
m inisterial dominance.
U nder cohabitation, therefore, the Prim e M inister controlled public
policy. As W right has stated:
Cohabitation w as to dem onstrate that a governm ent w ith  a friendly 
m ajority in parliam ent could displace the President as the centre of 
domestic decision m a k in g .2 4
The Prime M inister's newfound influence was seen in the case studies. It was
Chirac w ho decided which parts of the electoral platform  to legislate. For
exam ple, he  took the  decision  to  delay  the  p re p a ra tio n  of the
telecommunications law. It was also the Prim e M inister who took the most
im portant policy decisions, for example, the num ber of television companies
to p rivatise . Sim ilarly, even though  C hirac de legated  m uch of the
responsibility for draw ing up the 1987 budget to Balladur, this situation was a
sign of strength not weakness. Balladur was a loyal lieutenant w ho could be
trusted to draw  up policy in a m anner consistent w ith  the Prime M inister's
preferences.
It is apparent, therefore, that the m ain conjunctural constraint upon 
which prim e ministerial influence depended was the results of presidential 
and  legislative elections. This observation, w hilst fundam ental, is not 
sufficient in  o rder p roperly  to explain all of the  variations in prim e 
m inisterial influence. The m ain problem  is that this factor is not able to 
account for the variations in prim e m inisterial influence w ithin periods of
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d ua l m ajorities. For exam ple, there  w ere m ajor differences in prim e 
m inisterial influence during  the M auroy and Fabius prem ierships, despite 
the fact tha t they both  served under the sam e President w ith  the same 
parliam entary majority. The same obsevation w ould also be true w hen there 
w as a disjunction of majorities, although the unique example of cohabitation 
m eans that this can only be posited as a hypothesis and cannot be proved.
Variations of influence within electoral periods can partly be ascribed 
to  changes in the second conjunctural constraint under w hich the Prim e 
M inister operated, namely, party  politics. It m ust be appreciated that party  
politics affected the Prime M inister's influence in their w idest sense. To this 
end, consideration needs to be m ade of in ter-party  relations, in tra-party  
relations and party  organisations. ,
The m ain im pact of in ter-party  relations upon  prim e m inisterial 
influence w as seen w hen there w ere coalition governm ents. D uring the 
period covered by the case studies there were two radically different types of 
coalitions which were w itnessed. Both of these types of coalition had  a 
different im pact upon the policy process. The first type w as a tw o party  
coalition (PS/PC) w ith one dom inant party (PS). This coalition survived from 
1981 until 1984. The second type was a tw o party  coalition (RPR/UDF) with 
bo th  p a rtn e rs  hav ing  equal w eight. This s itua tion  occurred  u n d er 
cohabitation.
In the first scenario, the effect of the m inor coalition partner on overall 
governm ent policy m aking was minimal. In the specific M inistries which 
were headed by PC representatives, there was naturally a m uch greater role 
for the junior party. However, the overall impact of the PC on policy making 
was small. It could be seen, for example, that the PC w as not form ally 
involved in the preparation of the 1982 broadcasting act. The only impact
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came from Ralite at the request of Lang and was informal w ith no discernible 
im pact on the w ording of the bill. Moreover, no concerted attem pt was made 
by  the governm ent to prevent the communists from abstaining on the vote 
in the Assemblée nationale. Indeed, more attem pt was m ade to woo the RPR 
in the Sénat. Similarly, apart from several m inor concessions on expenditure 
for the PC Ministers, the influence of the comm unists on the preparation of 
the 1985 budget was also meagre. It m ight be concluded, therefore, that the 
influence of the Prime Minister in the policy process was hardly affected by 
the nature of the governmental coalition from 1981-84.
By contrast, the impact of the 1986-88 coalition upon decision making 
was great. During cohabitation the fact that Chirac headed a coalition of two 
equal parties had an impact upon his influence in the policy process. In qrder 
to keep the coalition together so as to pass laws through Parliament, Chirac 
had  to negotiate w ith and on occasions m ake concessions to his coalition 
partners.
The impact of inter-party politics on the policy process was so great that
it was called "la deuxième cohabitation" by Léotard. As Servent has noted:
A une prem ière cohabitation entre le Président et le Premier ministre, 
se surajoutait une deuxième cohabitation avec les com posantes de la 
m ajorité parlem entaire  engagées dans des cam ps présiden tie ls 
différents (Chirac, Barre, Léotard).25 =
The preparation of the 1986 broadcasting act w as a good exam ple of this
situation. Léotard, aided and abetted by Giscard d'Estaing, tried to use his
position to draw  up w hat could be considered to be a Parti Républicain law.
As a result, he naturally  came up against fierce opposition from the RPR,
particularly in the Sénat. The fact, however, that Chirac felt that he had to
arbitrate in Léotard's favour on several key occasions showed that the Prime
Minister was not simply able to carry out the wishes of his own party, but that
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he was constrained by the exigencies of the parliam entary coalition. These 
same exigencies could be seen at work during  the preparation of the 1987 
budget, particu larly  on the fiscal com ponent. The harristes m ade their 
opposition to the governm ent's original plans very plain and, as the price for 
the budget's  sm ooth passage through Parliam ent, Balladur had  to concede 
several costly amendments. Thus, whilst the UDF, or certain components of 
it, could  n o t d ictate  its term s to the  Prim e M inister and  the  RPR, 
nevertheless, it still had  an im pact which Chirac could not ignore in the 
arbitration process.
The tw o other parliam entary situations in  w hich the governm ent 
found itself also had repercussions upon prim e m inisterial influence. In the 
first of these situations, th a t of a single p a rty  governm ent w ifh a 
parliam entary majority, the Prime M inister had  little to w orry  about with 
regard to inter-party relations. However, in the second case, that of a minority 
governm ent, the Prim e M inister had  to take the w ishes of o ther 
parliam entary parties very seriously into account. The second situation was 
the one under which Rocard had to operate during  the preparation of the 
1989 broadcasting act and the 1990 budget. The minority situation in which he 
found himself had a demonstrable effect upon the Prime M inister's influence 
in the policy process. -
The m inority situation obliged the Prim e M inister to bargain w ith the 
UDC and the PC on every bill that was presented  to  Parliam ent. This 
bargaining took place both before and during the parliam entary stage and was 
usually conducted informally. The need to w in the support, or abstention, of 
either the UDC or the PC m eant that concessions had to m ade which altered 
the nature of the bill as it had been agreed in the interministerial arbitration 
meetings. Changes were m ade which w ould not otherwise have been made.
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In this sense, the minority situation had an effect upon the role of the Prime 
M inister. The effect of this bargaining could be m ost clearly seen in the 
preparation  of the 1989 broadcasting act. H ere, som e not insubstantial 
alterations were m ade to the bill as a result of the Prime M inister's desire to 
win the support of the UDC.
The influence of the o ther parliam entary  groups after 1988 was 
im portant, bu t not unlimited. Rocard used Article 49-3 to pass both the 1989 
broadcasting bill and the 1990 budget, so as to avoid having to  accept 
am endm ents w hich w ere totally  unpalatable. Indeed, the  UDC set its 
dem ands so high over the former bill because it was worried about the rffects 
that supporting the government would have on its inter-party relations with 
the RPR and the UDF. Thus, the evidence available shows the importance of 
in ter-party  relations on governm ent policy. W ith regard  to the  Prim e 
M inister in a m inority situation, however, while his room  for m anoeuvre 
was limited, he still retained a certain space in which to operate.
Intra-party  politics were also im portant as a conjunctural constraint. 
Whilst the nature of intra-party disputes is often seized upon and exaggerated 
by the press, they did have an impact upon the outcome of public policy and, 
hence, the influence of the Prime Minister in the policy process. As Gaffney
has noted: _
All changes in the balance of pow er within the party  have, therefore,
potentially far-reaching c o n s e q u e n c e s . ^ ^
Internal party  problems were particularly noticeable w ithin the PS in the post- 
1988 period. Evidence of these problems was seen in the preparation of the 
1990 budget w ith the exchanges betw een the fabiusiens and the jospinistes. 
Rocard's strategy at this time was to appear to take neither side so as to 
enhance his position as arbitrator. This strategy did  m ean, however, that he
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w as not able to act as he would have w anted and that he had to acquiesce to
decisions to which he was not overly favourable. This was seen with some of
the decisions on the fiscal side of the 1990 budget.
The im portance of intra-party politics m eant that the position of the
Prim e M inister w ithin the party  was vital for his influence on the policy
process. Intuitively, the stronger the Prim e M inister's position w ithin the
party , the greater his capacity is for influencing policy. In this respect, the
contrast between, for example, Chirac and Rocard was great. Chirac was the
founder and undisputed leader of the RPR in 1986. Rocard, by contrast, has
always been rather a maverick figure within the PS. As Cole has noted: —
He is distrusted not only by the new PS leadership under the control of 
Mauroy, but also by a majority of anti-Rocardian PS deputies.27
*
In fact, the position of all socialist Prim e M inister's during  the period in 
question was one of subordination to the President. M itterrand 's authority 
w as derived not only from his election, bu t also from  his position of co­
founder and 'historic' leader of the PS. This position of authority lim ited the
capacity for influence that his Prime M inister's possessed. As Lemaire stated: 
M itterrand  a placé le parti en liberté surveillé, en établissant la 
dom ination du  courant m itterrandiste. C 'est pour cette raison, entre 
autre, qu'il a placé Pierre Mauroy au poste de Premier ministre qui, de 
M atignon, ne pourrait jamais prétendre diriger le parti. De même, 
Laurent Fabius, son jeune dauphin, n 'avait pas d'assise réelle au sein 
du  PS; ainsi, François M itterrand pourrait rester l'arbitre suprêm e ...28
Thus, the Prime M inister's position within the party  was both im portant vis-
à-vis governm ent Ministers and also the President.
A fu rther elem ent of this conjunctural constraint upon  the Prime
M inister's influence was the party  qua individual actor. For example, after
1981 the PS was consistently associated w ith  policy preparation, usually
through a series of informal policy meetings which were attended by the party
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leaders.^9 w h ils t it was difficult to dissociate the independent influence of
party  leaders from the interests of their constituent parts, such as factions and
the parliam entary group, the party could be said to have had an influence.
The organisation of the party w as an im portant factor in the am ount of
influence it had on the policy process. Parties which follow their leaders have
less impact upon the policy process. Parties which bind their leaders have a
greater impact. So, for example, the PS after 1981 was often classed in the
form er category as a godillot party  "totally subord inated  to presidential
d irec tiv e s" .30 W hilst the Fifth Republic's institutional structure tends to
create parties which follow their leaders (présidentiables), the situation in
which a m ore independent party  was able to influence policy should not be
dismissed. ^
In all of the aspects considered above, party politics acted as a constraint
on the Prim e M inister's influence. His relationship to his party  and  to
opposing  parties inside or ou tside  of the governing coalition w as an
im portant determ inant of his role in the policy process. Indeed, Jones has
argued that, of all the factors which im pinge upon the Prim e M inister's
influence, party  politics is the most important. He states:
The relationship betw een prim e m inisters and  parties is the m ost 
im portant of all linkages for most prime ministers ... Party is the critical 
resource and constraint: the key to the pow er of both  the  prim e 
m inister and the other actors and institutions.31
Certainly, it was clear that the party  related factors identified above were
central to an explanantion of the Prim e M inister's influence and, equally
importantly, to an explanation of why that influence changed over time.
A further conjunctural constraint which determ ined the level of prim e
ministerial influence was that of personality. In this case, the variations in his
influence were due at least in part to the interaction between the personality
2 2 7
of the different Prime M inisters and of the other senior office holders. An 
im m ediate  p rov iso  m ust be m ade, how ever. It w ill n o t^w g u ed  that 
personality w as the m ain determ inant of the Prim e M inister's influence. 
Ind iv idua ls alw ays opera ted  w ith in  system s w hich possessed  certain 
structural characteristics. These structures, as outlined above, set the limits to 
the influence of a particular institution. Here, it is argued that w ithin those 
lim its the personality of the different protagonists was im portant. W hilst 
individuals were, to some extent, the bearers of the structural characteristics 
of the institutions within which they operated, nevertheless they m aintained 
a certain freedom of action. Greenstein has suggested a set of circumstances 
within which personality can influence political b e h a v i o u r . 3 2  it is under such 
circum stances tha t personality  was a de term inan t of p rim e m inisterial 
influence.
It is im portant to give some content to the notion of 'personality ' as it 
is being used here. W hat is no t im plied are characteristics presented in 
anecdotal accounts of politicians' behaviour, for example, Chirac's reputation 
for having a short temper. Even if he were to have a short tem per, it would 
not be the basis for an analytical account of his influence in the policy process. 
Personality  approaches the notion of psychological characteristics m ore 
analytically. These characteristics are one of the factors which m ay detesxiine 
a person’s influence in the policy process. Lasswell, for example, introduced 
the concept of the "psycopathology" of leaders.33 He argued that the reaction 
of leaders to particu lar events was due  to the  ind iv idua l's  childhood 
experiences, for example. Taras and W eyant have quoted a study of British 
Prim e M inisters which concluded that: "the driv ing  force in their lives 
em erged from  their being deprived  in  ch ildhood of the love of their 
p a r e n t s " .34 Thus, the  im pact of personality  m ay d epend  on such
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psychological traits. The relevance of these traits to the outcome of the policy
process m ust pass A. J. A yer's test that: "the passage from  evidence to
conclusion m ust be legitimate".35 Whilst it is difficult in the present study to
identify psychological characteristics which influenced the Prim e M inister's
approach to policy preparation, the salience of these characteristics should not
be dismissed out of hand.
Other personality based factors were of demonstrable importance. For
exam ple, both G reenstein and  M achin have argued  tha t skill p lays an
im portant role in the policy p r o c e s s . 3 6  it was dem onstrated, for example, in
intragovernm ental negotiations, in the tim ing of political issues and in the
oratorical, or televisual capacity which an individual possessed. Similarly, the
absence of such skill was a factor. Individuals m ay possess such skills
innately, or, m ore likely, they will leam  them  during the early years of their
political formation. People who accede to top positions after m uch ministerial
experience deal better with the rigours of office than those who are young and
relatively inexperienced. For example. Rose has noted:
L 'orientation de M itterrand est issue de son expérience de plusieurs 
décennies en tant que parlementaire et ministre.37
Certainly, M itterrand's experience was a decisive factor in his handling of the
1983 devaluation  crisis. One aspect of this factor will be w hether the
ind iv idual has had  a background in local politics, or w hether he is a
technocrat. Rose again notes:
Les Prem iers m inistres qui accèdent à leur fonction pa r la voie de 
l'A ssem blée ou  de la politique locale, com m e Chaban-D elm as et 
M auroy, ont probablem ent d 'au tres priorités qu 'un  Prem ier m inistre 
qui a d 'abord commencé comme technocrate, tel que Raymond Barre.^^
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It was d ea r that Fabius's background as an inspecteur des finances and as a 
form er Budget Minister m eant that he was better placed to intervene in the 
budgetary decision making process than Mauroy before him.
Presidential and  prim e m inisterial relations w ere also particularly  
affected by the ambitions of the two protagonists. As Servent has p u t it, the 
Prim e M inister is on 'l'avan t-dem ière  marche du  p o u v o i r " .39 He is, or is at 
least seen to be, the m ain contender for the President's title. Some Prime 
Ministers use their time in office to prepare the way for a future presidential 
campaign. This was true for Rocard from 1988-91. His desire to avoid making 
enem ies in  the run  up  to the next presidential election w as one of the 
m otivations behind  his refusal to take sides in the d ispu tes betw een 
Bérégovoy and Chevènem ent over the defence budget in 1989. However, 
am bitious Prim e M inisters are  usually  faced w ith  P residents w ho are 
reluctant to give up  their office to anyone except their favourite dauphin. In 
such a situation the President and Prime M inister naturally clash. Thus, for 
example, Rocard and M itterrand never had each other's tru st during  the 
form er's prem iership.
The personal relations tha t the Prim e M inister enjoyed w ith  the 
President and other M inisters were also im portant. Some Prim e M inisters 
have enjoyed close personal relations w ith the President before commg to 
office, others have been sworn enemies. M auroy and Fabius were both loyal 
presidential acolytes before their appointm ent as Prim e M inister. On the 
other hand, Chirac and Rocard w ere long-term  presidential rivals. Thus, 
personal likes and dislikes are likely to influence the nature of the relations 
between the two institutions.
Sim ilarly, the relations betw een the P residen t and  M inisters, or 
between individual Ministers had an affect on the Prime M inister's role. For
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exam ple, successive socialist Prim e M inister’s w ere lim ited by Lang's 
relations w ith  M itterrand w hich often allow ed the C ultu re  M inister to 
succeed in interm inisterial arbitrations. In addition, Chirac's position was 
m ade m ore difficult in  1986 because of the animosity betw een M onory and 
Devaquet.
The final conjunctural constraint which needs to be considered is the 
role played by the public. The influence of the public manifested itself in two 
different ways. First, through the action of pressure groups and, second, 
through public opinion in general. Although the two ways are related and the 
analysis of them  will overlap, it is useful to consider them separately. —
There is a tem ptation to place the role of pressure groups in the 
category of quasi-perm anent institutional constraints. The debates W iich 
have raged over recent years as to whether France can be considered to have 
neo-corporatist, m eso-corporatist, o r p lu ralis t m odes of in te rest group 
organisation would seem to be predicated upon a relatively stable framework 
of group  \governm en t interaction. Similarly, sociological studies, which 
suggest that the French are a nation of individualists w ho do not like joining 
voluntary associations, suggest that this characteristic is a perm anent feature 
of French political life, not a conjunctural one.
In fact, we w ould  argue that pressure  group activity should  be 
considered alongside the other conjunctural constraints. The case studies 
showed that their influence was not constant. It varied from one study to the 
next. The m ain reason for the variations in their influence was that they were 
no t associated  w ith  parties and  there  w ere few  fixed channels of 
interm ediation with the government. That is to say, for example, that parties 
w ere not dependent upon them  for finance and there w ere few official 
committees where policy was m ade upon which they were represented. Thus,
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their capacity for influencing policy was structurally  weak. Instead, their 
influence w as dependent upon conjunctural factors, such as the level of 
public sym pathy for their cause and the immediate economic situation.
W hen these conjunctural factors operated in favour of the pressure 
groups, then the Prime M inister's influence was constrained. A particularly 
clear example of this situation was the Devaquet crisis in 1986. The UNEF-ID 
w as no t structurally  strong, nor d id  it occupy a position  of strategic 
importance in the productive process liable to increase its bargaining position 
relative to that of the government. Instead, the m ovem ent used the means at 
its disposal (demonstrations, television appearances and so on) so as to-build 
up  a body of public opinion in favour of its position, sufficient to force Chirac 
to w ithdraw  the bill in question. Indeed, the D evaquet crisis w as a good 
exam ple of the interaction of the influence of pressure groups and  public 
opinion. The studen t p ro test m ovem ent w as pow erful because it w ent 
beyond the lobbying practices of UNEF-ID to incorporate a w ider social 
movem ent that was much more threatening to the government.
Pressure group influence was also seen during  various o ther case 
studies. For example, the lobbying surrounding the introduction or otherwise 
of advertising on local radio in the 1982 broadcasting law. This example also 
show ed the im portance of the conjunctural com ponent of pressure group 
influence. In 1982, the anti-advertising lobby succeeded because it had a 
powerful ally in Mauroy who, at that time, had considerable authority within 
the executive. On this occassion, therefore, pressure group lobbying helped 
the Prime M inister's cause, rather than hindering it as in 1986. Thus, pressure 
group activity m ay be either a constraint or a resource for the Prime Minister. 
Short-term  conjunctural factors determ ined w hich of these tw o situations 
prevails.
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Similarly, as Jones has argued, public opinion m ay act as a constraint 
on the Prime M inister's influence, or a resource which increases it.^O He goes 
on to  argue that the m ost im portant public are the voters because election 
results depend upon their preferences. Rocard recognised the importance of 
public opinion for his position as Prim e M inister w hen he incorporated a 
professional pollster in his cabinet for the first time. One of the tasks of the 
pollster, w hether s \h e  is institutionalised in the cabinet or not, was to alert 
the Prime Minister to potentially unfavourable m ovements of public opinion 
as the result of a bill being passed. Therefore, the Prim e M inister tried to 
second-guess public opinion. On occasions, such as w ith the Devaquet crisis, 
the polls were signally unsuccessful in their capacity as an early w arning 
device and the Prim e M inister was faced w ith a m assive m ovem ent of 
discontent.
It can be seen, therefore, that conjunctural constraints w ere an 
im p o rtan t de term inan t of the Prim e M inister's influence. There is a 
fundam ental difference, however, between this set of constraints and  the set 
of quasi-perm anent institutional constraints. In the latter set, some of these 
constraints lim ited the Prime M inister's influence, while others increased it. 
By contrast, each element of the set of conjunctural constraints may be either 
a lim it or a resource for the Prime Minister. For example, pressure groups 
m ay help the Prim e M inister's cause, or h inder it. Similarly, one Prim e 
M inister m ay have a pow erful position in the party  w hich increases his 
overall level of influence, while another Prim e M inister m ay be a minor 
party  figure.
Moreover, even though there may be a slow change in the importance 
of institutional constraints over time, they do set the general boundaries 
w ithin which the Prime Minister may act. In this case, variations are usually
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only incremental. By contrast, the Prime M inister's relationship w ith the set 
of conjunctural constraints is open to quick and violent fluctuations. For 
exam ple, election results have an overnight effect. Similarly, a change of 
Prim e M inister introduces som eone to the office w ho m ay have a very 
different relationship to hisXher party  and coalition partners than the person 
w ho is being replaced.
It is precisely because of this situation  tha t the Prim e M inister's 
influence cannot be quantified. Each Prim e M inister found him self in a 
unique position, which was itself inherently unstable. The Prim e Minister's 
influence varied according to the slow changes in institutional constraints 
and  to the  rap id  fluctuations in conjunctural constraints. H ow ever, the 
m ovem ent of these constraints was not necessarily consistent the one with 
the other. For example, Chirac was in a stronger position vis-à-vis Fabius 
because of his position of leadership over his ow n party  and because of the 
fact that the President was largely disempowered. However, at the same time 
his position w as w eaker than that of Fabius in that he faced a difficult 
electoral coalition which enjoyed only a fragile parliam entary majority. Thus, 
their relative influences are difficult to assess. We can only poin t to the 
factors upon which that influence depended. This is a them e which we will 
return  to in the final chapter.
iiL M om entary constraints
The th ird  set of factors which determ ined the level of prim e m inisterial 
influence are m om entary constraints. The im pact of the elements in this set 
of constraints was abrupt and immediate. They did  not have any m edium  or 
long-term effects on the extent of prim e ministerial influence, bu t their short­
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term , or m om entary , im pact on the outcom e of public  policy w ere 
occasionally great indeed. Thus, their impact cannot be ignored.
Unlike, the two previous sets of constraints which were identified, the 
elements in this set cannot be listed definitively. All that it is possible to do is 
to give examples of such constraints as they were present in the case studies. 
These examples will give a pointer as to the factors that need to be included in 
this set of constraints, even if, by their very nature, a full list is impossible to 
provide.
The first m omentary constraint to be considered concerns the relation
of the the bill in question to past and forthcoming bills. For example, during
the parliam entary stage of the 1989 broadcasting bill, the leader of the UDC,
M éhaignerie, was reluctant to do a deal w ith the governm ent because his
■/
party  had  just facilitated the passage of the 1989 budget. M éhaignerie was 
aw are that, if he had  allow ed his group to vote for o r abstain on the 
broadcasting bill, then it would have appeared to his RPRXUDF allies as if his 
group  w ere not an independen t parliam entary  group, b u t one which 
supported  the socialists. In the run  up  to the 1989 m unicipal elections, 
Méhaignerie had to avoid giving this impression as it w ould have weakened 
his bargaining position vis-à-vis the RPRXUDF in the negotiations over the 
preparation of coalition lists for this election.
Therefore, whilst conjunctural party  factors cannot be dissociated from 
this example, the content of the 1989 broadcasting law was in part determined 
by the UDC's decision a few days previously to vote for the 1989 budget. This 
exam ple illustrates how  m om entary constraints affected the  outcom e of 
policy. If the vote on the broadcasting bill had taken place before the vote on 
the budget, then the content of the final law may have been different.
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A related momentary constraint concerns the Prime M inister's role in 
the intergovernm ental arbitration process. The Prim e M inister could not 
consistently arbitrate in favour of one Minister, or against another. If he were 
to do so, then he w ould risk the charge of favouritism, on the one hand, or 
the M inister's resignation, on the other. This point is particularly im portant 
w hen it is realised that the Prime Minister m ay have to chair a num ber of 
comités in a short space of time. As one of Rocard's advisers noted, it is 
difficult not to acquiesce to a particular M inister's dem ands if, a few hours 
previously, he has been defeated on an im portant issue in  the arbitration 
process of another bill.^^ Thus, it is impossible to consider the preparation of 
any bill in isolation. Its contents may be in part determ ined by the debate 
which surrounds other bills being prepared at the same time.
A further m om entary constraint w as w itnessed m ost vividly during 
the course of the Devaquet crisis. The most acute moments of the Devaquet 
crisis were experienced after and because of the death of Malik Oussekine. The 
governm ent had little or no control over the circumstances of his death, but 
the fact that it occurred created a wave of public sym pathy for the students 
that forced Chirac to w ithdraw  the bill. Thus, the im pact of this exogenous, 
momentary factor was crucial to the outcome of the policy process.
As w ith the case of conjunctural constraints previously, the impact of 
m om entary constraints can be a limit or a resource for the Prime Minister. In 
the case of Oussekine's death, the Prime Minister was forced to w ithdraw  a 
bill which, until that point, he had shown no signs of w anting to w ithdraw . 
In the case of the 1989 broadcasting bill, however, the Prime Minister was able 
to return to the text as it had been agreed in the pre-parliam entary arbitration 
process. Am endem ents originally inserted to accommodate the UDC group 
were withdrawn.
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The incidence of m om entary constraints is highly unpredictable. In 
this sense, the set of m om entary constraints differs from the tw o previous 
sets of constraint examined, which were to a large extent predictable. In no 
w ay could the death of Oussekine have been either predicted or prevented. 
Once it occurred, the g o vernm en t had to react and the odds were not stacked 
in its favour. Similarly, the consequences deriving from  the parliam entary 
vote p rio r to the one in question, or to the previous prim e m inisterial 
a rb itra tio n  on the  conten t of the  bills w hich follow s, are equally
unpredictable. It is sim ply 'le hasard du calendrier'. W hether the result is
n
favourable or unfavourable to the Prim e M inister is contjl^ent upon the 
prevailing circumstances, bu t his influence is in part determined by them.
y
Conclusion
Approaching the nature of prim e ministerial influence in this w ay proves to 
be m uch more satisfying than any attem pt to try and quantify the level of his 
influence. This approach provides a rounder picture of policy outcomes. It 
shows that they result from a complex process of interaction between a series 
of different actors and institutions. The result of this interaction is conflict, 
negotiations and bargaining. While the Prime Minister has several strategic 
stuctural advantages in this interaction process, his short-term  influence 
ultim ately depends upon the conjunctural constraints w ith which he is faced 
at any one time.
However, it is also im portant to see how  the three sets of constraints 
identified above relate to each other. They do not operate independently the 
one from the other. Thus, institutional factors affect the nature^onjunctural 
and m om entary constraints. For example, the party  system will in part be 
determ ined  by  the constitutional fram ew ork w ith in  w hich the system
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o p e r a t e s . 4 2  Similarly, conjunctural constraints will have an effect on the 
function ing  of in stitu tiona l constraints. For exam ple, the  P residen t's  
influence over the core executive is determ ined to a large part by election 
results and the state of the party  system. The system is never static. There is 
alw ays interaction betw een its different com ponents. Thus, the level of 
influence of the various protagonists is constantly changing.
It is also im portant to realise that w hat has been presented is a general 
picture of the nature of an institution's influence over the policy process. In 
the present case, our attention has been focused on the Prim e Minister. 
How ever, a study of the President's influence on the policy process would 
have to identify his relationship with all of the factors identified above. If 
such a study were undertaken, we m ight find that the President's position 
was stronger than the Prime M inister's in relation to some of the elements 
identified above. However, we w ould have to conclude in a similar vein that 
his influence was not fixed and that the m ain short-term  set of variables 
which affected it were conjunctural factors.
The conclusions reached are of great im portance for the study of the 
policy process and for the study of any person or insitution's influence on that 
process. In the final chapter we will return to the nature of prim e ministerial 
influence and develop our understanding  of his position in  the political 
system.
Chapter 8
The Capacity for Systemic Dynamism
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This chapter builds upon the conclusions of the previous one. Initially, we 
return  to the subject m atter of the first chapter and consider the different 
m odels of core executive operations which were identified there. From the 
evidence gleaned from the case studies, it will be show n that none of these 
m odels accurately accounted for the nature  of core executive operations 
throughout the 1981-1991 period. Rather than constructing an alternative all- 
embracing model, it will be argued that it is best to appreciate that the system 
can move from one model to another in a relatively short space of time.
It will then be argued that this capacity for systemic dynamism is due to 
changes in the im pact of the different elem ents of the three types of 
constraints which were identified in the previous chapter. On the whole, 
changes in the impact of institutional constraints were slow to take effect, and 
determ ined the influence of the executive branch of governm ent as a whole. 
C onversely , changes in the im pact of conjunctural and  m om entary  
constraints often had a rapid effect and, especially in the case of the former, 
usually determ ined the relations between the different elements w ithin the 
core executive itself.
Finally, when accounting for the dynamic capacity of the system, it will 
be show n that there are several reasons as to w hy the im pact of the 
constraints upon the system should change. In this way the dynamic capacity 
of the system is realised and is not simply latent. In fact, over the 1981-1991 
period, it will be argued that the impact of these constraints changed, so as to 
produce periods of both relatively strong and weak presidential government, 
as well as a form of prim e ministerial governm ent and that, at times, the 
impact of Ministers and of bureaucrats was far from négligeable. It is necessary 
to begin, however, by returning to the different m odels of core executive 
operations as they were identified in the opening chapter.
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M odels of core executive operations
In the opening chapter six different m odels of core executive operations in 
France w ere identified . These m odels were: p residen tia l governm ent; 
segm ented decision m aking; executive co-operation; p rim e m inisterial 
governm ent; m inisterial governm ent; and  bureaucratic coordination. The 
role of the Prime Minister was shown to vary w ith each different model. It is 
our task to evaluate the above models in the light of the evidence provided 
by the case studies, so as to show w hether any of them  can account for the 
nature of core executive operations throughout the 1981-1991 period. In fact, 
as we shall now  show, no single model successfully captured core executive 
operations for all of this period, bu t each m odel accurately could be said to 
have depicted certain elements of those operations during that time. W e'w ill 
now  return  to the different models and briefly examine their strengths and 
weaknesses.
The 1982 and 1989 broadcasting acts w ere examples of presidential 
governm ent. That is to say, the President was personally responsible for 
making major policy decisions. For the 1982 broadcasting act, the President 
and his advisers oversaw the preparation of the bill and M itterrand himself 
arbitrated on a num ber of key policy matters. The same was true for the 1989 
broadcasting law  when, in addition to the situation in 1982, the P re^den t 
himself, through the Lettre aux Français, was also the inspiration behind the 
creation of the CSA. Nevertheless, it w ould be incorrect to conclude from this 
evidence that there was presidential governm ent throughout the 1981-1991 
period. It was certainly absent, for example, during cohabitation, whilst the 
preparation of the 1985 and 1990 budgets saw the President only playing a 
relatively m inor role.
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These variations in presidential influence lead us to conclude that it is 
necessary to distinguish between periods of relatively strong presidential 
governm ent and lim ited presidential governm ent. In the form er situation, 
the President and his advisers intervened frequently in the policy process, 
w ith m ost major policy decisions and m any m inor policy decisions being 
taken either directly by the President in formal or informal conseils, or by his 
advisers in interm inisterial conunittee meetings. In the latter situation, the 
President and  his advisers intervened less frequently  and  few er policy 
decisions emanated directly or indirectly from the Elysée. The preparation of 
the 1981 broadcasting act was an example of the former situation, whereas the 
preparation of the 1990 broadcasting act was an example of the latter.
The case studies also appeared to identify various elem ents of the 
segm ented decision m aking model. As was outlined in  the opening chapter, 
this m odel states that the President is solely responsible for taking key 
decisions in the areas of foreign and defence policy, EC policy and decisions 
relating to currency stability. The debate surrounding the devaluation of the 
Franc in 1983 provided the clearest example of this m odel in practice. The 
decision to  rem ain in the EMS and to devalue the Franc was taken by 
M itterrand personally. The Prime M inister's role was merely secondary. The 
P residen t's involvem ent in the preparation  of the 1990 defence budget 
provided another example of this model. The defence budget of that year was 
of great importance as its preparation coincided w ith the im portant defence 
decisions w hich had  to be taken relating to the  loi de programmation 
militaire. As a result, the key budgetary decisions were taken by the President 
du ring  a conseil de défense a t the Elysée w hen the strateg ic  choices 
concerning the loi de programmation were also m ade. The greater role played 
by the Prime Minister in the preparation of all other aspects of the 1990 budget
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showed that the President's influence was only confined to certain sectors and 
that he did  not dominate the policy process as a whole.
However, despite the above evidence in support of this model, it still 
fails to capture the intricacies of the policy process as revealed in the case 
studies. On the one hand, the roles played by the Finance M inister, Defence 
M inister and Prime M inister in the preparation of the 1990 defence budget 
should not be underestim ated. The President was obliged to fix the level of 
defence spending cuts, so as to keep the support of these other actors. Whilst 
M itterrand  m ade the final decision, it represented a com prom ise which 
app>eased all interested parties. In this sense, defence policy (and w e w ould 
argue the other policy areas in this model as well) was not an area of decision 
m aking reserved for the President's attention alone. Rather, decisions in this 
area w ere the result of a complex process of interaction betw een several 
different actors. Similarly, in areas outside of the P residen t's supposed 
reserved policy domain, the Prime Minister was not free to legislate as he saw 
fit. The influence of other M inisters, for exam ple, lim ited  his actions. 
M oreover, the President was also able to intervene w hen he so desired. For 
example, M itterrand's call in 1989 for more low cost housing to be built meant 
th a t the level of spending allocated to the H ousing M inister had  to be 
increased.
Thus, w hilst the President m ay have been personally responsible for 
taking the major policy decisions regarding currency stability and  defence 
policy, w hen he did  so he w as not free from  the influence of other key 
political actors. Conversely, in other policy areas w here, according to the 
original model, the Prime M inister's role was critical, the President was not 
absent from  decision m aking and his influence w as still great. Thus, the 
analytical coherence of this model can be called into question. The division of
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responsib ilities w hich it posits do& no t stand  u p  to close scru tiny . 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the President's influence in defence and foreign 
policy matters particularly was consistently great. Therefore, whilst the model 
itself is open to question, the President's authority  in  these tw o areas still 
needs to be accounted for.
The key elements of the executive co-operation model also appeared to 
be present in the case studies. One noticeable feature of the decision making 
process was the close relationship between the cabinets of both the President 
and Prim e Minister. Representatives of both teams attended interministerial 
com m ittee m eetings and  there w ere often substantial inform al contacts 
between members of both cabinets. Similarly, several of the Prime M inister's 
services, such as the SGG and the SJTI for the broadcasting acts worked in 
close contact w ith  the Elysée. Their role w as im portan t in bo th  the 
coordination of policy and its preparation. Moreover, the President regularly 
m et alone with each of the different Prime Ministers during the period under 
examination. On these occasions policy matters were discussed.
However, there are certain weaknesses to the model as well. Firstly, it 
does not apply to the period of cohabitation. A t tha t tim e, co-operation 
betw een the tw o parts of the executive was m inim al. The only regular 
contacts were between Bianco at the Elysée and Ulrich at Matignon. Secondly, 
there is an inherent problem  w ith the model itself, because it assumes that, 
w hen there  is co-operation, then  neither in stitu tion  is dom inant. This 
assum ption is false. Even when the President's influence was at its greatest, 
during the M arch 1983 devaluation crisis, for example, there w as still co­
operation between the Prime Minister and his advisers and the President and 
his team. There were daily contacts throughout the crisis period, bu t the
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President still took the decisions to stay in the EMS and to retain Mauroy as 
Prim e Minister.
In fact, the executive co-operation m odel seems analytically weak. 
There will always have to be co-operation between the President and Prime 
M inister in order for the system to function effectively. Similarly, there will 
always have to be co-operation betw een the Prim e M inister and Ministers 
and , apart from  the period of cohabitation, betw een the  P resident and 
Ministers. The rigours of governm ent necessitate the relaying of information 
betw een institutions, so as to prepare decisions and then to im plem ent them. 
In this way, there will always have to be contacts and, in  this sense, co­
operation  betw een the different com ponents of the executive. How ever, 
sim ply because there is co-operation of this sort does not m ean that one 
institu tion , usually  the President or the  Prim e M inister, is n o t able to 
dom inate the decision m aking process. Thus, this m odel tells us little about 
the  natu re  of the relations betw een the different elem ents of the core 
executive, even if it does underline  the fact th a t they  w ill have to 
communicate w ith each other in order for the system to operate effectively.
In contrast to the previous model, the prim e m inisterial governm ent 
m odel was clearly identifiable, if only during  the period  of cohabitation. 
D uring this time, the Prime M inister was responsible for taking the major 
policy decisions of the governm ent, such as the decision to w ithdraw  the 
Devaquet bill, the decision to privatise only one television channel and the 
choice of TFl for that privatisation.
A problem  with this model is that, because cohabitation only occurred 
for a single brief two-year period, it is im possible to distinguish between 
possib le  varia tions of this m odel. As w ith  the  case of p residen tia l 
governm ent, it is possible that there m ight be occasions w hen there is
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relatively strong prim e m inisterial governm ent and other occasions when 
there  is w eak prim e m inisterial governm ent. H ow ever, because of the 
absence of any similar situations w ith which the second Chirac prem iership 
could be compared, it is impossible to say whether the 1986-1988 period was 
an  exam ple  of s tro n g  or lim ited  p rim e  m in is te ria l governm ent. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to state that the Prim e M inister's pow er during 
this period w as not unlim ited. Notably, M inisters were given considerable 
leeway by Chirac to ru n  their ow n departm ental affairs and, adm ittedly 
outside of the scope of the case studies, the President's influence over defence 
and EC policy in particular was not négligeable. Despite these examples, 
cohabitation d id  provide some form of prim e ministerial governm ent for the 
first time during the whole of the history of the Fifth Republic to date.
By con trast, a t no period  betw een 1981-1991 w as m in isteria l 
governm ent unequivocally identifiable. However, during this time Ministers 
were not simply subordinate to the wishes of the President a n d \o r  the Prime 
Minister. Indeed, it w ould have been surprising if this were to have been the 
case. M inisters are senior political figures w ho w ould  be likely to resign, 
ra ther than  accept such subordination. Instead, M inisters w ere largely 
responsible for the laws which were draw n up  in their particular spheres of 
influence. For example, for all three broadcasting laws, Fillioud, Léotard and 
Tasca played a major role in determ ining the contents of the legislation. 
However, also on all three occasions, both the Prime M inister and especially 
the President were also involved in the decision making process.
In fact, we w ould  argue that m inisterial governm ent w as m ost 
prevalent during  cohabitation. As was stated above, a t this time there was 
undoubtedly a form of prim e ministerial governm ent at work, however, the 
influence of indiv idual M inisters was also a t its greatest. For example.
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Chirac's delegation of responsibility for budgetary  and financial affairs to 
Balladur m eant that the role of the Finance M inister and, indeed, the Budget 
M inister w as increased vis-à-vis p rev ious years. Sim ilarly, the  1986 
broadcasting law  was draw n up  largely by Léotard and his cabinet. Also, the 
responsibility for m anaging the Devaquet crisis was devolved first upon the 
eponym ous M inister him self and  then u pon  M onory. Thus, individual 
ministerial influence was great. However, it was also observed that Chirac did 
arbitrate in the most im portant of the budgetary disputes. He also did likewise 
for the key decisions of the broadcasting act, w hilst it was his decision to 
w ithdraw  the Devaquet bill once the crisis had become unmanageable. In this 
sense, there was still prim e ministerial governm ent during this period, even 
if elements of ministerial government were also present.
Finally, it m ight be argued that the bureaucratic co-ordination model 
was also identifiable. For example, it could be seen w ith the involvem ent of 
the Direction du Budget in the preparation of all three budgets studied. It 
could also be seen in the preparation of the 1982 broadcasting act w hen the 
SJTI tried to sell its ow n policy preferences to the government. Similarly, in 
the course of the 1989 broadcasting act, the SJTI w as also actively trying to 
im pose its ow n policy agenda. The evidence suggests, therefore, that 
bureaucrats did play a major role in policy preparation.
H ow ever, the  claim  m ade by the  m odel th a t politicians w ere 
disem pow ered and that the policy process was effectively controlled by top 
civil servants was not seen to be correct. In all of the examples d ted  above, the 
major and, indeed, m any of the m inor policy decisions w ere taken by 
politicians free from  the  influence of bu reaucra ts . Thus, w h ilst the  
perm anent administration on occasions had  its ow n policy preferences which
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it tried to have adopted, the evidence does not suggest that it had the means 
to succeed.
In addition, the exam ple of the 1983 devaluation crisis show ed that 
there w ere dangers in the term inology of the bureaucratic coordination 
model. In this model, the w ord 'bureaucrat', m eaning a representative of the 
perm anent adm inistration, is often synoymous w ith 'technocrat', m eaning a 
rep resen ta tive  of the adm inistration  w ho has undergone a period  of 
specialised, technical administrative training. However, in the example of the 
1983 devaluation , it w as show n that technocrats w ere p resen t in  the 
perm anent adm inistration, in various cabinets and in the governm ent itself. 
As a result, the w ord had little analytical content, w ith the interests and aims 
of the 'technocrats' differing according to the positions they held. Therefore, it 
is necessary to clarify the term inology of the m odel, such that the w ord 
'technocrat' is removed. By so doing, the model refers simply to the influence 
of m em bers of the perm anent adm inistration on the policy process. The 
evidence from the case studies showed that examples of such influence were
<x
identifiable; however, politicians were not disempowered and burejjjcrats did 
not dom inate the process.
An alternative approach to the study of core executive operations
From the above analysis, it can be seen that, w hilst all of these models 
contained certain descriptive truths about the policy process, none of them 
fully captured the complexity of that process and none of them  accurately 
portrayed the true nature of core executive operations and the respective 
influences of the President, Prime Minister and Ministers for the whole of the 
1981-1991 period.
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As a result of these observations, we are left w ith three akom ativc
approaches to the exam ination of prim e m inisterial influence. The first of
these approaches is to construct an al ternative, all-embracing m odel of the
central governm ent decision m aking process w hich captures the positive
aspects of the above theories, whilst dispensing w ith their negative qualities.
This approach, w hilst tem pting, is ultim ately unrew arding. Even if it were
possible to constuct an a lternative all-embracing m odel of core executive
operations, it is likely that any such model w ould suffer from the same basic
problem  as the ones presented above. Namely, it m ight account for a part of
the 1981-1991 period, but it is unlikely that it could account for all of it. The
variations in the relative influences of the different components of the core
executive were so great during this period, that to capture all of them  in a
single theory would be a fruitless exercise.
The second approach is the one which W right has championed. He has
avoided the tem ptation of constructing a  alternative, global m odel by
tem pering his presentation of presidential governm ent w ith  the frequent
addition of p rov iso^ . Consequently, his argum ent is rendered m ore flexible.
For example, at one point he states:
With the exception of the nomination of Jacques Chirac in March 1986 
(when the president had no alternative to appoint), all prim e ministers 
have owed their office to the president.^
Similarly, a few pages later he states that the President:
... is the general spokesm an of the governm ent and  its principal 
p ed ag o g u e  {again, the exception of the 1986-1988 period must be 
noted).'^
These provisoes occur regularly during the course of his book.
There is no doubt that this approach is an advance upon the desire to 
construct a global theory. The argum ent is m ore flexible and it serves to
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account sim ultaneously for two of the m odels presented above. W hile this 
approach is unquestionably a step in the righ t direction, it needs to be 
extended even further so as to account for the scenarios of ministerial and 
bureaucratic governm ent and so as to allow  for an appreciation of the 
differences betw een strong and lim ited presidential and  prim e ministerial 
governm ent.
In fact, w e favour a th ird  approach. This approach em phasises the 
dynamic quality of core executive operations. We argue that the régim e can 
move from one model of core executive operations to another in a relatively 
short period of time. That is to say, it is possible to m ove successively from a 
system  of, for example, relatively strong presidentialism  to one of lim ited 
presidentialism. Similarly, it possible for the system to m ove from the latter 
to strong or lim ited prim e m inisterial governm ent. Indeed, should  the 
necessary conditions arise, the sytem could m ove from any of the above 
systems to m inisterial government, bureaucratic coordination, or, indeed, to 
Cabinet governm ent à la Great Britain. We argue that the m ove from one 
m odel of core executive operations to another is the result of exogenjk>us 
changes in the  natu re  of the three types of constraints (institu tional, 
conjunctural and momentary) which were examined in the previous chapter.
In the study  of core executive operations, the capacity for systemic 
dynam ism  has been under appreciated. One reason for this is that m uch of 
the w ork on core executive operations has been carried out on the British 
system of government. However, one of the features of the British system is 
its systemic stability. For long periods of time the system has operated under a 
tw o party  system  w ith  stable, single party , m ajority governm ents. This 
situation has led to w hat Dunleavy and Rhodes have described as: "the static 
quality of traditional controversies".^
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Moreover, the capacity for systemic dynamism  has been overlooked in 
the French case, because the configuration of the three types of constraints 
which prevail upon core executive operations has, under the Fifth Republic, 
generally favoured the exercise of presidential government. As a result, the 
dynam ics of the system  have no t been obviously apparent. In fact, the 
dynamic potential of the régime was only appreciated fully w ith the advent of 
cohabitation in 1986. Certainly, the possibility of victory in the 1976 legislative 
elections by the union de la gauche had raised the issue of cohabitation  
previously. How ever, only w hen the situation actually occurred was its 
im pact properly realised. The 1986-1988 period p u t into relief the hitherto 
latent dynamic capacity of the system. As a result, it is necessary to consider 
not simply a single model of core executive operations as being sufficient to 
describe the workings of the political system, bu t rather to appreciate that the 
system can move from one model to another in a short space of time.
The capacity for systemic dynamism
The m ove from one model to another is induced by changes in the nature of 
the three types of constraints which w ere show n to lim it the actions and 
influence of the different com ponents of the core executive. H ow ever, 
changes in these constraints do not affect core executive operations equally. 
The natu re  of institutional constraints, because of their quasi-perm anent 
characteristics, usually vary only gradually over a long period of time. Thus, 
for example, the im pact of the EC has evolved slowly, although since 1986 
this evolution has been m ore rapid . Sim ilarly, the ju risprudence of the 
Conseil constitutionnel has increased only increm entally. On occasions, 
how ever, the im pact of changes in institutional constraints m ay happen
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quickly. Such rapid change was seen w ith the oil price shocks in the 1970s and 
w ith the move from world boom to recession in the late 1980s.
It m ust be stressed, however, that changes in institutional constraints 
usually only limit or expand the potential of the core executive as a whole. 
For example, the increase in the influence of the Conseil constitutionnel has 
not altered the nature of the relations betw een the different elements of the 
core executive itself. Rather, it changed the relations in toto betw een the the 
judicial and  executive branches of governm ent. Similarly, the position of 
France in w orld  economic and political system  lim its the actions of the 
President, Prime M inister and M inisters equally. Nevertheless, on occasions, 
variations in the nature of institutional constraints m ay alter the relative 
influence of the individual components of the core executive. For example, it 
w as seen that, du ring  the course of the 1985 budget, the international 
economic constraints w ith which France was faced due to the world recession 
increased the role of the perm anent adm inistration in the policy process vis- 
à-vis the other political elements of the core executive.
Therefore, it is im portan t to apprecia te  th a t p rim e m inisterial 
influence is affected in tw o w ays by the im pact of quasi-perm anent 
institutional factors. First, they determ ine the boundaries w ithin which the 
core executive (and the Prime M inister as part of the core executive) m ay 
operate. Second, they may alter the relations between the different elements 
of the core executive.
In contrast to  institu tional constraints, changes in the na tu re  of 
conjunctural constraints m ay occur very rapidly. Indeed, from  1981-1991 it 
was variations in this set of constraints which served to alter m ost frequently 
core executive operations and which led to the m ove from one m odel to 
another. So, for example, the results of presidential and  legislative elections
2 5 2
had an overnight impact on the system. The clearest example of this situation 
was in 1986 w ith the move from limited presidentialism  to prim e ministerial 
governm ent follow ing the M arch legislative elections. W hilst no t all 
elections produced great variations in core executive operations, during the 
1981-1991 period they were critical on three occasions, namely,. 1981, 1986 and 
1988.
Similarly, the Prim e M inister's influence vis-à-vis party  factors may 
also vary rapidly. For example, inter-party relations m ay become m ore or less 
restrictive after elections. This situation was seen w ith the uneasy RPRXUDF 
parliam entary majority in 1986, or with the m inority situation in 1988, when 
com pared  w ith  the stable, single-party  PS govem ent from  1984-1986. 
Similarly, the im pact of intra-party factors on the Prime M inister's influence 
m ay change over time and from one Prime Minister to the next. For example, 
the internecine struggles w ithin the PS grew  worse as the decade passed, 
w hile Chirac's position of hegemony over the RPR contrasted greatly with 
Rocard's weak position w ithin the PS.
As w as noted in the previous chapter, changes in  the im pact of 
conjunctural constraints are not necessarily all one-way. That is to say, Chirac 
enjoyed a greater control over his party than had been the case under Fabius 
and the PS, whereas Chirac was also faced w ith m anaging difficult coalition 
problem s w hich his predecessor had  been spared. Thus, changes m ay 
effectively cancel each other out. However, the dynamic capacity of the system 
is still apparent.
By contrast w ith the im pact of conjunctural constraints, m om entary 
constraints are rarely of sufficient im portance to induce a shift in  the the 
nature of core executive relations from one model to another. That is not to 
say that they are unimportant. Indeed, as was shown in the last chapter, their
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im pact on policy decisions may be great. However, by their nature they are 
rarely system changing. Even so, for example, Malik O ussekine's death did 
w eaken C hirac's position as Prim e M inister. H e was not only forced to 
w ithdraw  the Devaquet bill, bu t he also called a pause in the governm ent's 
legislative program m e and he was then faced w ith a debilitating series of 
public sector strikes partly inspired by the success of the students. Moreover, it 
was at the time of the Devaquet crisis that his standing in the opinion polls 
started to plum m et, thus, affecting his presidential ambitions. So, whilst we 
w ould not w ish to argue that Oussekine's death was the only reason for the 
above sequence of events, it d id  have an impact on Chirac's influence and it 
shows the im portance that m om entary constraints can have. Nevertheless, 
we w ould reiterate that such constraints are unlikely to be system changing.
Systemic dynamism  and m odels of core executive operations
It is apparen t, therefore, that variations in the na tu re  of institu tional, 
conjunctural and m om entary constraints p rov ide  the  dynam ic for the 
transition from one set of core executive operations to the next. Indeed, we 
w ould argue that the capacity for systemic dynamism  means that, as long as 
the m odels are themselves correctly form ulated and analytically coherent, 
there is no reason w hy any m odel should  not apply  if the necessary 
conditions are met. However, the requirem ent that the models be correctly 
form ulated and analytically coherent is of great im portance. It is for this 
reason that the models of both segmented decision m aking and executive co­
operation are most problematic.
As regards the form er, it was argued tha t the strict division of 
responsibility between the President and Prime Minister did not seem to hold 
good. The Prime M inister and Ministers were not absent from the decision
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m aking process in the President's sector, w hilst the President and  Ministers 
w ere not absent from the process in the Prim e M inister's domain. Thus, the 
model appears to be flawed. Nevertheless, it is clear that successive Presidents 
have indeed enjoyed a great hold over defence and foreign policy matters and 
that their attention has been turned  m ore tow ards these questions, rather 
than  o ther dom estic policy m atters. There are good constitu tional and 
practical reasons for this situation. The form er refer to the President's 
constitutional prerogatives as they are set out in Articles 5, 15 and 52. The 
latter refer, for example, to the benefits which the President can derive from 
m edia coverage of state visits abroad.
Therefore, instead of persevering w ith an analytically flawed model, it 
is better to integrate its positive aspects into the other, m ore analytically 
sound m odels. As a result, we w ould  argue that, even u n d er lim ited 
presidential government, the Head of State will retain a substantial influence 
over foreign and defence policy. Indeed, the same m ight be argued for the 
situation under strong and limited prim e ministerial government. The 1986- 
1988 period showed that the President retained an influence in both of these 
areas, whereas he had no impact on domestic policy making at all.
As regards, the model of executive co-operation, it was shown to be no 
less flawed analytically. The model was not able to account for variations in 
the influence of the President and Prim e M inister. M oreoever, it d id not 
consider the impact of Ministers or the bureaucracy on the outcome of policy. 
In these tw o respects, the model was deficient. Nevertheless, it was also 
show n that, even under periods of strong presidentialism , there was co­
operation  betw een the President and  Prim e M inister. Once again, this 
positive aspect should be integrated into the other models. W e w ould argue, 
therefore, that the m odels of relatively strong and lim ited presidentialism
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and tha t of lim ited prim e m inisterial governm ent do  no t preclude co­
operation between the tw o elements of the executive. Indeed, even under a 
period of relatively strong prim e ministerial government, the Prime Minister 
w ould need the President's co-operation for a variety of adm inistrative and 
constitutional m atters.
Thus, w e are now  presented  w ith  four m odels of core executive 
operations, the first two of which each have two variations. These models 
are: presidential governm ent, w ith relatively strong and lim ited variations; 
prim e m inisterial governm ent, again w ith  relatively strong and  lim ited 
variations; m inisterial government; and bureaucratic government. According 
to the evidence derived from the previous chapters, the 1981-1991 period 
produced exam ples of both relatively strong and lim ited presidentialism . 
There w as also a form  of prim e m inisterial governm ent, although the 
absence of other examples of this type of government means that it is difficult 
to state w hether the Prim e M inister's influence w as strong or lim ited. In 
addition, on occasions the extent of m inisterial and bureaucratic influence 
was great, even if the full set of requirements were not m et for it to  be said 
that these models were in operation.
Even though the dynamism  of the system has been dem onstrated and 
various of the different models of governm ent were seen to operate between 
1981 and 1991, it m ust be recognised that the Fifth Republic is m ore likely to 
produce a form of presidential governm ent than any other type. The system 
encourages presidentialism . For exam ple, presidential elections are often, 
even if not always, the critical elections which determine how  the system will 
operate. The elections of 1981 and 1988 provide examples of their importance. 
On these two occasions, the legislative elections were largely presidential coat­
tail elections which broadly m irrored the result of the previous presidential
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election. Sim ilarly, parties organise their stuctures around  presidential
elections. Party leaders become présidentiables and party  activity is centralised
around  these figures, ra ther than  in  favour of rank-and-file  m ilitants.
Moreover, in addition to the normal advantages which a H ead of State enjoys
in any country, such as m edia attention, patronage and the role as a world
statesm an, a French President inherits the mantle of de Gaulle w ho was able
to im pose his de facto presidentialist reading of the C onstitution on the de
jure prim e ministerial reading. Thus, in 1981 M itterrand stated:
Les institutions n 'é taient pas faites à m on intention. Mais elles sont 
bien faites pour moi.^
M itte rran d  sim ply  fo llow ed  in  the  foo tsteps of th e  tra d itio n  of
presidentialism which had been created by his predecessors.
It is precisely  because the system  favours a fo rm ^presiden tia l
government that, as was noted above, the capacity for systemic dynamism has
been underappreciated. However, it m ust be realised that, even if there is a
dem onstrated tendency in favour of presidential governm ent, the President
is no t always able to be the dom inant political force. On occasions, the
conjunction of constraints m ay be unfavourable to him , as happened, for
example, under cohabitation. Indeed, it is precisely because these constraints
are always present, at least to some extent, that we have classed the first
variant of presidentialism  as 'relatively strong presidential governm ent. This
terminology has been used so as to discourage the tem ptation to believe that
Presidents can ever be all-powerful. They will always face certain constraints
and, thus, their pow er is always less than  absolute. M oreover, as will be
argued below, it m ay be argued that presidential governm ent is subject to
cyclical variations. Thus, whilst the combination of constraints m ay facilitate
presidentialism , it is necessary to appreciate the dynamism  of the system, so
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as to be able to account for the move to  alternative types of core executive 
operations when the occasion arises.
Accounting for systemic dynamism
From the above analysis, it is apparent tha t the dynam ic potential of the 
system is great. The question remains, however, as to w hy these constraints 
them selves should change. We have assum ed that they do  change and, 
indeed, these changes and their effects have been identified. However, it is 
necessary to explain why the nature of the constraints should vary in the first 
place. After all, in some countries, notably under totalitarian régimes, the 
political system can rem ain frozen for m any years w ith pow er consistently 
being exercised by one person and his successors. In France, however, the 
system has not rem ained frozen and there have been great variations in the 
nature of the constraints. It is necessary to account for these variations. There 
are four reasons as to w hy these constraints m ay change. They are: the 
electoral cycle; exogen^ous international factors; institutional uncertainty; 
and time. Each of these reasons will be considered in turn.
The electoral cycle is the first m ajor reason as to w hy there are 
variations in the nature of the constraints which affect the system. It was 
show n in the p revious chapter that the m ost im portan t conjunctural 
constraint which determ ined core executive operations was that of elections, 
both  presidential and legislative. The fact th a t these elections w ere not 
synchronised m eant that there was a constant potential for change in the 
system. Even if the Assemblée nationale is dissolved im m ediately after the 
presidential elections, there still have to be a fu rther set of legislative 
elections after five years. At these elections the m ajority supporting  the 
President in the Assemblée nationale risks being defeated.
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Thus, the resu lts of this second set of legislative elections are 
fundam ental to the relative influences of the President and  Prim e Minister. 
They m ay result in a period of cohabitation, or they m ay at least weaken the 
President's influence, as in 1978, when the President's party  d id  badly, but not 
as badly so as to lose them outright. In fact, rarely have m id-term  legislative 
elections reinforced the P resident's influence. For exam ple, a t the 1967 
legislative elections, the Prime Minister derived the greatest benefit from the 
results, even though they largely confirmed the results of the 1962 elections. 
Pom pidou's increased influence after 1967 was caused by the fact that he had 
organised the governm ent's electoral cam paign and, thus, was seen by the 
public and the party as being the architect of the governm ent's victory.
Thus, it may be argued that, during the course of the septennat, there is 
a cycle of presiden tia l influence. As the sep tenna t p rogresses, so the 
President's authority weakens. This situation is testim ony to the dynamism  
of the system and is largely the result of the disjunction of presidential and 
legislative terms. If presidential elections are the key aligning elections at the 
start of a septennat, then legislative elections produce a second set of key 
elections after five years of the new President's term.
The m ain beneficiary in this situation has usually been the Prime 
M inister. Thus, for example, Pom pidou's personal authority  increased after 
1967, while Chirac was clearly the m ain beneficiary in 1986. However, it is 
im portan t to avoid the conclusion th a t the  level of p rim e m inisterial 
influence exhibits an inverse relationship to that of the President. It m ust be 
rem em bered that prim e ministerial influence is dependent on the relations 
s \h e  has w ith the whole set of constraints identified in the previous chapter. 
For example, Chirac has stated that if the RPR were to be the largest party after 
the 1993 legislative elections, he would not agree to be Prime M inister and he
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w ould not subm it himself to another period of cohabitation, even though he 
still intends to be the party 's candidate at the 1995 presidential elections. Thus, 
if the RPR w ere to be the largest party  in 1993, the Prim e M inister w ould 
either be a less senior RPR figure whose authority w ould be challenged by 
Chirac's interventions, or he w ould be a non-RPR figure w hose authority 
w ould be challenged by the majority position of the party  as a whole in the 
Assemblée nationale. Thus, it can be seen that the Prime M inister does not 
necessarily benefit from the decline in presidential influence during  the 
septennat cycle, even if often he is in a position to do so.
The second reason as to w hy the nature of the constraints which affect 
the system m ay change is due the impact of ex o g en o u s international factors. 
It was shown in the previous chapter that one of the m ain components of the 
set of quasi-perm anent institutional constraints was the position of France in 
the international economic and political system. The global influence of the 
Prime Minister and, indeed, of any of the other domestic actors was limited by 
the position that France occupied in the international system.
As a result of this situation, events which occur in other countries will 
affect the im pact of this constraint upon  the decision m aking process in 
France. Thus, the actions of the oil producing countries in the early 1970s 
brought about the first oil price shock which greatly affected the French 
economy and lim ited the Prime M inister's and the governm ent's room for 
m anoeuvre in  the policy m aking process. Sim ilar consequences for the 
dom estic decision m aking process could be derived from  the im pact of 
budgetary and financial policies of the United States or Germany, from w ar in 
the Gulf, or from decisions emanating from the European Court of Justice, for 
example.
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The th ird  reason  concerns A sh fo rd 's  no tio n  of in s titu tio n a l 
u n c e r ta in ty .5 A shford argues that, w hen com pared w ith  o ther w estern 
democratic systems, France has only a low level of institutional stability. That 
is to say, beliefs about the use of collective authority are not w idely shared; 
there is little alternation of parties in power; the roles of the executive and 
legislature are poorly defined; and  the  checks on the use  of collective 
authority by political and adm inistrative actors are not clearly established.^ 
The reasons for this situation can be found in the country 's historical and 
political developm ent, which did  not foster the grow th of institutionalised 
political and social behaviour. The result is that the system  faces constant 
uncertain ty  about the basic tenets of w hat is and  w hat is no t acceptable 
behaviour for both political and social actors. As Ashford notes, "uncertainty 
is critically im portant in the French policy process because institutions are 
poorly defined".7
In fact, Ashford's argum ent per se only seems applicable, if at all, to the 
early years of the Fifth Republic. Over the past two decades, the system has 
seen the developm ent and im plantation in the public psyche of m ost of the 
requirem ents which Ashford states are necessary for there to be institutional 
stability. In this respect, the 1981 and 1986 alternations in pow er play a major 
role, as does M itterrand's refusal to abuse his power as President.
N evertheless, A shford 's argum ent should not be dism issed ou t of 
hand. Its strength is that it emphasises the impact of social behaviour on the 
policy process. That is to say, the im portance of shared societal values, 
popular mores, sociological norm s and cultural traditions. These elements 
are difficult to identify with great precision. They are also fluid. Beliefs are not 
necessarily the sam e from one generation to the next, for example. As a 
result, an elem ent of uncertainty is in troduced  into the policy process.
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Political actors are only vaguely aware of the nature and importance of these 
factors. As a result, their judgem ent in the policy process w hen confronted 
w ith issues of society is often flawed.
The clearest exam ple of this phenom enon in the case studies came 
w ith the Devaquet crisis. The governm ent was refighting the battles of 1968 
when, in fact, the social system had changed imm easurably in the meantime. 
The governm ent's inability to com prehend the rationale behind the student 
m ovem ent was as great a factor in the outcome of the crisis as the death of 
Malik Oussekine. In this instance, the element of uncertainty served to alter 
the nature of the constraints operating upon prim e ministerial influence and 
Chirac was left w ith no option but to w ithdraw  the offending bill.
A fourth  reason concerns the im pact of tim e upon  the constraints 
identified above. Time is particularly critical in its influence upon the impact 
of personalities on the policy process. It was show n that, although structural 
factors are of prim ary im portance, questions of personality m ay have an 
impact upon the decision making process. By definition, however, the impact 
of personalities is linked to individual people and people are subject to the 
m arch of time. For example, the individual im pact of de Gaulle upon the 
post-1958 policy process was great indeed. However, w ith the passage of time, 
his impact upon the system has become less salient. He has become a figure 
w hose place is largely confined to studies of the early years of the Fifth 
Republic. Even though the leaders of the RPR still pledge their allegiance to 
his memory, the policies and rhetoric of the party  are far rem oved from those 
of their mentor. The same will be true of M itterrand in a few years time. 
Thus, given that the policy process is affected by aspects of personality, then 
the passage of tim e will ensure a turnover of political personnel and a
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constant fluctuation in the im pact of particu lar personalities upon the 
political system.
Conclusion
The above analysis represents a developm ent of the study  of the French 
Prime M inister and his influence over the decision m aking process. It also 
represents a developm ent of the study of core executive operations in both 
the French case and in  a w ider comparative aspect. Despite the centrality of 
questions concerning Prime Ministers and core executives to the functioning 
of the political system  in any country, this area of study  has rem ained 
rem arkably under-researched and under-conceptualised. This observation is 
especially true  for France. The above analysis has helped to increase the 
understanding of the French case and suggests a way forward for comparative 
core executive studies.
The n a tu re  of prim e m in isterial influence in France has been 
reassessed in a num ber of ways. First, it has been shown that it is im portant to 
m ove away from  crude m easurem ents of prim e m inisterial influence, such 
as the num ber of m eetings s \h e  chairs, or the num ber of people officially 
em ployed in  his \  her personal office. Instead , influence can only be 
understood as a relationship between all of the actors in the political system. 
One person 's influence can only be m easured in com parison w ith the 
influence of all of these other actors.
This reasoning led directly onto the second m ain observation, namely, 
that it is im portan t to m ove aw ay from  the study  of p rim e m inisterial 
influence simply as it relates to that of the President. Both actors are subject to 
a w ide range of forces which on occasions m ay strengthen their resources, or 
on other occasions m ay weaken them. It was show n that there w ere three
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types of forces the Prime M inister's relationship w ith which determ ined the 
level of his influence in the policy process. These forces w ere identified as 
in s titu tio n a l co n stra in ts , con ju n c tu ra l c o n s tra in ts  a n d  m om entary  
constraints. The first set of forces generally defined the limits to the influence 
of the executive branch of governm ent as a whole. The second set generally 
defined the relations betw een the different actors w ith in  the executive 
branch. The th ird  set accounted for seemingly spontaneous fluctuations in 
the level of influence of the whole set of political actors.
Third, from these observations it was show n that the im pact upon the 
political system of the different components of these three sets of constraints 
was subject to great variations. These variations m eant that the configuration 
of the political system as a whole and of the core executive component of that 
system in particular was liable to change. The varying im pact of the set of 
institu tional constraints changed the overall room  for m anoeuvre of the 
executive b ranch of governm ent, w hile the  fluctuations in the  set of 
conjunctural constraints precipitated the m ove from  one typology of core 
executive operations to another. Thus, it was shown that the political system 
was potentially dynamic. In particular, it was shown that during the 1981-1991 
period prim e m inisterial influence fluctuated as a result of changes in the 
relationship of the head of governm ent w ith these constraints. D uring this 
period it was show n that the system operated under both relatively strong 
and lim ited presidential governm ent, as well as under a form  of prim e 
m inisterial governm ent and that, at tim es, the influence of M inisters and 
bureaucrats was far from négligeable.
These findings have two im portant implications for the study of prime 
m inisterial influence and  core executive operations both  in  France and 
elsewhere. First, it is im portant to appreciate that the Prime M inister cannot
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be studied in isolation. Because of the diverse nature of the constraints which 
determ ine hisXher influence, the study of prim e m inisterial influence m ust 
also involve the study of the different elements which go to make up  those 
constraints. Thus, it is necessary to study in depth, for example, the electoral 
process, parties and the party  system, presidential and ministerial resources 
and bureaucratic politics. The study of the Prime M inister is not a separate 
discipline, but one which is integrated w ith the whole gam ut of disciplines of 
contemporary political studies.
Second, it is also im portant to realise that the conclusions of the above 
study  are no t applicable sim ply to France alone. The study  of prim e 
ministerial influence and of core executives in any country can be approached 
in the m anner described above. Each country which is studied  will yield 
different results. The Prime M inister's relationship w ith the different types of 
constraints and their individual components will differ from one country to 
another. However, the same approach is valid for each individual system. 
Indeed, this approach represents the best w ay to tackle the study of Prime 
Ministers and all of the different aspects of their activity. Thus, whilst the 
present study has focussed upon France, it has provided the starting point for 
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